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Documents authored by Chandran, Nishanth


Document
Universally Composable Almost-Everywhere Secure Computation

Authors: Nishanth Chandran, Pouyan Forghani, Juan Garay, Rafail Ostrovsky, Rutvik Patel, and Vassilis Zikas

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 230, 3rd Conference on Information-Theoretic Cryptography (ITC 2022)


Abstract
Most existing work on secure multi-party computation (MPC) ignores a key idiosyncrasy of modern communication networks, that there are a limited number of communication paths between any two nodes, many of which might even be corrupted. The problem becomes particularly acute in the information-theoretic setting, where the lack of trusted setups (and the cryptographic primitives they enable) makes communication over sparse networks more challenging. The work by Garay and Ostrovsky [EUROCRYPT'08] on almost-everywhere MPC (AE-MPC), introduced "best-possible security" properties for MPC over such incomplete networks, where necessarily some of the honest parties may be excluded from the computation. In this work, we provide a universally composable definition of almost-everywhere security, which allows us to automatically and accurately capture the guarantees of AE-MPC (as well as AE-communication, the analogous "best-possible security" version of secure communication) in the Universal Composability (UC) framework of Canetti. Our results offer the first simulation-based treatment of this important but under-investigated problem, along with the first simulation-based proof of AE-MPC. To achieve that goal, we state and prove a general composition theorem, which makes precise the level or "quality" of AE-security that is obtained when a protocol’s hybrids are replaced with almost-everywhere components.

Cite as

Nishanth Chandran, Pouyan Forghani, Juan Garay, Rafail Ostrovsky, Rutvik Patel, and Vassilis Zikas. Universally Composable Almost-Everywhere Secure Computation. In 3rd Conference on Information-Theoretic Cryptography (ITC 2022). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 230, pp. 14:1-14:25, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2022)


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@InProceedings{chandran_et_al:LIPIcs.ITC.2022.14,
  author =	{Chandran, Nishanth and Forghani, Pouyan and Garay, Juan and Ostrovsky, Rafail and Patel, Rutvik and Zikas, Vassilis},
  title =	{{Universally Composable Almost-Everywhere Secure Computation}},
  booktitle =	{3rd Conference on Information-Theoretic Cryptography (ITC 2022)},
  pages =	{14:1--14:25},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-238-9},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2022},
  volume =	{230},
  editor =	{Dachman-Soled, Dana},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITC.2022.14},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-164929},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ITC.2022.14},
  annote =	{Keywords: Secure multi-party computation, universal composability, almost-everywhere secure computation, sparse graphs, secure message transmission}
}
Document
Hierarchical Functional Encryption

Authors: Zvika Brakerski, Nishanth Chandran, Vipul Goyal, Aayush Jain, Amit Sahai, and Gil Segev

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 67, 8th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2017)


Abstract
Functional encryption provides fine-grained access control for encrypted data, allowing each user to learn only specific functions of the encrypted data. We study the notion of hierarchical functional encryption, which augments functional encryption with delegation capabilities, offering significantly more expressive access control. We present a generic transformation that converts any general-purpose public-key functional encryption scheme into a hierarchical one without relying on any additional assumptions. This significantly refines our understanding of the power of functional encryption, showing that the existence of functional encryption is equivalent to that of its hierarchical generalization. Instantiating our transformation with the existing functional encryption schemes yields a variety of hierarchical schemes offering various trade-offs between their delegation capabilities (i.e., the depth and width of their hierarchical structures) and underlying assumptions. When starting with a scheme secure against an unbounded number of collusions, we can support arbitrary hierarchical structures. In addition, even when starting with schemes that are secure against a bounded number of collusions (which are known to exist under rather minimal assumptions such as the existence of public-key encryption and shallow pseudorandom generators), we can support hierarchical structures of bounded depth and width.

