LIPIcs.ECOOP.2016.17.pdf
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The Elements of Decision Alignment
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30th European Conference on Object-Oriented Programming (ECOOP 2016)
Series: Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)
Conference: European Conference on Object-Oriented Programming (ECOOP) - License:
Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported license
- Publication Date: 2016-07-18
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Mark S. Miller and Bill Tulloh. The Elements of Decision Alignment. In 30th European Conference on Object-Oriented Programming (ECOOP 2016). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 56, pp. 17:1-17:5, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2016)
https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.ECOOP.2016.17
Abstract
When one object makes a request of another, why do we expect that the second object's behavior correctly satisfies the first object's wishes? The need to cope with such principal-agent problems shapes programming practice as much as it shapes human organizations and economies. However, the literature about such plan coordination issues among humans is almost disjoint from the literature about these issues among objects. Even the terms used are unrelated. These fields have much to learn from each other---both from their similarities and from the causes of their differences. We propose a framework for thinking about decision alignment as a bridge between these disciplines.
Subject Classification
Keywords
- economics
- law
- contracts
- principal-agent problem
- incentive alignment
- least authority
- verification
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