Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik GmbH Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik GmbH scholarly article en Wolfstetter, Elmar; Giebe, Thomas License
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URN: urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-11514


License Auctions with Royalty Contracts for (Winners and) Losers



This paper revisits the licensing of a non--drastic process innovation by an outside innovator to a Cournot oligopoly. We propose a new mechanism that combines a restrictive license auction with royalty licensing. This mechanism is more profitable than standard license auctions, auctioning royalty contracts, fixed--fee licensing, pure royalty licensing, and two-part tariffs. The key features are that royalty contracts are auctioned and that losers of the auction are granted the option to sign a royalty contract. Remarkably, combining royalties for winners and losers makes the
integer constraint concerning the number of licenses irrelevant.

BibTeX - Entry

  author =	{Wolfstetter, Elmar and Giebe, Thomas},
  title =	{{License Auctions with Royalty Contracts for (Winners and) Losers}},
  booktitle =	{Computational Social Systems and the Internet},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{7271},
  editor =	{Peter Cramton and Rudolf M\"{u}ller and Eva Tardos and Moshe Tennenholtz},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-11514},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.9},
  annote =	{Keywords: Auctions, Patents, Licensing}

Keywords: Auctions, Patents, Licensing
Seminar: 07271 - Computational Social Systems and the Internet
Issue date: 2007
Date of publication: 02.10.2007

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