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Commit-Reveal Schemes Against Front-Running Attacks (Extended Abstract)

Authors Andrea Canidio , Vincent Danos



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Author Details

Andrea Canidio
  • IMT School for Advanced Studies, Lucca, Italy
  • CoW Protocol, Paris, France
Vincent Danos
  • CNRS, Paris, France
  • École Normale Supérieure, Paris, France

Acknowledgements

We are grateful to Agostino Capponi, Jiasun Li, Christof Ferreira Torres, Arthur Gervais, Ari Juels, and the participants to UBRI Connect 2022, Tokenomics 2022 for their comments and suggestions.

Cite AsGet BibTex

Andrea Canidio and Vincent Danos. Commit-Reveal Schemes Against Front-Running Attacks (Extended Abstract). In 4th International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2022). Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs), Volume 110, pp. 7:1-7:5, Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2023)
https://doi.org/10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.7

Abstract

We provide a game-theoretic analysis of the problem of front-running attacks. We use it to study a simple commit-reveal protocol and discuss its properties. This protocol has costs because it requires two messages and imposes a delay. However, we show that it prevents the most severe front-running attacks ("bad MEV") while preserving legitimate competition between users, guaranteeing that the earliest transaction in a block belongs to the honest user who values it the most ("good MEV").

Subject Classification

ACM Subject Classification
  • Computer systems organization → Dependable and fault-tolerant systems and networks
Keywords
  • Front running
  • Game theory
  • MEV
  • Transactions reordering
  • commit-reveal

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References

  1. Lorenz Breidenbach, Phil Daian, Florian Tramèr, and Ari Juels. Enter the hydra: Towards principled bug bounties and exploit-resistant smart contracts. In 27th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 18), pages 1335-1352, 2018. Google Scholar
  2. Andrea Canidio and Vincent Danos. Commitment against front running attacks, 2023. URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2301.13785.
  3. Philip Daian, Steven Goldfeder, Tyler Kell, Yunqi Li, Xueyuan Zhao, Iddo Bentov, Lorenz Breidenbach, and Ari Juels. Flash boys 2.0: Frontrunning, transaction reordering, and consensus instability in decentralized exchanges. arXiv preprint, 2019. URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1904.05234.
  4. Joshua S Gans and Richard T Holden. A solomonic solution to ownership disputes: An application to blockchain front-running. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research, 2022. Google Scholar
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  6. John Nash. Equilibrium points in n-person games. Proceedings of the national academy of sciences, 36(1):48-49, 1950. Google Scholar
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