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Popular Matchings with Multiple Partners

Authors Florian Brandl, Telikepalli Kavitha

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  • Bipartite graphs
  • Linear programming duality
  • Gale-Shapley algorithm

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Abstract

Our input is a bipartite graph G=(A\cup B,E) where each vertex in A\cup B has a preference list strictly ranking its neighbors. The vertices in A and in B are called students and courses, respectively. Each student a seeks to be matched to cap(a)\geq 1 many courses while each course b seeks cap(b)\geq 1 many students to be matched to it. The Gale-Shapley algorithm computes a pairwise-stable matching (one with no blocking edge) in G in linear time. We consider the problem of computing a popular matching in G - a matching M is popular if M cannot lose an election to any matching where vertices cast votes for one matching versus another. Our main contribution is to show that a max-size popular matching in G can be computed by the 2-level Gale-Shapley algorithm in linear time. This is an extension of the classical Gale-Shapley algorithm and we prove its correctness via linear programming.

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Florian Brandl and Telikepalli Kavitha. Popular Matchings with Multiple Partners. In 37th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2017). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 93, pp. 19:1-19:15, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2018) https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2017.19

Author Details

Florian Brandl
Telikepalli Kavitha

References

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