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<h2>Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 5011, </h2>
<ul>
<li>
    <span class="authors">Daniel Lehmann, Rudolf Müller, and Tuomas Sandholm</span>
    <span class="title">05011 Abstracts Collection – Computing and Markets</span>
    <a class="doi" href="https://doi.org/10.4230/DagSemProc.05011.1">10.4230/DagSemProc.05011.1</a>
</li>
<li>
    <span class="authors">Daniel Lehmann, Rudolf Müller, and Tuomas Sandholm</span>
    <span class="title">05011 Executive Summary – Computing and Markets</span>
    <a class="doi" href="https://doi.org/10.4230/DagSemProc.05011.2">10.4230/DagSemProc.05011.2</a>
</li>
<li>
    <span class="authors">Edward Anderson, Frank Kelly, and Richard Steinberg</span>
    <span class="title">A Contract and Balancing Mechanism for Sharing Capacity in a Communication Network</span>
    <a class="doi" href="https://doi.org/10.4230/DagSemProc.05011.3">10.4230/DagSemProc.05011.3</a>
</li>
<li>
    <span class="authors">Rudolf Müller, Andres Perea, and Sascha Wolf</span>
    <span class="title">A Network Approach to Bayes-Nash Incentive Compatible Mechanisms</span>
    <a class="doi" href="https://doi.org/10.4230/DagSemProc.05011.4">10.4230/DagSemProc.05011.4</a>
</li>
<li>
    <span class="authors">Tuomas Sandholm</span>
    <span class="title">Automated Mechanism Design</span>
    <a class="doi" href="https://doi.org/10.4230/DagSemProc.05011.5">10.4230/DagSemProc.05011.5</a>
</li>
<li>
    <span class="authors">Kevin Leyton-Brown and Navin A.R. Bhat</span>
    <span class="title">Computing Nash Equilibria of Action-Graph Games</span>
    <a class="doi" href="https://doi.org/10.4230/DagSemProc.05011.6">10.4230/DagSemProc.05011.6</a>
</li>
<li>
    <span class="authors">Michal Penn, Maria Polukarov, and Moshe Tennenholtz</span>
    <span class="title">Congestion games with failures</span>
    <a class="doi" href="https://doi.org/10.4230/DagSemProc.05011.7">10.4230/DagSemProc.05011.7</a>
</li>
<li>
    <span class="authors"> Hongwei Gui, Rudolf Müller, and Rakesh V. Vohra</span>
    <span class="title">Dominant Strategy Mechanisms with Multidimensional Types</span>
    <a class="doi" href="https://doi.org/10.4230/DagSemProc.05011.8">10.4230/DagSemProc.05011.8</a>
</li>
<li>
    <span class="authors">Robert Day and S. Raghavan</span>
    <span class="title">Fair Payments for Efficient Allocations in Public Sector Combinatorial Auctions</span>
    <a class="doi" href="https://doi.org/10.4230/DagSemProc.05011.9">10.4230/DagSemProc.05011.9</a>
</li>
<li>
    <span class="authors">Kazuo Murota</span>
    <span class="title">Fundamentals in Discrete Convex Analysis</span>
    <a class="doi" href="https://doi.org/10.4230/DagSemProc.05011.10">10.4230/DagSemProc.05011.10</a>
</li>
<li>
    <span class="authors">Kevin Leyton-Brown and Moshe Tennenholtz</span>
    <span class="title">Local-Effect Games</span>
    <a class="doi" href="https://doi.org/10.4230/DagSemProc.05011.11">10.4230/DagSemProc.05011.11</a>
</li>
<li>
    <span class="authors">Rann Smordinsky and Moshe Tennenholtz</span>
    <span class="title">Overcoming Free Riding in Multi-Party Computations</span>
    <a class="doi" href="https://doi.org/10.4230/DagSemProc.05011.12">10.4230/DagSemProc.05011.12</a>
</li>
<li>
    <span class="authors">Henner Gimpel</span>
    <span class="title">Reference-Dependent Preferences in Multi-Issue Bargaining</span>
    <a class="doi" href="https://doi.org/10.4230/DagSemProc.05011.13">10.4230/DagSemProc.05011.13</a>
</li>
<li>
    <span class="authors">Anna Osepayshvili, Michael Wellman, Daniel Reeves, and Jeffrey MacKie-Mason</span>
    <span class="title">Self-Confirming Price Prediction for Bidding in Simultaneous Ascending Auctions</span>
    <a class="doi" href="https://doi.org/10.4230/DagSemProc.05011.14">10.4230/DagSemProc.05011.14</a>
</li>
<li>
    <span class="authors">Rainer Feldmann</span>
    <span class="title">Selfish Routing of Splittable Flow with Respect to Maximum Congestion</span>
    <a class="doi" href="https://doi.org/10.4230/DagSemProc.05011.15">10.4230/DagSemProc.05011.15</a>
</li>
<li>
    <span class="authors">Tuomas Sandholm and Andrew Gilpin</span>
    <span class="title">Sequences of Take-It-or-Leave-It Offers: Near-Optimal Auctions Without Full Valuation Revelation</span>
    <a class="doi" href="https://doi.org/10.4230/DagSemProc.05011.16">10.4230/DagSemProc.05011.16</a>
</li>
<li>
    <span class="authors">Felix Brandt, Tuomas Sandholm, and Yoav Shoham</span>
    <span class="title">Spiteful Bidding in Sealed-Bid Auctions</span>
    <a class="doi" href="https://doi.org/10.4230/DagSemProc.05011.17">10.4230/DagSemProc.05011.17</a>
</li>
<li>
    <span class="authors">Alon Altman</span>
    <span class="title">The PageRank Axioms</span>
    <a class="doi" href="https://doi.org/10.4230/DagSemProc.05011.18">10.4230/DagSemProc.05011.18</a>
</li>
<li>
    <span class="authors">Martin Gairing, Thomas Lücking, Marios Mavronicolas, and Burkhard Monien</span>
    <span class="title">The Price of Anarchy for Polynomial Social Cost</span>
    <a class="doi" href="https://doi.org/10.4230/DagSemProc.05011.19">10.4230/DagSemProc.05011.19</a>
</li>
<li>
    <span class="authors">Itai Ashlagi, Dov Monderer, and Moshe Tennenholtz</span>
    <span class="title">The Value of Correlation in Strategic Form Games</span>
    <a class="doi" href="https://doi.org/10.4230/DagSemProc.05011.20">10.4230/DagSemProc.05011.20</a>
</li>
</ul>

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