Volume
OASIcs, Volume 71
International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2019)
Event
Tokenomics 2019, May 6-7, 2019, Paris, FranceEditors
Publication Details
- published at: 2020-03-17
- Publisher: Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik
- ISBN: 978-3-95977-108-5
- DBLP: db/conf/tokenomics/tokenomics2019
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Document
Complete Volume
OASIcs, Vol. 71, Tokenomics 2019, Complete Volume
Abstract
OASIcs, Vol. 71, Tokenomics 2019, Complete Volume
Cite as
International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2019). Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs), Volume 71, pp. 1-192, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2020)
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@Proceedings{danos_et_al:OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019,
title = {{OASIcs, Vol. 71, Tokenomics 2019, Complete Volume}},
booktitle = {International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2019)},
pages = {1--192},
series = {Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs)},
ISBN = {978-3-95977-108-5},
ISSN = {2190-6807},
year = {2020},
volume = {71},
editor = {Danos, Vincent and Herlihy, Maurice and Potop-Butucaru, Maria and Prat, Julien and Tucci-Piergiovanni, Sara},
publisher = {Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
address = {Dagstuhl, Germany},
URL = {https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019},
URN = {urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-119634},
doi = {10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019},
annote = {Keywords: OASIcs, Vol. 71, Tokenomics 2019, Complete Volume}
}
Document
Front Matter
Front Matter, Table of Contents, Preface, Conference Organization
Abstract
Front Matter, Table of Contents, Preface, Conference Organization
Cite as
International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2019). Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs), Volume 71, pp. 0:i-0:xii, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2020)
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@InProceedings{danos_et_al:OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.0,
author = {Danos, Vincent and Herlihy, Maurice and Potop-Butucaru, Maria and Prat, Julien and Tucci-Piergiovanni, Sara},
title = {{Front Matter, Table of Contents, Preface, Conference Organization}},
booktitle = {International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2019)},
pages = {0:i--0:xii},
series = {Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs)},
ISBN = {978-3-95977-108-5},
ISSN = {2190-6807},
year = {2020},
volume = {71},
editor = {Danos, Vincent and Herlihy, Maurice and Potop-Butucaru, Maria and Prat, Julien and Tucci-Piergiovanni, Sara},
publisher = {Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
address = {Dagstuhl, Germany},
URL = {https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.0},
URN = {urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-119640},
doi = {10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.0},
annote = {Keywords: Front Matter, Table of Contents, Preface, Conference Organization}
}
Document
Keynote Lecture
Demystifying Blockchains: Decentralized and Fault-Tolerant Storage for the Future of Big Data? (Keynote Lecture)
Abstract
Bitcoin is a successful and interesting example of a global scale peer-to-peer cryptocurrency that integrates many techniques and protocols from cryptography, distributed systems, and databases. The main underlying data structure is blockchain, a scalable fully replicated structure that is shared among all participants and guarantees a consistent view of all user transactions by all participants in the cryptocurrency system. The novel aspect of Blockchain is that historical data about all transactions is maintained in the absence of any central authority. This property of Blockchain has given rise to the possibility that future applications will transition from centralized databases to a fully decentralized storage based on blockchains. In this talk, we start by developing an understanding of the basic protocols used in blockchain, and elaborate on their main advantages and limitations. To overcome these limitations, we will explore some of the challenges of managing large scale fully replicated ledgers in the context of achieving large scale consensus. Finally, we ponder over recent efforts to use blockchains in diverse applications.
