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Analyzing the Economic Impact of Decentralization on Users

Authors Amit Levy , S. Matthew Weinberg , Chenghan Zhou

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Subject Classification

ACM Subject Classification
  • Theory of computation → Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
  • Applied computing → Digital cash
Keywords
  • Blockchain
  • Cryptocurrency
  • Blockspace Markets
  • Decentralization
  • Distributed Ledgers
  • Equilibrium Analysis
  • Tullock Contests

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Abstract

We model the ultimate price paid by users of a decentralized ledger as resulting from a two-stage game where Miners (/Proposers/etc.) first purchase blockspace via a Tullock contest, and then price that space to users. When analyzing our distributed ledger model, we find:  
- A characterization of all possible pure equilibria (although pure equilibria are not guaranteed to exist). 
- A natural sufficient condition, implied by Regularity (à la [Myerson, 1981]), for existence of a "market-clearing" pure equilibrium where Miners choose to sell all space allocated by the Distributed Ledger Protocol, and that this equilibrium is unique. 
- The market share of the largest miner is the relevant "measure of decentralization" to determine whether a market-clearing pure equilibrium exists. 
- Block rewards do not impact users' prices at equilibrium, when pure equilibria exist. But, higher block rewards can cause pure equilibria to exist. 
We also discuss aspects of our model and how they relate to blockchains deployed in practice. For example, only "patient" users (who are happy for their transactions to enter the blockchain under any miner) would enjoy the conclusions highlighted by our model, whereas "impatient" users (who are interested only for their transaction to be included in the very next block) still face monopoly pricing.

Cite As Get BibTex

Amit Levy, S. Matthew Weinberg, and Chenghan Zhou. Analyzing the Economic Impact of Decentralization on Users. In 17th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2026). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 362, pp. 93:1-93:21, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2026) https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.93

Author Details

Amit Levy
  • Better Bytes
  • Princeton University, NJ, USA
S. Matthew Weinberg
  • Princeton University, NJ, USA
Chenghan Zhou
  • Stanford University, CA, USA

Funding

  • Weinberg, S. Matthew: NSF CAREER Award CCF-1942497, and an Ethereum Foundation Academic Grant.

Acknowledgements

The authors are extremely grateful to Scott Kominers and Jacob Leshno for multiple exceptionally useful conversations that helped us improve this work.

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