Search Results

Documents authored by Canidio, Andrea

Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2023.24
Batching Trades on Automated Market Makers

Authors: Andrea Canidio and Robin Fritsch

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 282, 5th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2023)

Abstract
We consider an automated market maker (AMM) in which all trades are batched and executed at a price equal to the marginal price (i.e., the price of an arbitrarily small trade) after the batch trades. We show that such an AMM is a function maximizing AMM (or FM-AMM): for given prices, it trades to reach the highest possible value of a given function. Competition between arbitrageurs guarantees that an FM-AMM always trades at a fair, equilibrium price, and arbitrage profits (also known as LVR) are eliminated. Sandwich attacks are also eliminated because all trades occur at the exogenously-determined equilibrium price. Finally, we show that our results are robust to the case where the batch has exclusive access to the FM-AMM, but can also trade on a traditional constant function AMM.
Cite as

Andrea Canidio and Robin Fritsch. Batching Trades on Automated Market Makers. In 5th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2023). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 282, pp. 24:1-24:17, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2023)

Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{canidio_et_al:LIPIcs.AFT.2023.24,
  author =	{Canidio, Andrea and Fritsch, Robin},
  title =	{{Batching Trades on Automated Market Makers}},
  booktitle =	{5th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2023)},
  pages =	{24:1--24:17},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-303-4},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2023},
  volume =	{282},
  editor =	{Bonneau, Joseph and Weinberg, S. Matthew},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2023.24},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-192139},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2023.24},
  annote =	{Keywords: Arbitrage profits, Loss-vs-Rebalancing (LVR), MEV, Sandwich attacks, AMM, Mechanism design, Batch trading}
}
Document
Extended Abstract
DOI: 10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.7
Commit-Reveal Schemes Against Front-Running Attacks (Extended Abstract)

Authors: Andrea Canidio and Vincent Danos

Published in: OASIcs, Volume 110, 4th International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2022)

Abstract
We provide a game-theoretic analysis of the problem of front-running attacks. We use it to study a simple commit-reveal protocol and discuss its properties. This protocol has costs because it requires two messages and imposes a delay. However, we show that it prevents the most severe front-running attacks ("bad MEV") while preserving legitimate competition between users, guaranteeing that the earliest transaction in a block belongs to the honest user who values it the most ("good MEV").
Cite as

Andrea Canidio and Vincent Danos. Commit-Reveal Schemes Against Front-Running Attacks (Extended Abstract). In 4th International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2022). Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs), Volume 110, pp. 7:1-7:5, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2023)

Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{canidio_et_al:OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.7,
  author =	{Canidio, Andrea and Danos, Vincent},
  title =	{{Commit-Reveal Schemes Against Front-Running Attacks}},
  booktitle =	{4th International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2022)},
  pages =	{7:1--7:5},
  series =	{Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-274-7},
  ISSN =	{2190-6807},
  year =	{2023},
  volume =	{110},
  editor =	{Amoussou-Guenou, Yackolley and Kiayias, Aggelos and Verdier, Marianne},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.7},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-184241},
  doi =		{10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.7},
  annote =	{Keywords: Front running, Game theory, MEV, Transactions reordering, commit-reveal}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2020.6
VeriOSS: Using the Blockchain to Foster Bug Bounty Programs

Authors: Andrea Canidio, Gabriele Costa, and Letterio Galletta

Published in: OASIcs, Volume 82, 2nd International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2020)

Abstract
Nowadays software is everywhere and this is particularly true for free and open source software (FOSS). Discovering bugs in FOSS projects is of paramount importance and many bug bounty programs attempt to attract skilled analysts by promising rewards. Nevertheless, developing an effective bug bounty program is challenging. As a consequence, many programs fail to support an efficient and fair bug bounty market. In this paper, we present VeriOSS, a novel bug bounty platform. The idea behind VeriOSS is to exploit the blockchain technology to develop a fair and efficient bug bounty market. To this aim, VeriOSS combines formal guarantees and economic incentives to ensure that the bug disclosure is both reliable and convenient for the market actors.
Cite as

Andrea Canidio, Gabriele Costa, and Letterio Galletta. VeriOSS: Using the Blockchain to Foster Bug Bounty Programs. In 2nd International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2020). Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs), Volume 82, pp. 6:1-6:14, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2021)

Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{canidio_et_al:OASIcs.Tokenomics.2020.6,
  author =	{Canidio, Andrea and Costa, Gabriele and Galletta, Letterio},
  title =	{{VeriOSS: Using the Blockchain to Foster Bug Bounty Programs}},
  booktitle =	{2nd International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2020)},
  pages =	{6:1--6:14},
  series =	{Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-157-3},
  ISSN =	{2190-6807},
  year =	{2021},
  volume =	{82},
  editor =	{Anceaume, Emmanuelle and Bisi\`{e}re, Christophe and Bouvard, Matthieu and Bramas, Quentin and Casamatta, Catherine},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2020.6},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-135286},
  doi =		{10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2020.6},
  annote =	{Keywords: Bug Bounty, Decentralized platforms, Symbolic-reverse debugging}
}
Questions / Remarks / Feedback
X

Feedback for Dagstuhl Publishing


Thanks for your feedback!

Feedback submitted

Could not send message

Please try again later or send an E-mail
© 2023-2024 Schloss Dagstuhl – LZI GmbH Imprint Privacy Contact