Cite as
Amr El Abbadi. Demystifying Blockchains: Decentralized and Fault-Tolerant Storage for the Future of Big Data? (Keynote Lecture). In International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2019). Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs), Volume 71, p. 1:1, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2020)
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@InProceedings{abbadi:OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.1,
author = {Abbadi, Amr El},
title = {{Demystifying Blockchains: Decentralized and Fault-Tolerant Storage for the Future of Big Data?}},
booktitle = {International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2019)},
pages = {1:1--1:1},
series = {Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs)},
ISBN = {978-3-95977-108-5},
ISSN = {2190-6807},
year = {2020},
volume = {71},
editor = {Danos, Vincent and Herlihy, Maurice and Potop-Butucaru, Maria and Prat, Julien and Tucci-Piergiovanni, Sara},
publisher = {Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
address = {Dagstuhl, Germany},
URL = {https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.1},
URN = {urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-119658},
doi = {10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.1},
annote = {Keywords: distributed algorithms for databases, distributed storage, blockchains}
}
Document
Keynote Lecture
Flexible BFT: Separating BFT Protocol Design from the Fault Model (Keynote Lecture)
Abstract
Byzantine Fault Tolerant (BFT) protocols designed for building replicated services collapse if deployed under settings that differ from the fault model they are designed for. For example, in a partial-synchrony model, a known lower bound for BFT is 1/3. Optimal-resilience solutions completely break if the fraction of Byzantine faults exceeds 1/3. The only way we know to achieve > 1/3 resilience is by assuming synchrony, but this requires the protocol to be designed with that assumption. Flexible BFT is a new approach to BFT protocol design that separates between the fault model and the solution. Clients in Flexible BFT specify (i) the adversarial threshold they need to tolerate, and (ii) whether they believe in synchrony (and the presumed bound on transmission delays). We present a Flexible BFT solution that simultaneously supports different clients, who differ simply by the number of messages and/or time the clients are willing to wait for. At an even finer grain, Flexible BFT supports under the same solution high-value and low-value transactions, each tolerating a different threat model.
Cite as
Dahlia Malkhi. Flexible BFT: Separating BFT Protocol Design from the Fault Model (Keynote Lecture). In International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2019). Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs), Volume 71, p. 2:1, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2020)
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@InProceedings{malkhi:OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.2,
author = {Malkhi, Dahlia},
title = {{Flexible BFT: Separating BFT Protocol Design from the Fault Model}},
booktitle = {International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2019)},
pages = {2:1--2:1},
series = {Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs)},
ISBN = {978-3-95977-108-5},
ISSN = {2190-6807},
year = {2020},
volume = {71},
editor = {Danos, Vincent and Herlihy, Maurice and Potop-Butucaru, Maria and Prat, Julien and Tucci-Piergiovanni, Sara},
publisher = {Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
address = {Dagstuhl, Germany},
URL = {https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.2},
URN = {urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-119660},
doi = {10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.2},
annote = {Keywords: Byzantine fault-tolerance, blockchains}
}
Document
A Puff of Steem: Security Analysis of Decentralized Content Curation
Abstract
Decentralized content curation is the process through which uploaded posts are ranked and filtered based exclusively on users' feedback. Platforms such as the blockchain-based Steemit employ this type of curation while providing monetary incentives to promote the visibility of high quality posts according to the perception of the participants. Despite the wide adoption of the platform very little is known regarding its performance and resilience characteristics. In this work, we provide a formal model for decentralized content curation that identifies salient complexity and game-theoretic measures of performance and resilience to selfish participants. Armed with our model, we provide a first analysis of Steemit identifying the conditions under which the system can be expected to correctly converge to curation while we demonstrate its susceptibility to selfish participant behaviour. We validate our theoretical results with system simulations in various scenarios.
Cite as
Aggelos Kiayias, Benjamin Livshits, Andrés Monteoliva Mosteiro, and Orfeas Stefanos Thyfronitis Litos. A Puff of Steem: Security Analysis of Decentralized Content Curation. In International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2019). Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs), Volume 71, pp. 3:1-3:21, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2020)
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@InProceedings{kiayias_et_al:OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.3,
author = {Kiayias, Aggelos and Livshits, Benjamin and Monteoliva Mosteiro, Andr\'{e}s and Thyfronitis Litos, Orfeas Stefanos},
title = {{A Puff of Steem: Security Analysis of Decentralized Content Curation}},
booktitle = {International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2019)},
pages = {3:1--3:21},
series = {Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs)},
ISBN = {978-3-95977-108-5},
ISSN = {2190-6807},
year = {2020},
volume = {71},
editor = {Danos, Vincent and Herlihy, Maurice and Potop-Butucaru, Maria and Prat, Julien and Tucci-Piergiovanni, Sara},
publisher = {Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
address = {Dagstuhl, Germany},
URL = {https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.3},
URN = {urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-119675},
doi = {10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.3},
annote = {Keywords: blockchain, content curation, decentralized, voting}
}
Document
An Empirical Study of Speculative Concurrency in Ethereum Smart Contracts
Abstract
We use historical data to estimate the potential benefit of speculative techniques for executing Ethereum smart contracts in parallel. We replay transaction traces of sampled blocks from the Ethereum blockchain over time, using a simple speculative execution engine. In this engine, miners attempt to execute all transactions in a block in parallel, rolling back those that cause data conflicts. Aborted transactions are then executed sequentially. Validators execute the same schedule as miners.
