5 Search Results for "Goel, Gagan"

Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.51
Near-Optimal Sparsifiers for Stochastic Knapsack and Assignment Problems

Authors: Shaddin Dughmi, Yusuf Hakan Kalayci, and Xinyu Liu

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 362, 17th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2026)

Abstract
When uncertainty meets costly information gathering, a fundamental question emerges: which data points should we probe to unlock near-optimal solutions? Sparsification of stochastic packing problems addresses this trade-off. The existing notions of sparsification measure the level of sparsity, called degree, as the ratio of queried items to the optimal solution size. While effective for matching and matroid-type problems with uniform structures, this cardinality-based approach fails for knapsack-type constraints where feasible sets exhibit dramatic structural variation. We introduce a polyhedral sparsification framework that measures the degree as the smallest scalar needed to embed the query set within a scaled feasibility polytope, naturally capturing redundancy without relying on cardinality. Our main contribution establishes that knapsack, multiple knapsack, and generalized assignment problems admit (1-ε)-approximate sparsifiers with degree polynomial in 1/p and 1/ε - where p denotes the independent activation probability of each element - remarkably independent of problem dimensions. The key insight involves grouping items with similar weights and deploying a charging argument: when our query set misses an optimal item, we either substitute it directly with a queried item from the same group or leverage that group’s excess contribution to compensate for the loss. This reveals an intriguing complexity-theoretic separation - while the multiple knapsack problem lacks an FPTAS and generalized assignment is APX-hard, their sparsification counterparts admit efficient (1-ε)-approximation algorithms that identify polynomial degree query sets. Finally, we raise an open question: can such sparsification extend to general integer linear programs with degree independent of problem dimensions?
Cite as

Shaddin Dughmi, Yusuf Hakan Kalayci, and Xinyu Liu. Near-Optimal Sparsifiers for Stochastic Knapsack and Assignment Problems. In 17th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2026). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 362, pp. 51:1-51:22, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2026)

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@InProceedings{dughmi_et_al:LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.51,
  author =	{Dughmi, Shaddin and Kalayci, Yusuf Hakan and Liu, Xinyu},
  title =	{{Near-Optimal Sparsifiers for Stochastic Knapsack and Assignment Problems}},
  booktitle =	{17th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2026)},
  pages =	{51:1--51:22},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-410-9},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2026},
  volume =	{362},
  editor =	{Saraf, Shubhangi},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.51},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-253386},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.51},
  annote =	{Keywords: Packing Problems, Assignment Problems, Stochastic Selection, Sparsification}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ISAAC.2025.13
Optimal Online Bipartite Matching in Degree-2 Graphs

Authors: Amey Bhangale, Arghya Chakraborty, and Prahladh Harsha

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 359, 36th International Symposium on Algorithms and Computation (ISAAC 2025)

Abstract
Online bipartite matching is a classical problem in online algorithms and we know that both the deterministic fractional and randomized integral online matchings achieve the same competitive ratio of 1-1/e. In this work, we study classes of graphs where the online degree is restricted to 2. As expected, one can achieve a competitive ratio of better than 1-1/e in both the deterministic fractional and randomized integral cases, but surprisingly, these ratios are not the same. It was already known that for fractional matching, a 0.75 competitive ratio algorithm is optimal. We show that the folklore Half-Half algorithm achieves a competitive ratio of η ≈ 0.717772… and more surprisingly, show that this is optimal by giving a matching lower-bound. This yields a separation between the two problems: deterministic fractional and randomized integral, showing that it is impossible to obtain a perfect rounding scheme.
Cite as

Amey Bhangale, Arghya Chakraborty, and Prahladh Harsha. Optimal Online Bipartite Matching in Degree-2 Graphs. In 36th International Symposium on Algorithms and Computation (ISAAC 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 359, pp. 13:1-13:19, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{bhangale_et_al:LIPIcs.ISAAC.2025.13,
  author =	{Bhangale, Amey and Chakraborty, Arghya and Harsha, Prahladh},
  title =	{{Optimal Online Bipartite Matching in Degree-2 Graphs}},
  booktitle =	{36th International Symposium on Algorithms and Computation (ISAAC 2025)},
  pages =	{13:1--13:19},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-408-6},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{359},
  editor =	{Chen, Ho-Lin and Hon, Wing-Kai and Tsai, Meng-Tsung},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ISAAC.2025.13},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-249216},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ISAAC.2025.13},
  annote =	{Keywords: Online Algorithm, Bipartite matching}
}
Document
Track A: Algorithms, Complexity and Games
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2025.58
A New Impossibility Result for Online Bipartite Matching Problems

Authors: Flavio Chierichetti, Mirko Giacchini, Alessandro Panconesi, and Andrea Vattani

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 334, 52nd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2025)

Abstract
Online Bipartite Matching with random user arrival is a fundamental problem in the online advertisement ecosystem. Over the last 30 years, many algorithms and impossibility results have been developed for this problem. In particular, the latest impossibility result was established by Manshadi, Oveis Gharan and Saberi [Manshadi et al., 2011] in 2011. Since then, several algorithms have been published in an effort to narrow the gap between the upper and the lower bounds on the competitive ratio. In this paper we show that no algorithm can achieve a competitive ratio better than 1- e/(e^e) = 0.82062…, improving upon the 0.823 upper bound presented in [Manshadi et al., 2011]. Our construction is simple to state, accompanied by a fully analytic proof, and yields a competitive ratio bound intriguingly similar to 1 - 1/e, the optimal competitive ratio for the fully adversarial Online Bipartite Matching problem. Although the tightness of our upper bound remains an open question, we show that our construction is extremal in a natural class of instances.
Cite as

