3 Search Results for "Biais, Bruno"

Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2024.7
Incentive Compatibility of Ethereum’s PoS Consensus Protocol

Authors: Ulysse Pavloff, Yackolley Amoussou-Guenou, and Sara Tucci-Piergiovanni

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 324, 28th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2024)

Abstract
This paper investigates whether following the fork-choice rule in the Ethereum PoS consensus protocol constitutes a Nash equilibrium - i.e., whether the protocol that maintains the canonical chain in Ethereum is incentive-compatible. Specifically, we explore whether selfish participants may attempt to manipulate the fork-choice rule by forking out previous blocks and capturing the rewards associated with those blocks. Our analysis considers two strategies for participants: the obedient strategy, which adheres to the prescribed protocol, and the cunning strategy, which attempts to manipulate the fork-choice rule to gain more rewards. We evaluate the conditions under which selfish participants might deviate from the obedient strategy. We found that, in a synchronous system, following the prescribed fork-choice rule is incentive-compatible. However, in an eventually synchronous system, the protocol is eventually incentive-compatible - that is, only a limited number of proposers will find it profitable to fork the chain during the synchronous period. After this sequence of cunning proposers, subsequent proposers will find it more profitable to follow the protocol.
Cite as

Ulysse Pavloff, Yackolley Amoussou-Guenou, and Sara Tucci-Piergiovanni. Incentive Compatibility of Ethereum’s PoS Consensus Protocol. In 28th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2024). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 324, pp. 7:1-7:23, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2024)

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@InProceedings{pavloff_et_al:LIPIcs.OPODIS.2024.7,
  author =	{Pavloff, Ulysse and Amoussou-Guenou, Yackolley and Tucci-Piergiovanni, Sara},
  title =	{{Incentive Compatibility of Ethereum’s PoS Consensus Protocol}},
  booktitle =	{28th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2024)},
  pages =	{7:1--7:23},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-360-7},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{324},
  editor =	{Bonomi, Silvia and Galletta, Letterio and Rivi\`{e}re, Etienne and Schiavoni, Valerio},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2024.7},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-225431},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2024.7},
  annote =	{Keywords: Ethereum PoS, Game Theory, Block Reward}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2020.12
Rational Behaviors in Committee-Based Blockchains

Authors: Yackolley Amoussou-Guenou, Bruno Biais, Maria Potop-Butucaru, and Sara Tucci-Piergiovanni

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 184, 24th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2020)

Abstract
We study the rational behaviors of participants in committee-based blockchains. Committee-based blockchains rely on specific blockchain consensus that must be guaranteed in presence of rational participants. We consider a simplified blockchain consensus algorithm based on existing or proposed committee-based blockchains that encapsulate the main actions of the participants: voting for a block, and checking its validity. Knowing that those actions have costs, and achieving the consensus gives rewards to committee members, we study using game theory how strategic participants behave while trying to maximize their gains. We consider different reward schemes, and found that in each setting, there exist equilibria where blockchain consensus is guaranteed; in some settings however, there can be coordination failures hindering consensus. Moreover, we study equilibria with trembling participants, which is a novelty in the context of committee-based blockchains. Trembling participants are rational that can do unintended actions with a low probability. We found that in presence of trembling participants, there exist equilibria where blockchain consensus is guaranteed; however, when only voters are rewarded, there also exist equilibria where validity can be violated.
Cite as

Yackolley Amoussou-Guenou, Bruno Biais, Maria Potop-Butucaru, and Sara Tucci-Piergiovanni. Rational Behaviors in Committee-Based Blockchains. In 24th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2020). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 184, pp. 12:1-12:16, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2021)

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@InProceedings{amoussouguenou_et_al:LIPIcs.OPODIS.2020.12,
  author =	{Amoussou-Guenou, Yackolley and Biais, Bruno and Potop-Butucaru, Maria and Tucci-Piergiovanni, Sara},
  title =	{{Rational Behaviors in Committee-Based Blockchains}},
  booktitle =	{24th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2020)},
  pages =	{12:1--12:16},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-176-4},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2021},
  volume =	{184},
  editor =	{Bramas, Quentin and Oshman, Rotem and Romano, Paolo},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2020.12},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-134973},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2020.12},
  annote =	{Keywords: BFT Consensus, Blockchains, Game Theory}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/OASIcs.Gabbrielli.2
A Formal Analysis of the Bitcoin Protocol

Authors: Cosimo Laneve and Adele Veschetti

Published in: OASIcs, Volume 86, Recent Developments in the Design and Implementation of Programming Languages (2020)

Abstract
We study Nakamoto’s Bitcoin protocol that implements a distributed ledger on peer-to-peer asynchronous networks. In particular, we define a principled formal model of key participants - the miners - as stochastic processes and describe the whole system as a parallel composition of miners. We therefore compute the probability that ledgers turn into a state with more severe inconsistencies, e.g. with longer forks, under the assumptions that messages are not lost and nodes are not hostile. We also study how the presence of hostile nodes mining blocks in wrong positions impacts on the consistency of the ledgers. Our theoretical results agree with the simulations performed on a probabilistic model checker that we extended with dynamic datatypes in order to have a faithful description of miners' behaviour.
Cite as

Cosimo Laneve and Adele Veschetti. A Formal Analysis of the Bitcoin Protocol. In Recent Developments in the Design and Implementation of Programming Languages. Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs), Volume 86, pp. 2:1-2:17, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2020)

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@InProceedings{laneve_et_al:OASIcs.Gabbrielli.2,
  author =	{Laneve, Cosimo and Veschetti, Adele},
  title =	{{A Formal Analysis of the Bitcoin Protocol}},
  booktitle =	{Recent Developments in the Design and Implementation of Programming Languages},
  pages =	{2:1--2:17},
  series =	{Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-171-9},
  ISSN =	{2190-6807},
  year =	{2020},
  volume =	{86},
  editor =	{de Boer, Frank S. and Mauro, Jacopo},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/OASIcs.Gabbrielli.2},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-132242},
  doi =		{10.4230/OASIcs.Gabbrielli.2},
  annote =	{Keywords: Bitcoin, Distributed consensus, Distributed ledgers, Blockchain, PRISM, forks}
}
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