We find that our speculative technique yields estimated speed-ups starting at about 8-fold in 2016, declining to about 2-fold at the end of 2017, where speed-up is measured using either gas costs or instruction counts. We also observe that a small set of contracts are responsible for many data conflicts resulting from speculative concurrent execution.
Cite as
Vikram Saraph and Maurice Herlihy. An Empirical Study of Speculative Concurrency in Ethereum Smart Contracts. In International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2019). Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs), Volume 71, pp. 4:1-4:15, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2020)
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@InProceedings{saraph_et_al:OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.4,
author = {Saraph, Vikram and Herlihy, Maurice},
title = {{An Empirical Study of Speculative Concurrency in Ethereum Smart Contracts}},
booktitle = {International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2019)},
pages = {4:1--4:15},
series = {Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs)},
ISBN = {978-3-95977-108-5},
ISSN = {2190-6807},
year = {2020},
volume = {71},
editor = {Danos, Vincent and Herlihy, Maurice and Potop-Butucaru, Maria and Prat, Julien and Tucci-Piergiovanni, Sara},
publisher = {Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
address = {Dagstuhl, Germany},
URL = {https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.4},
URN = {urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-119684},
doi = {10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.4},
annote = {Keywords: Blockchains, Smart Contracts}
}
Document
Atomic Appends: Selling Cars and Coordinating Armies with Multiple Distributed Ledgers
Abstract
The various applications using Distributed Ledger Technologies (DLT) or blockchains, have led to the introduction of a new "marketplace" where multiple types of digital assets may be exchanged. As each blockchain is designed to support specific types of assets and transactions, and no blockchain will prevail, the need to perform interblockchain transactions is already pressing.
In this work we examine the fundamental problem of interoperable and interconnected blockchains. In particular, we begin by introducing the Multi-Distributed Ledger Objects (MDLO), which is the result of aggregating multiple Distributed Ledger Objects - DLO (a DLO is a formalization of the blockchain) and that supports append and get operations of records (e.g., transactions) in them from multiple clients concurrently. Next we define the AtomicAppends problem, which emerges when the exchange of digital assets between multiple clients may involve appending records in more than one DLO. Specifically, AtomicAppend requires that either all records will be appended on the involved DLOs or none. We examine the solvability of this problem assuming rational and risk-averse clients that may fail by crashing, and under different client utility and append models, timing models, and client failure scenarios. We show that for some cases the existence of an intermediary is necessary for the problem solution. We propose the implementation of such intermediary over a specialized blockchain, we term Smart DLO (SDLO), and we show how this can be used to solve the AtomicAppends problem even in an asynchronous, client competitive environment, where all the clients may crash.
