2 Search Results for "Demeulemeester, Tom"

Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagRep.15.2.41
Dealing with Complexities in Auction and Matching Market Design (Dagstuhl Seminar 25071)

Authors: Martin Bichler, Péter Biró, Tom Demeulemeester, and Bettina Klaus

Published in: Dagstuhl Reports, Volume 15, Issue 2 (2025)

Abstract
Dagstuhl Seminar 25071 gathered an interdisciplinary group of researchers from economics, computer science, and operations research to address current challenges in auction and matching market design. These centralized allocation mechanisms - used in school admissions, kidney exchanges, refugee resettlement, power markets, and spectrum auctions - must increasingly accommodate complex real-world requirements, including multi-objective optimization, dynamic participation, and strategic behavior under uncertainty.
Cite as

Martin Bichler, Péter Biró, Tom Demeulemeester, and Bettina Klaus. Dealing with Complexities in Auction and Matching Market Design (Dagstuhl Seminar 25071). In Dagstuhl Reports, Volume 15, Issue 2, pp. 41-62, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@Article{bichler_et_al:DagRep.15.2.41,
  author =	{Bichler, Martin and Bir\'{o}, P\'{e}ter and Demeulemeester, Tom and Klaus, Bettina},
  title =	{{Dealing with Complexities in Auction and Matching Market Design (Dagstuhl Seminar 25071)}},
  pages =	{41--62},
  journal =	{Dagstuhl Reports},
  ISSN =	{2192-5283},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{15},
  number =	{2},
  editor =	{Bichler, Martin and Bir\'{o}, P\'{e}ter and Demeulemeester, Tom and Klaus, Bettina},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagRep.15.2.41},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-230912},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagRep.15.2.41},
  annote =	{Keywords: algorithms, auctions, game theory, market design, matching markets}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.MFCS.2023.41
Relaxed Core Stability for Hedonic Games with Size-Dependent Utilities

Authors: Tom Demeulemeester and Jannik Peters

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 272, 48th International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS 2023)

Abstract
We study relationships between different relaxed notions of core stability in hedonic games. In particular, we study (i) q-size core stable outcomes in which no deviating coalition of size at most q exists and (ii) k-improvement core stable outcomes in which no coalition can improve by a factor of more than k. For a large class of hedonic games, including fractional and additively separable hedonic games, we derive upper bounds on the maximum factor by which a coalition of a certain size can improve in a q-size core stable outcome. We further provide asymptotically tight lower bounds for a large class of hedonic games. Finally, our bounds allow us to confirm two conjectures by Fanelli et al. [Angelo Fanelli et al., 2021][IJCAI'21] for symmetric fractional hedonic games (S-FHGs): (i) every q-size core stable outcome in an S-FHG is also q/(q-1)-improvement core stable and (ii) the price of anarchy of q-size stability in S-FHGs is precisely 2q/q-1.
Cite as

Tom Demeulemeester and Jannik Peters. Relaxed Core Stability for Hedonic Games with Size-Dependent Utilities. In 48th International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS 2023). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 272, pp. 41:1-41:14, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2023)

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@InProceedings{demeulemeester_et_al:LIPIcs.MFCS.2023.41,
  author =	{Demeulemeester, Tom and Peters, Jannik},
  title =	{{Relaxed Core Stability for Hedonic Games with Size-Dependent Utilities}},
  booktitle =	{48th International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS 2023)},
  pages =	{41:1--41:14},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-292-1},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2023},
  volume =	{272},
  editor =	{Leroux, J\'{e}r\^{o}me and Lombardy, Sylvain and Peleg, David},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.MFCS.2023.41},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-185759},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.MFCS.2023.41},
  annote =	{Keywords: hedonic games, core stability, algorithmic game theory, computational social choice}
}
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