Cite as

Zvika Brakerski, Nishanth Chandran, Vipul Goyal, Aayush Jain, Amit Sahai, and Gil Segev. Hierarchical Functional Encryption. In 8th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2017). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 67, pp. 8:1-8:27, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2017)


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@InProceedings{brakerski_et_al:LIPIcs.ITCS.2017.8,
  author =	{Brakerski, Zvika and Chandran, Nishanth and Goyal, Vipul and Jain, Aayush and Sahai, Amit and Segev, Gil},
  title =	{{Hierarchical Functional Encryption}},
  booktitle =	{8th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2017)},
  pages =	{8:1--8:27},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-029-3},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2017},
  volume =	{67},
  editor =	{Papadimitriou, Christos H.},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2017.8},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-81992},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2017.8},
  annote =	{Keywords: Functional Encryption, Delegatable Encryption, Cryptography}
}
Document
Block-Wise Non-Malleable Codes

Authors: Nishanth Chandran, Vipul Goyal, Pratyay Mukherjee, Omkant Pandey, and Jalaj Upadhyay

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 55, 43rd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2016)


Abstract
Non-malleable codes, introduced by Dziembowski, Pietrzak, and Wichs (ICS'10) provide the guarantee that if a codeword c of a message m, is modified by a tampering function f to c', then c' either decodes to m or to "something unrelated" to m. In recent literature, a lot of focus has been on explicitly constructing such codes against a large and natural class of tampering functions such as split-state model in which the tampering function operates on different parts of the codeword independently. In this work, we consider a stronger adversarial model called block-wise tampering model, in which we allow tampering to depend on more than one block: if a codeword consists of two blocks c = (c1, c2), then the first tampering function f1 could produce a tampered part c'_1 = f1(c1) and the second tampering function f2 could produce c'_2 = f2(c1, c2) depending on both c2 and c1. The notion similarly extends to multiple blocks where tampering of block ci could happen with the knowledge of all cj for j <= i. We argue this is a natural notion where, for example, the blocks are sent one by one and the adversary must send the tampered block before it gets the next block. A little thought reveals that it is impossible to construct such codes that are non-malleable (in the standard sense) against such a powerful adversary: indeed, upon receiving the last block, an adversary could decode the entire codeword and then can tamper depending on the message. In light of this impossibility, we consider a natural relaxation called non-malleable codes with replacement which requires the adversary to produce not only related but also a valid codeword in order to succeed. Unfortunately, we show that even this relaxed definition is not achievable in the information-theoretic setting (i.e., when the tampering functions can be unbounded) which implies that we must turn our attention towards computationally bounded adversaries. As our main result, we show how to construct a block-wise non-malleable code (BNMC) from sub-exponentially hard one-way permutations. We provide an interesting connection between BNMC and non-malleable commitments. We show that any BNMC can be converted into a nonmalleable (w.r.t. opening) commitment scheme. Our techniques, quite surprisingly, give rise to a non-malleable commitment scheme (secure against so-called synchronizing adversaries), in which only the committer sends messages. We believe this result to be of independent interest. In the other direction, we show that any non-interactive non-malleable (w.r.t. opening) commitment can be used to construct BNMC only with 2 blocks. Unfortunately, such commitment scheme exists only under highly non-standard assumptions (adaptive one-way functions) and hence can not substitute our main construction.

Cite as

Nishanth Chandran, Vipul Goyal, Pratyay Mukherjee, Omkant Pandey, and Jalaj Upadhyay. Block-Wise Non-Malleable Codes. In 43rd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2016). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 55, pp. 31:1-31:14, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2016)


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@InProceedings{chandran_et_al:LIPIcs.ICALP.2016.31,
  author =	{Chandran, Nishanth and Goyal, Vipul and Mukherjee, Pratyay and Pandey, Omkant and Upadhyay, Jalaj},
  title =	{{Block-Wise Non-Malleable Codes}},
  booktitle =	{43rd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2016)},
  pages =	{31:1--31:14},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-013-2},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2016},
  volume =	{55},
  editor =	{Chatzigiannakis, Ioannis and Mitzenmacher, Michael and Rabani, Yuval and Sangiorgi, Davide},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2016.31},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-63102},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2016.31},
  annote =	{Keywords: Non-malleable codes, Non-malleable commitments, Block-wise Tampering, Complexity-leveraging}
}
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