Volume

Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 6371

Publication Details

  • published at: 2007-01-10
  • Publisher: Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik

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Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.06371.1
06371 Abstracts Collection – From Security to Dependability

Authors: Christian Cachin, Felix C. Freiling, and Jaap-Henk Hoepman

Abstract
From 10.09.06 to 15.09.06, the Dagstuhl Seminar 06371 ``From Security to Dependability'' was held in the International Conference and Research Center (IBFI), Schloss Dagstuhl. During the seminar, several participants presented their current research, and ongoing work and open problems were discussed. Abstracts of the presentations given during the seminar as well as abstracts of seminar results and ideas are put together in this paper. The first section describes the seminar topics and goals in general. Links to extended abstracts or full papers are provided, if available.
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Christian Cachin, Felix C. Freiling, and Jaap-Henk Hoepman. 06371 Abstracts Collection – From Security to Dependability. In From Security to Dependability. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 6371, pp. 1-19, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)

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@InProceedings{cachin_et_al:DagSemProc.06371.1,
  author =	{Cachin, Christian and Freiling, Felix C. and Hoepman, Jaap-Henk},
  title =	{{06371 Abstracts Collection – From Security to Dependability}},
  booktitle =	{From Security to Dependability},
  pages =	{1--19},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{6371},
  editor =	{Christian Cachin and Felix C. Freiling and Jaap-Henk Hoepman},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.06371.1},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-8532},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.06371.1},
  annote =	{Keywords: Fault-tolerance, safety, distributed computing, language-based security, cryptography}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.06371.2
06371 Executive Summary – From Security to Dependability

Authors: Christian Cachin, Felix C. Freiling, and Jaap-Henk Hoepman

Abstract
This seminar brought together researchers and practitioners from the different areas of dependability and security, in particular, from fault-tolerance, safety, distributed computing, langelanguage-based security, and cryptography. The aim was to discuss common problems faced by research in these areas, the differences in their respective approaches, and to identify research challenges in this context.
Cite as

Christian Cachin, Felix C. Freiling, and Jaap-Henk Hoepman. 06371 Executive Summary – From Security to Dependability. In From Security to Dependability. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 6371, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)

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@InProceedings{cachin_et_al:DagSemProc.06371.2,
  author =	{Cachin, Christian and Freiling, Felix C. and Hoepman, Jaap-Henk},
  title =	{{06371 Executive Summary – From Security to Dependability}},
  booktitle =	{From Security to Dependability},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{6371},
  editor =	{Christian Cachin and Felix C. Freiling and Jaap-Henk Hoepman},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.06371.2},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-8512},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.06371.2},
  annote =	{Keywords: Fault-tolerance, safety, distributed computing, language-based security, cryptography}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.06371.3
Abstracting out Byzantine Behavior

Authors: Peter Druschel, Andreas Haeberlen, and Petr Kouznetsov

Abstract
Many distributed systems are designed to tolerate the presence of emph{Byzantine} failures: an individual process may arbitrarily deviate from the algorithm assigned to it. Depending on the application requirements, systems enjoy various levels of fault-tolerance. Systems based on state machine replication are able to emph{mask} failures so that their effect is not visible by the application. In contrast, cooperative peer-to-peer systems can tolerate bounded deviant behavior to some extent and therefore do not require masking, as long as each faulty node is emph{exposed}eventually. Finding an abstract way to reason about the levels of fault-tolerance is thus of immanent importance. We discuss how the information of deviant behavior can be abstracted out in the form of a emph{Byzantine failure detector} (BFD). We formally define a BFD abstraction, and we discuss two ways of using the abstraction: (1) monitoring systems in order to retroactively detect Byzantine failures and (2) enforcing systems in order to boost their level of fault-tolerance. Interestingly, the BFD formalism allowed us to determine the relative hardness of implementing two popular abstractions in distributed computing: state machine replication and weak interactive consistency.
Cite as

Peter Druschel, Andreas Haeberlen, and Petr Kouznetsov. Abstracting out Byzantine Behavior. In From Security to Dependability. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 6371, pp. 1-12, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)

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@InProceedings{druschel_et_al:DagSemProc.06371.3,
  author =	{Druschel, Peter and Haeberlen, Andreas and Kouznetsov, Petr},
  title =	{{Abstracting out Byzantine Behavior}},
  booktitle =	{From Security to Dependability},
  pages =	{1--12},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{6371},
  editor =	{Christian Cachin and Felix C. Freiling and Jaap-Henk Hoepman},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.06371.3},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-8501},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.06371.3},
  annote =	{Keywords: Fault-tolerance, Byzantine failures, masking, detection, total order broadcast, weak interactive consistency}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.06371.4
Denial of Service Protection with Beaver

