5 Search Results for "Sandhu, Ravi S."

Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.DISC.2025.8
Auditable Shared Objects: From Registers to Synchronization Primitives

Authors: Hagit Attiya, Antonio Fernández Anta, Alessia Milani, Alexandre Rapetti, and Corentin Travers

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 356, 39th International Symposium on Distributed Computing (DISC 2025)

Abstract
Auditability allows to track operations performed on a shared object, recording who accessed which information. This gives data owners more control on their data. Initially studied in the context of single-writer registers, this work extends the notion of auditability to other shared objects, and studies their properties. We start by moving from single-writer to multi-writer registers, and provide an implementation of an auditable n-writer m-reader read / write register, with O(n+m) step complexity. This implementation uses (m+n)-sliding registers, which have consensus number m+n. We show that this consensus number is necessary. The implementation extends naturally to support an auditable load-linked / store-conditional (LL/SC) shared object. LL/SC is a primitive that supports efficient implementation of many shared objects. Finally, we relate auditable registers to other access control objects, by implementing an anti-flickering deny list from auditable registers.
Cite as

Hagit Attiya, Antonio Fernández Anta, Alessia Milani, Alexandre Rapetti, and Corentin Travers. Auditable Shared Objects: From Registers to Synchronization Primitives. In 39th International Symposium on Distributed Computing (DISC 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 356, pp. 8:1-8:22, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{attiya_et_al:LIPIcs.DISC.2025.8,
  author =	{Attiya, Hagit and Anta, Antonio Fern\'{a}ndez and Milani, Alessia and Rapetti, Alexandre and Travers, Corentin},
  title =	{{Auditable Shared Objects: From Registers to Synchronization Primitives}},
  booktitle =	{39th International Symposium on Distributed Computing (DISC 2025)},
  pages =	{8:1--8:22},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-402-4},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{356},
  editor =	{Kowalski, Dariusz R.},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.DISC.2025.8},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-248253},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.DISC.2025.8},
  annote =	{Keywords: Auditability, Wait-free implementation, Synchronization power, Distributed objects, Shared memory, LL/SC, Deny List}
}
Document
Track A: Algorithms, Complexity and Games
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2025.56
Boosting SNARKs and Rate-1 Barrier in Arguments of Knowledge

Authors: Jiaqi Cheng and Rishab Goyal

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 334, 52nd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2025)

Abstract
We design a generic compiler to boost any non-trivial succinct non-interactive argument of knowledge (SNARK) to full succinctness. Our results come in two flavors: 1) For any constant ε > 0, any SNARK with proof size |π| < |ω|/(λ^ε) + poly(λ, |x|) can be upgraded to a fully succinct SNARK, where all system parameters (such as proof/CRS sizes and setup/verifier run-times) grow as fixed polynomials in λ, independent of witness size. 2) Under an additional assumption that the underlying SNARK has as an efficient knowledge extractor, we further improve our result to upgrade any non-trivial SNARK. For example, we show how to design fully succinct SNARKs from SNARKs with proofs of length |ω| - Ω(λ), or |ω|/(1+ε) + poly(λ, |x|), any constant ε > 0. Our result reduces the long-standing challenge of designing fully succinct SNARKs to designing arguments of knowledge that beat the trivial construction. It also establishes optimality of rate-1 arguments of knowledge (such as NIZKs [Gentry-Groth-Ishai-Peikert-Sahai-Smith; JoC'15] and BARGs [Devadas-Goyal-Kalai-Vaikuntanathan, Paneth-Pass; FOCS'22]), and suggests any further improvement is tantamount to designing fully succinct SNARKs, thus requires bypassing established black-box barriers [Gentry-Wichs; STOC'11].
Cite as

Jiaqi Cheng and Rishab Goyal. Boosting SNARKs and Rate-1 Barrier in Arguments of Knowledge. In 52nd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 334, pp. 56:1-56:20, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{cheng_et_al:LIPIcs.ICALP.2025.56,
  author =	{Cheng, Jiaqi and Goyal, Rishab},
  title =	{{Boosting SNARKs and Rate-1 Barrier in Arguments of Knowledge}},
  booktitle =	{52nd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2025)},
  pages =	{56:1--56:20},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-372-0},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{334},
  editor =	{Censor-Hillel, Keren and Grandoni, Fabrizio and Ouaknine, Jo\"{e}l and Puppis, Gabriele},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2025.56},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-234339},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2025.56},
  annote =	{Keywords: SNARGs, RAM Delegation}
}
Document
Replication Paper
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ECOOP.2025.40
Scaling Up: Revisiting Mining Android Sandboxes at Scale for Malware Classification (Replication Paper)

Authors: Francisco Handrick Tomaz da Costa, Ismael Medeiros, Leandro Oliveira, João Calássio, Rodrigo Bonifácio, Krishna Narasimhan, Mira Mezini, and Márcio Ribeiro

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 333, 39th European Conference on Object-Oriented Programming (ECOOP 2025)