Cite as
Antonio Fernández Anta, Chryssis Georgiou, and Nicolas Nicolaou. Atomic Appends: Selling Cars and Coordinating Armies with Multiple Distributed Ledgers. In International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2019). Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs), Volume 71, pp. 5:1-5:16, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2020)
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@InProceedings{fernandezanta_et_al:OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.5,
author = {Fern\'{a}ndez Anta, Antonio and Georgiou, Chryssis and Nicolaou, Nicolas},
title = {{Atomic Appends: Selling Cars and Coordinating Armies with Multiple Distributed Ledgers}},
booktitle = {International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2019)},
pages = {5:1--5:16},
series = {Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs)},
ISBN = {978-3-95977-108-5},
ISSN = {2190-6807},
year = {2020},
volume = {71},
editor = {Danos, Vincent and Herlihy, Maurice and Potop-Butucaru, Maria and Prat, Julien and Tucci-Piergiovanni, Sara},
publisher = {Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
address = {Dagstuhl, Germany},
URL = {https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.5},
URN = {urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-119695},
doi = {10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.5},
annote = {Keywords: DLO, Interoperability, Atomic Appends, Rational Clients, Fault-tolerance}
}
Document
A Smart Contract Oracle for Approximating Real-World, Real Number Values
Abstract
A key challenge of smart contract systems is the fact that many useful contracts require access to information that does not natively live on the blockchain. While miners can verify the value of a hash or the validity of a digital signature, they cannot determine who won an election, whether there is a flood in Paris, or even what is the price of ether in US dollars, even though this information might be necessary to execute prediction market, insurance, or financial contracts respectively.
A number of promising projects and research developments have provided a better understanding of how one might construct a decentralized, binary oracle - namely an oracle that can respond by one of two possibilities, typically "yes" or "no", even while not requiring the interaction of a trusted third party. In this work, we extend these ideas to construct a general-purpose, decentralized oracle that can estimate the value of a real-world quantity that is in a dense totally ordered set, such as R. In particular, this proposal can be used to estimate real number valued quantities, such as required for a price oracle. We will establish a number of desirable properties about this proposal. Particularly, we will see that the precision of the output is tunable to users' needs.
Cite as
William George and Clément Lesaege. A Smart Contract Oracle for Approximating Real-World, Real Number Values. In International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2019). Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs), Volume 71, pp. 6:1-6:15, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2020)
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@InProceedings{george_et_al:OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.6,
author = {George, William and Lesaege, Cl\'{e}ment},
title = {{A Smart Contract Oracle for Approximating Real-World, Real Number Values}},
booktitle = {International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2019)},
pages = {6:1--6:15},
series = {Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs)},
ISBN = {978-3-95977-108-5},
ISSN = {2190-6807},
year = {2020},
volume = {71},
editor = {Danos, Vincent and Herlihy, Maurice and Potop-Butucaru, Maria and Prat, Julien and Tucci-Piergiovanni, Sara},
publisher = {Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
address = {Dagstuhl, Germany},
URL = {https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.6},
URN = {urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-119705},
doi = {10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.6},
annote = {Keywords: price oracle, Ethereum, blockchain}
}
Document
Cryptocurrency Egalitarianism: A Quantitative Approach
Abstract
Since the invention of Bitcoin one decade ago, numerous cryptocurrencies have sprung into existence. Among these, proof-of-work is the most common mechanism for achieving consensus, whilst a number of coins have adopted "ASIC-resistance" as a desirable property, claiming to be more "egalitarian," where egalitarianism refers to the power of each coin to participate in the creation of new coins. While proof-of-work consensus dominates the space, several new cryptocurrencies employ alternative consensus, such as proof-of-stake in which block minting opportunities are based on monetary ownership. A core criticism of proof-of-stake revolves around it being less egalitarian by making the rich richer, as opposed to proof-of-work in which everyone can contribute equally according to their computational power. In this paper, we give the first quantitative definition of a cryptocurrency’s egalitarianism. Based on our definition, we measure the egalitarianism of popular cryptocurrencies that (may or may not) employ ASIC-resistance, among them Bitcoin, Ethereum, Litecoin, and Monero. Our simulations show, as expected, that ASIC-resistance increases a cryptocurrency’s egalitarianism. We also measure the egalitarianism of a stake-based protocol, Ouroboros, and a hybrid proof-of-stake/proof-of-work cryptocurrency, Decred. We show that stake-based cryptocurrencies, under correctly selected parameters, can be perfectly egalitarian, perhaps contradicting folklore belief.
