A Catalog of EXISTS-R-Complete Decision Problems About Nash Equilibria in Multi-Player Games

Authors Vittorio Bilò, Marios Mavronicolas

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Vittorio Bilò
Marios Mavronicolas

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Vittorio Bilò and Marios Mavronicolas. A Catalog of EXISTS-R-Complete Decision Problems About Nash Equilibria in Multi-Player Games. In 33rd Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS 2016). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 47, pp. 17:1-17:13, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2016)


[Schaefer and Stefankovic, Theory of Computing Systems, 2015] provided an explicit formulation of EXISTS-R as the class capturing the complexity of deciding the Existential Theory of the Reals, and established that deciding, given a 3-player game, whether or not it has a Nash equilibrium with no probability exceeding a given rational is EXISTS-R-complete. Four more decision problems about Nash equilibria for 3-player games were very recently shown EXISTS-R-complete via a chain of individual, problem-specific reductions in [Garg et al., Proceedings of ICALP 2015]; determining more such EXISTS-R-complete problems was posed there as an open problem. In this work, we deliver an extensive catalog of EXISTS-R-complete decision problems about Nash equilibria in 3-player games, thus resolving completely the open problem from [Garg et al., Proceedings of ICALP 2015]. Towards this end, we present a single and very simple, unifying reduction from the EXISTS-R-complete decision problem from [Schaefer and Stefankovic, Theory of Computing Systems, 2015] to (almost) all the decision problems about Nash equilibria that were before shown NP-complete for 2-player games in [Bilo and Mavronicolas, Proceedings of SAGT 2012; Conitzer and Sandholm, Games and Economic Behavior, 2008; Gilboa and Zemel, Games and Economic Behavior, 1989]. Encompassed in the catalog are the four decision problems shown EXISTS-R-complete in [Garg et al., Proceedings of ICALP 2015].
  • Nash equilibrium
  • complexity of equilibria
  • EXISTS-R-completeness


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