Authors: Gal Badishi, Idit Keidar, Amir Herzberg, Oleg Romanov, and Avital Yachin

Abstract
We present Beaver, a method and architecture to ``build dams'' to protect servers from Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. Beaver allows efficient filtering of DoS traffic using low-cost, high-performance, readily-available packet filtering mechanisms. Beaver improves on previous solutions by not requiring cryptographic processing of messages, allowing the use of efficient routing (avoiding overlays), and establishing keys and state as needed. We present two prototype implementations of Beaver, one as part of IPSec in a Linux kernel, and a second as an NDIS hook driver on a Windows machine. Preliminary measurements illustrate that Beaver withstands severe DoS attacks without hampering the client-server communication. Moreover, Beaver is simple and easy to deploy.
Cite as

Gal Badishi, Idit Keidar, Amir Herzberg, Oleg Romanov, and Avital Yachin. Denial of Service Protection with Beaver. In From Security to Dependability. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 6371, pp. 1-6, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)

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@InProceedings{badishi_et_al:DagSemProc.06371.4,
  author =	{Badishi, Gal and Keidar, Idit and Herzberg, Amir and Romanov, Oleg and Yachin, Avital},
  title =	{{Denial of Service Protection with Beaver}},
  booktitle =	{From Security to Dependability},
  pages =	{1--6},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{6371},
  editor =	{Christian Cachin and Felix C. Freiling and Jaap-Henk Hoepman},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.06371.4},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-8492},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.06371.4},
  annote =	{Keywords: Denial of Service}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.06371.5
Towards bounded wait-free PASIS

Authors: Michael Abd-El-Malek, Gregory R. Ganger, Garth R. Goodson, Michael K. Reiter, and Jay J. Wylie

Abstract
The PASIS read/write protocol implements a Byzantine fault-tolerant erasure-coded atomic register. The prototype PASIS storage system implementation provides excellent best-case performance. Writes require two round trips and contention- and failure-free reads require one. Unfortunately, even though writes and reads are wait-free in PASIS, Byzantine components can induce correct clients to perform an unbounded amount of work. In this extended abstract, we enumerate the avenues by which Byzantine servers and clients can induce correct clients to perform an unbounded amount of work in PASIS. We sketch extensions to the PASIS protocol and Lazy Verification that bound the amount of work Byzantine components can induce correct clients to perform. We believe that the extensions provide bounded wait-free reads and writes. We also believe that an implementation that incorporates these extensions will preserve the excellent best-case performance of the original PASIS prototype.
Cite as

Michael Abd-El-Malek, Gregory R. Ganger, Garth R. Goodson, Michael K. Reiter, and Jay J. Wylie. Towards bounded wait-free PASIS. In From Security to Dependability. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 6371, pp. 1-4, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)

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@InProceedings{abdelmalek_et_al:DagSemProc.06371.5,
  author =	{Abd-El-Malek, Michael and Ganger, Gregory R. and Goodson, Garth R. and Reiter, Michael K. and Wylie, Jay J.},
  title =	{{Towards bounded wait-free PASIS}},
  booktitle =	{From Security to Dependability},
  pages =	{1--4},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{6371},
  editor =	{Christian Cachin and Felix C. Freiling and Jaap-Henk Hoepman},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.06371.5},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-8488},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.06371.5},
  annote =	{Keywords: Byzantine fault-tolerant, erasure-coded storage, bounded wait-free, non-skipping timestamps}
}

Filters

  • Authors
  • A
  • Abd-El-Malek, Michael
  • B
  • Badishi, Gal
  • C
  • Cachin, Christian
  • D
  • Druschel, Peter
  • F
  • Freiling, Felix C.
  • G
  • Ganger, Gregory R.
  • Goodson, Garth R.
  • H
  • Haeberlen, Andreas
  • Herzberg, Amir
  • Hoepman, Jaap-Henk
  • K
  • Keidar, Idit
  • Kouznetsov, Petr
  • R
  • Reiter, Michael K.
  • Romanov, Oleg
  • W
  • Wylie, Jay J.
  • Y
  • Yachin, Avital

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