Cite as
Dimitris Karakostas, Aggelos Kiayias, Christos Nasikas, and Dionysis Zindros. Cryptocurrency Egalitarianism: A Quantitative Approach. In International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2019). Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs), Volume 71, pp. 7:1-7:21, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2020)
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@InProceedings{karakostas_et_al:OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.7,
author = {Karakostas, Dimitris and Kiayias, Aggelos and Nasikas, Christos and Zindros, Dionysis},
title = {{Cryptocurrency Egalitarianism: A Quantitative Approach}},
booktitle = {International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2019)},
pages = {7:1--7:21},
series = {Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs)},
ISBN = {978-3-95977-108-5},
ISSN = {2190-6807},
year = {2020},
volume = {71},
editor = {Danos, Vincent and Herlihy, Maurice and Potop-Butucaru, Maria and Prat, Julien and Tucci-Piergiovanni, Sara},
publisher = {Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
address = {Dagstuhl, Germany},
URL = {https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.7},
URN = {urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-119715},
doi = {10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.7},
annote = {Keywords: blockchain, egalitarianism, cryptocurrency, economics, proof-of-work, proof-of-stake}
}
Document
The Stability and the Security of the Tangle
Abstract
In this paper we study the stability and the security of the distributed data structure at the base of the IOTA protocol, called the Tangle. The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, we present a simple model to analyze the Tangle and give the first discrete time formal analyzes of the average number of unconfirmed transactions and the average confirmation time of a transaction.
Then, we define the notion of assiduous honest majority that captures the fact that the honest nodes have more hashing power than the adversarial nodes and that all this hashing power is constantly used to create transactions. This notion is important because we prove that it is a necessary assumption to protect the Tangle against double-spending attacks, and this is true for any tip selection algorithm (which is a fundamental building block of the protocol) that verifies some reasonable assumptions. In particular, the same is true with the Markov Chain Monte Carlo selection tip algorithm currently used in the IOTA protocol.
Our work shows that either all the honest nodes must constantly use all their hashing power to validate the main chain (similarly to the Bitcoin protocol) or some kind of authority must be provided to avoid this kind of attack (like in the current version of the IOTA where a coordinator is used).
The work presented here constitute a theoretical analysis and cannot be used to attack the current IOTA implementation. The goal of this paper is to present a formalization of the protocol and, as a starting point, to prove that some assumptions are necessary in order to defend the system again double-spending attacks. We hope that it will be used to improve the current protocol with a more formal approach.
Cite as
Quentin Bramas. The Stability and the Security of the Tangle. In International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2019). Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs), Volume 71, pp. 8:1-8:15, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2020)
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@InProceedings{bramas:OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.8,
author = {Bramas, Quentin},
title = {{The Stability and the Security of the Tangle}},
booktitle = {International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2019)},
pages = {8:1--8:15},
series = {Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs)},
ISBN = {978-3-95977-108-5},
ISSN = {2190-6807},
year = {2020},
volume = {71},
editor = {Danos, Vincent and Herlihy, Maurice and Potop-Butucaru, Maria and Prat, Julien and Tucci-Piergiovanni, Sara},
publisher = {Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
address = {Dagstuhl, Germany},
URL = {https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.8},
URN = {urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-119725},
doi = {10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.8},
annote = {Keywords: Distributed Ledger Technology, Security, Stability}
}
Document
The Impact of Ethereum Throughput and Fees on Transaction Latency During ICOs
Abstract
The Ethereum blockchain has gained popularity for its ability to implement Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs), whereby a buyer enters a market order agreement with a seller in order to purchase cryptographic tokens at an agreed price. The popularity of ICOs in 2017 has created an increasingly adversarial environment among potential buyers, who compete for what is often a fixed supply of tokens offered for a limited period of time.
We study the impact of a series of ICOs in order to understand the relationship between transaction fees, throughput and latency in Ethereum. Our analysis considers the effects on both Ethereum’s service providers, known as miners, and users who issue transactions in the network. Our results show that while buyers incentivise miners generously to include their transactions during ICOs, the latency of these transactions is predominantly determined by the levels of supply and demand in the network.
