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MixEth: Efficient, Trustless Coin Mixing Service for Ethereum

Authors István András Seres , Dániel A. Nagy, Chris Buckland, Péter Burcsi

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Author Details

István András Seres
  • Eötvös Loránd University, Hungary
Dániel A. Nagy
  • Eötvös Loránd University, Hungary
Chris Buckland
  • King’s College London, United Kingdom
Péter Burcsi
  • Eötvös Loránd University, Hungary

Funding

The research at Eötvös Loránd University was partially supported by the European Union, co-financed by the European Social Fund (EFOP-3.6.2-16-2017-00012).
  • Buckland, Chris: is supported by an Ethereum Foundation scaling grant and an Ethereum Community Fund grant.

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank Liam Horne for helping with the state channel implementation, Barry Whitehat, Dmitry Khovratovich and Sina Mahmoodi for the insightful comments and discussions.

Cite As Get BibTex

István András Seres, Dániel A. Nagy, Chris Buckland, and Péter Burcsi. MixEth: Efficient, Trustless Coin Mixing Service for Ethereum. In International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2019). Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs), Volume 71, pp. 13:1-13:20, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2020) https://doi.org/10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.13

Abstract

Coin mixing is a prevalent privacy-enhancing technology for cryptocurrency users. In this paper, we present MixEth, which is a trustless coin mixing service for Turing-complete blockchains. MixEth does not rely on a trusted setup and is more efficient than any proposed trustless coin tumbler. It requires only 3 on-chain transactions at most per user and 1 off-chain message. It achieves strong notions of anonymity and is able to resist denial-of-service attacks. Furthermore the underlying protocol can also be used to efficiently shuffle ballots, ciphertexts in a trustless and decentralized manner.

Subject Classification

ACM Subject Classification
  • Theory of computation → Cryptographic protocols
Keywords
  • Cryptography
  • Verifiable shuffle
  • Anonymity
  • Cryptocurrency
  • Ethereum
  • Coin mixer
  • State Channel

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Supplementary Materials

References

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