Abstract
The widespread use of smartphones in daily life has raised concerns about privacy and security among researchers and practitioners. Privacy issues are generally highly prevalent in mobile applications, particularly targeting the Android platform - the most popular mobile operating system. For this reason, several techniques have been proposed to identify malicious behavior in Android applications, including the Mining Android Sandbox approach (MAS approach), which aims to identify malicious behavior in repackaged Android applications (apps). However, previous empirical studies evaluated the MAS approach using a small dataset consisting of only 102 pairs of original and repackaged apps. This limitation raises questions about the external validity of their findings and whether the MAS approach can be generalized to larger datasets. To address these concerns, this paper presents the results of a replication study focused on evaluating the performance of the MAS approach regarding its capabilities of correctly classifying malware from different families. Unlike previous studies, our research employs a dataset that is an order of magnitude larger, comprising 4,076 pairs of apps covering a more diverse range of Android malware families. Surprisingly, our findings indicate a poor performance of the MAS approach for identifying malware, with the F1-score decreasing from 0.90 for the small dataset used in the previous studies to 0.54 in our more extensive dataset. Upon closer examination, we discovered that certain malware families partially account for the low accuracy of the MAS approach, which fails to classify a repackaged version of an app as malware correctly. Our findings highlight the limitations of the MAS approach, particularly when scaled, and underscore the importance of complementing it with other techniques to detect a broader range of malware effectively. This opens avenues for further discussion on addressing the blind spots that affect the accuracy of the MAS approach.
Cite as

Francisco Handrick Tomaz da Costa, Ismael Medeiros, Leandro Oliveira, João Calássio, Rodrigo Bonifácio, Krishna Narasimhan, Mira Mezini, and Márcio Ribeiro. Scaling Up: Revisiting Mining Android Sandboxes at Scale for Malware Classification (Replication Paper). In 39th European Conference on Object-Oriented Programming (ECOOP 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 333, pp. 40:1-40:26, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{handricktomazdacosta_et_al:LIPIcs.ECOOP.2025.40,
  author =	{Handrick Tomaz da Costa, Francisco and Medeiros, Ismael and Oliveira, Leandro and Cal\'{a}ssio, Jo\~{a}o and Bonif\'{a}cio, Rodrigo and Narasimhan, Krishna and Mezini, Mira and Ribeiro, M\'{a}rcio},
  title =	{{Scaling Up: Revisiting Mining Android Sandboxes at Scale for Malware Classification}},
  booktitle =	{39th European Conference on Object-Oriented Programming (ECOOP 2025)},
  pages =	{40:1--40:26},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-373-7},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{333},
  editor =	{Aldrich, Jonathan and Silva, Alexandra},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ECOOP.2025.40},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-233320},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ECOOP.2025.40},
  annote =	{Keywords: Android Malware Detection, Dynamic Analysis, Mining Android Sandboxes}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.10141.1
10141 Abstracts Collection – Distributed Usage Control

Authors: Sandro Etalle, Alexander Pretschner, Ravi S. Sandhu, and Marianne Winslett

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 10141, Distributed Usage Control (2010)

Abstract
From 06.04. to 09.04.2010, the Dagstuhl Seminar 10141 ``Distributed Usage Control '' was held in Schloss Dagstuhl~--~Leibniz Center for Informatics. During the seminar, several participants presented their current research, and ongoing work and open problems were discussed. Abstracts of the presentations given during the seminar as well as abstracts of seminar results and ideas are put together in this paper. The first section describes the seminar topics and goals in general. Links to extended abstracts or full papers are provided, if available.
Cite as

Sandro Etalle, Alexander Pretschner, Ravi S. Sandhu, and Marianne Winslett. 10141 Abstracts Collection – Distributed Usage Control. In Distributed Usage Control. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 10141, pp. 1-12, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2010)

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@InProceedings{etalle_et_al:DagSemProc.10141.1,
  author =	{Etalle, Sandro and Pretschner, Alexander and Sandhu, Ravi S. and Winslett, Marianne},
  title =	{{10141 Abstracts Collection – Distributed Usage Control}},
  booktitle =	{Distributed Usage Control},
  pages =	{1--12},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2010},
  volume =	{10141},
  editor =	{Sandro Etalle and Alexander Pretschner and Raiv S. Sandhu and Marianne Winslett},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.10141.1},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-27185},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.10141.1},
  annote =	{Keywords: Usage control, access control, data protection, privacy, security policies, trust, trusted computing, compliance, DRM, information flow}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.10141.2
10141 Summary – Distributed Usage Control

Authors: Sandro Etalle, Alexander Pretschner, Ravi S. Sandhu, and Marianne Winslett

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 10141, Distributed Usage Control (2010)

Abstract
We summarize Dagstuhl seminar 10141 on Distributed Usage Control.
Cite as

Sandro Etalle, Alexander Pretschner, Ravi S. Sandhu, and Marianne Winslett. 10141 Summary – Distributed Usage Control. In Distributed Usage Control. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 10141, pp. 1-4, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2010)

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@InProceedings{etalle_et_al:DagSemProc.10141.2,
  author =	{Etalle, Sandro and Pretschner, Alexander and Sandhu, Ravi S. and Winslett, Marianne},
  title =	{{10141 Summary – Distributed Usage Control}},
  booktitle =	{Distributed Usage Control},
  pages =	{1--4},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2010},
  volume =	{10141},
  editor =	{Sandro Etalle and Alexander Pretschner and Raiv S. Sandhu and Marianne Winslett},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.10141.2},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-27174},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.10141.2},
  annote =	{Keywords: Usage control, access control, data protection, privacy, security policies, trust, trusted computing, compliance, DRM, information flow}
}
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