Cite as
Michael Spain, Sean Foley, and Vincent Gramoli. The Impact of Ethereum Throughput and Fees on Transaction Latency During ICOs. In International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2019). Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs), Volume 71, pp. 9:1-9:15, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2020)
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@InProceedings{spain_et_al:OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.9,
author = {Spain, Michael and Foley, Sean and Gramoli, Vincent},
title = {{The Impact of Ethereum Throughput and Fees on Transaction Latency During ICOs}},
booktitle = {International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2019)},
pages = {9:1--9:15},
series = {Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs)},
ISBN = {978-3-95977-108-5},
ISSN = {2190-6807},
year = {2020},
volume = {71},
editor = {Danos, Vincent and Herlihy, Maurice and Potop-Butucaru, Maria and Prat, Julien and Tucci-Piergiovanni, Sara},
publisher = {Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
address = {Dagstuhl, Germany},
URL = {https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.9},
URN = {urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-119735},
doi = {10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.9},
annote = {Keywords: ICO, Gas, Ethereum, Transaction Fee, Latency, Fairness}
}
Document
F1 Fee Distribution
Abstract
In a proof of stake blockchain, validators need to split the rewards gained from transaction fees each block. Furthermore, these fees must be fairly distributed to each of a validator’s constituent delegators. Delegators accrue this reward throughout the entire time which they are delegated, and they have a special operation to withdraw accrued rewards.
The F1 fee distribution scheme works for any algorithm to split fees and inflation between validators each block, with minimal iteration, and the only approximations being due to finite decimal precision. Per block there is a single iteration over the validator set, to enable reward algorithms that differ by validator. No iteration is required to delegate or to withdraw. The state usage is one state update per validator per block and one state entry per active delegation. F1 can optionally handle arbitrary inflation schemes, auto-bonding of rewards, and varying validator commission rates.
Cite as
Dev Ojha and Christopher Goes. F1 Fee Distribution. In International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2019). Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs), Volume 71, pp. 10:1-10:6, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2020)
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@InProceedings{ojha_et_al:OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.10,
author = {Ojha, Dev and Goes, Christopher},
title = {{F1 Fee Distribution}},
booktitle = {International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2019)},
pages = {10:1--10:6},
series = {Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs)},
ISBN = {978-3-95977-108-5},
ISSN = {2190-6807},
year = {2020},
volume = {71},
editor = {Danos, Vincent and Herlihy, Maurice and Potop-Butucaru, Maria and Prat, Julien and Tucci-Piergiovanni, Sara},
publisher = {Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
address = {Dagstuhl, Germany},
URL = {https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.10},
URN = {urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-119749},
doi = {10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.10},
annote = {Keywords: Proof of Stake, Fee Distribution, Cosmos}
}
Document
Selfish Mining and Dyck Words in Bitcoin and Ethereum Networks
Abstract
The main goal of this article is to present a direct approach for the formula giving the long-term apparent hashrates of Selfish Mining strategies using only elementary probabilities and combinatorics, more precisely, Dyck words. We can avoid computing stationary probabilities on Markov chain, nor stopping times for Poisson processes as in previous analysis. We do apply these techniques to other bockwithholding strategies in Bitcoin, and then, we consider also selfish mining in Ethereum.