Flavio Chierichetti, Mirko Giacchini, Alessandro Panconesi, and Andrea Vattani. A New Impossibility Result for Online Bipartite Matching Problems. In 52nd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 334, pp. 58:1-58:20, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{chierichetti_et_al:LIPIcs.ICALP.2025.58,
  author =	{Chierichetti, Flavio and Giacchini, Mirko and Panconesi, Alessandro and Vattani, Andrea},
  title =	{{A New Impossibility Result for Online Bipartite Matching Problems}},
  booktitle =	{52nd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2025)},
  pages =	{58:1--58:20},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-372-0},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{334},
  editor =	{Censor-Hillel, Keren and Grandoni, Fabrizio and Ouaknine, Jo\"{e}l and Puppis, Gabriele},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2025.58},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-234354},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2025.58},
  annote =	{Keywords: Bipartite Matching, Random Graphs, Competitive Ratio}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2016.142
Reservation Exchange Markets for Internet Advertising

Authors: Gagan Goel, Stefano Leonardi, Vahab Mirrokni, Afshin Nikzad, and Renato Paes-Leme

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 55, 43rd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2016)

Abstract
Internet display advertising industry follows two main business models. One model is based on direct deals between publishers and advertisers where they sign legal contracts containing terms of fulfillment for a future inventory. The second model is a spot market based on auctioning page views in real-time on advertising exchange (AdX) platforms such as DoubleClick's Ad Exchange, RightMedia, or AppNexus. These exchanges play the role of intermediaries who sell items (e.g. page-views) on behalf of a seller (e.g. a publisher) to buyers (e.g., advertisers) on the opposite side of the market. The computational and economics issues arising in this second model have been extensively investigated in recent times. In this work, we consider a third emerging model called reservation exchange market. A reservation exchange is a two-sided market between buyer orders for blocks of advertisers' impressions and seller orders for blocks of publishers' page views. The goal is to match seller orders to buyer orders while providing the right incentives to both sides. In this work we first describe the important features of mechanisms for efficient reservation exchange markets. We then address the algorithmic problems of designing revenue sharing schemes to provide a fair division between sellers of the revenue collected from buyers. A major conceptual contribution of this work is in showing that even though both clinching ascending auctions and VCG mechanisms achieve the same outcome from a buyer perspective, however, from the perspective of revenue sharing among sellers, clinching ascending auctions are much more informative than VCG auctions.
Cite as

Gagan Goel, Stefano Leonardi, Vahab Mirrokni, Afshin Nikzad, and Renato Paes-Leme. Reservation Exchange Markets for Internet Advertising. In 43rd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2016). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 55, pp. 142:1-142:13, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2016)

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@InProceedings{goel_et_al:LIPIcs.ICALP.2016.142,
  author =	{Goel, Gagan and Leonardi, Stefano and Mirrokni, Vahab and Nikzad, Afshin and Paes-Leme, Renato},
  title =	{{Reservation Exchange Markets for Internet Advertising}},
  booktitle =	{43rd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2016)},
  pages =	{142:1--142:13},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-013-2},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2016},
  volume =	{55},
  editor =	{Chatzigiannakis, Ioannis and Mitzenmacher, Michael and Rabani, Yuval and Sangiorgi, Davide},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2016.142},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-62863},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2016.142},
  annote =	{Keywords: Reservation Markets, Internet Advertising, Two-sided Markets, Clinching Auction, Envy-free allocations}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2010.436
Combinatorial Problems with Discounted Price Functions in Multi-agent Systems

Authors: Gagan Goel, Pushkar Tripathi, and Lei Wang

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 8, IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2010)

Abstract
Motivated by economic thought, a recent research agenda has suggested the algorithmic study of combinatorial optimization problems under functions which satisfy the property of decreasing marginal cost. A natural first step to model such functions is to consider submodular functions. However, many fundamental problems have turned out to be extremely hard to approximate under general submodular functions, thus indicating the need for a systematic study of subclasses of submodular functions that are practically motivated and yield good approximation ratios. In this paper, we introduce and study an important subclass of submodular functions, which we call discounted price functions. These functions are succinctly representable and generalize linear(additive) price functions. We study the following fundamental combinatorial optimization problems: edge cover, spanning tree, perfect matching and $s-t$ path. We give both upper and lower bound for the approximability of these problems.
Cite as

Gagan Goel, Pushkar Tripathi, and Lei Wang. Combinatorial Problems with Discounted Price Functions in Multi-agent Systems. In IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2010). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 8, pp. 436-446, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2010)

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@InProceedings{goel_et_al:LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2010.436,
  author =	{Goel, Gagan and Tripathi, Pushkar and Wang, Lei},
  title =	{{Combinatorial Problems with Discounted Price Functions in Multi-agent Systems}},
  booktitle =	{IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2010)},
  pages =	{436--446},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-939897-23-1},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2010},
  volume =	{8},
  editor =	{Lodaya, Kamal and Mahajan, Meena},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2010.436},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-28847},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2010.436},
  annote =	{Keywords: Approximation algorithm, decreasing marginal cost, submodular function, discounted price function}
}
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