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Multi: A Formal Playground for Multi-Smart Contract Interaction

Authors Martín Ceresa , César Sánchez

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Author Details

Martín Ceresa
  • IMDEA Software Institute, Madrid, Spain
César Sánchez
  • IMDEA Software Institute, Madrid, Spain

Funding

This work was funded in part by the Madrid Regional Government under project "S2018/TCS-4339 (BLOQUES-CM)‘’ and by a research grant from Nomadic Labs and the Tezos Foundation.

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Martín Ceresa and César Sánchez. Multi: A Formal Playground for Multi-Smart Contract Interaction. In 4th International Workshop on Formal Methods for Blockchains (FMBC 2022). Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs), Volume 105, pp. 5:1-5:16, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2022) https://doi.org/10.4230/OASIcs.FMBC.2022.5

Abstract

Blockchains are maintained by a network of participants, miner nodes, that run algorithms designed to maintain collectively a distributed machine tolerant to Byzantine attacks. From the point of view of users, blockchains provide the illusion of centralized computers that perform trustable verifiable computations, where all computations are deterministic and the results cannot be manipulated or undone.
Every blockchain is equipped with a crypto-currency. Programs running on blockchains are called smart-contracts and are written in a special-purpose programming language with deterministic semantics. Each transaction begins with an invocation from an external user to a smart contract. Smart contracts have local storage and can call other contracts, and more importantly, they store, send and receive cryptocurrency.
Once installed in a blockchain, the code of the smart-contract cannot be modified. Therefore, it is very important to guarantee that contracts are correct before deployment. However, the resulting ecosystem makes it very difficult to reason about program correctness, since smart-contracts can be executed by malicious users or malicious smart-contracts can be designed to exploit other contracts that call them. Many attacks and bugs are caused by unexpected interactions between multiple contracts, the attacked contract and unknown code that performs the exploit.
Moreover, there is a very aggressive competition between different blockchains to expand their user base. Ideas are implemented fast and blockchains compete to offer and adopt new features quickly.
In this paper, we propose a formal playground that allows reasoning about multi-contract interactions and is extensible to incorporate new features, study their behaviour and ultimately prove properties before features are incorporated into the real blockchain. We implemented a model of computation that models the execution platform, abstracts the internal code of each individual contract and focuses on contract interactions. Even though our Coq implementation is still a work in progress, we show how many features, existing or proposed, can be used to reason about multi-contract interactions.

Subject Classification

ACM Subject Classification
  • Theory of computation → Program reasoning
  • Theory of computation → Program constructs
  • Theory of computation → Abstract machines
Keywords
  • blockchain
  • formal methods
  • theorem prover
  • smart-contracts

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References

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