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Group Fairness: From Multiwinner Voting to Participatory Budgeting (Invited Talk)

Author Edith Elkind

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Edith Elkind
  • University of Oxford, UK
  • Alan Turing Institute, London, UK

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Edith Elkind. Group Fairness: From Multiwinner Voting to Participatory Budgeting (Invited Talk). In 34th International Symposium on Algorithms and Computation (ISAAC 2023). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 283, pp. 1:1-1:3, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2023) https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.ISAAC.2023.1

Abstract

Many cities around the world allocate a part of their budget based on residents' votes, following a process known as participatory budgeting. It is important to understand which outcomes of this process should be viewed as fair, and whether fair outcomes could be computed efficiently. We summarise recent progress on this topic. We first focus on a special case of participatory budgeting where all candidate projects have the same cost (known as multiwinner voting), formulate progressively more demanding notions of fairness for this setting, and identify efficiently computable voting rules that satisfy them. We then discuss the challenges of extending these ideas to the general model.

Subject Classification

ACM Subject Classification
  • Applied computing
Keywords
  • multiwinner voting
  • participatory budgeting
  • justified representation

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References

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