Cite as
Cyril Grunspan and Ricardo Pérez-Marco. Selfish Mining and Dyck Words in Bitcoin and Ethereum Networks. In International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2019). Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs), Volume 71, pp. 11:1-11:10, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2020)
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@InProceedings{grunspan_et_al:OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.11,
author = {Grunspan, Cyril and P\'{e}rez-Marco, Ricardo},
title = {{Selfish Mining and Dyck Words in Bitcoin and Ethereum Networks}},
booktitle = {International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2019)},
pages = {11:1--11:10},
series = {Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs)},
ISBN = {978-3-95977-108-5},
ISSN = {2190-6807},
year = {2020},
volume = {71},
editor = {Danos, Vincent and Herlihy, Maurice and Potop-Butucaru, Maria and Prat, Julien and Tucci-Piergiovanni, Sara},
publisher = {Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
address = {Dagstuhl, Germany},
URL = {https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.11},
URN = {urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-119755},
doi = {10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.11},
annote = {Keywords: Bitcoin, Blockchain, Ethereum, Proof-of-Work, Selfish Mining, Stubborn Mining, Apparent Hashrate, Revenue Ratio, Catalan Distributions, Dyck Words, Random Walk}
}
Document
B-CoC: A Blockchain-Based Chain of Custody for Evidences Management in Digital Forensics
Abstract
One of the main issues in digital forensics is the management of evidences. From the time of evidence collection until the time of their exploitation in a legal court, evidences may be accessed by multiple parties involved in the investigation that take temporary their ownership. This process, called Chain of Custody (CoC), must ensure that evidences are not altered during the investigation, despite multiple entities owned them, in order to be admissible in a legal court. Currently digital evidences CoC is managed entirely manually with entities involved in the chain required to fill in documents accompanying the evidence. In this paper, we propose a Blockchain-based Chain of Custody (B-CoC) to dematerialize the CoC process guaranteeing auditable integrity of the collected evidences and traceability of owners. We developed a prototype of B-CoC based on Ethereum and we evaluated its performance.
Cite as
Silvia Bonomi, Marco Casini, and Claudio Ciccotelli. B-CoC: A Blockchain-Based Chain of Custody for Evidences Management in Digital Forensics. In International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2019). Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs), Volume 71, pp. 12:1-12:15, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2020)
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@InProceedings{bonomi_et_al:OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.12,
author = {Bonomi, Silvia and Casini, Marco and Ciccotelli, Claudio},
title = {{B-CoC: A Blockchain-Based Chain of Custody for Evidences Management in Digital Forensics}},
booktitle = {International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2019)},
pages = {12:1--12:15},
series = {Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs)},
ISBN = {978-3-95977-108-5},
ISSN = {2190-6807},
year = {2020},
volume = {71},
editor = {Danos, Vincent and Herlihy, Maurice and Potop-Butucaru, Maria and Prat, Julien and Tucci-Piergiovanni, Sara},
publisher = {Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
address = {Dagstuhl, Germany},
URL = {https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.12},
URN = {urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-119767},
doi = {10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.12},
annote = {Keywords: Digital Forensics, Chain of Custody, Digital Evidence, Private Blockchain, Ethereum}
}
Document
MixEth: Efficient, Trustless Coin Mixing Service for Ethereum
Abstract
Coin mixing is a prevalent privacy-enhancing technology for cryptocurrency users. In this paper, we present MixEth, which is a trustless coin mixing service for Turing-complete blockchains. MixEth does not rely on a trusted setup and is more efficient than any proposed trustless coin tumbler. It requires only 3 on-chain transactions at most per user and 1 off-chain message. It achieves strong notions of anonymity and is able to resist denial-of-service attacks. Furthermore the underlying protocol can also be used to efficiently shuffle ballots, ciphertexts in a trustless and decentralized manner.
Cite as
István András Seres, Dániel A. Nagy, Chris Buckland, and Péter Burcsi. MixEth: Efficient, Trustless Coin Mixing Service for Ethereum. In International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2019). Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs), Volume 71, pp. 13:1-13:20, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2020)
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@InProceedings{seres_et_al:OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.13,
author = {Seres, Istv\'{a}n Andr\'{a}s and Nagy, D\'{a}niel A. and Buckland, Chris and Burcsi, P\'{e}ter},
title = {{MixEth: Efficient, Trustless Coin Mixing Service for Ethereum}},
booktitle = {International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2019)},
pages = {13:1--13:20},
series = {Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs)},
ISBN = {978-3-95977-108-5},
ISSN = {2190-6807},
year = {2020},
volume = {71},
editor = {Danos, Vincent and Herlihy, Maurice and Potop-Butucaru, Maria and Prat, Julien and Tucci-Piergiovanni, Sara},
publisher = {Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
address = {Dagstuhl, Germany},
URL = {https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.13},
URN = {urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-119770},
doi = {10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.13},
annote = {Keywords: Cryptography, Verifiable shuffle, Anonymity, Cryptocurrency, Ethereum, Coin mixer, State Channel}
}