Search Results

Documents authored by Del Pozzo, Antonella

Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2023.4
The Synchronization Power of Auditable Registers

Authors: Hagit Attiya, Antonella Del Pozzo, Alessia Milani, Ulysse Pavloff, and Alexandre Rapetti

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 286, 27th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2023)

Abstract
Auditability allows to track all the read operations performed on a register. It abstracts the need of data owners to control access to their data, tracking who read which information. This work considers possible formalizations of auditing and their ramification for the possibility of providing it. The natural definition is to require a linearization of all write, read and audit operations together (atomic auditing). The paper shows that atomic auditing is a powerful tool, as it can be used to solve consensus. The number of processes that can solve consensus using atomic audit depends on the number of processes that can read or audit the register. If there is a single reader or a single auditor (the writer), then consensus can be solved among two processes. If multiple readers and auditors are possible, then consensus can be solved among the same number of processes. This means that strong synchronization primitives are needed to support atomic auditing. We give implementations of atomic audit when there are either multiple readers or multiple auditors (but not both) using primitives with consensus number 2 (swap and fetch&add). When there are multiple readers and multiple auditors, the implementation uses compare&swap. These findings motivate a weaker definition, in which audit operations are not linearized together with read and write operations (regular auditing). We prove that regular auditing can be implemented from ordinary reads and writes on atomic registers.
Cite as

Hagit Attiya, Antonella Del Pozzo, Alessia Milani, Ulysse Pavloff, and Alexandre Rapetti. The Synchronization Power of Auditable Registers. In 27th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2023). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 286, pp. 4:1-4:23, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2024)

Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{attiya_et_al:LIPIcs.OPODIS.2023.4,
  author =	{Attiya, Hagit and Del Pozzo, Antonella and Milani, Alessia and Pavloff, Ulysse and Rapetti, Alexandre},
  title =	{{The Synchronization Power of Auditable Registers}},
  booktitle =	{27th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2023)},
  pages =	{4:1--4:23},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-308-9},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2024},
  volume =	{286},
  editor =	{Bessani, Alysson and D\'{e}fago, Xavier and Nakamura, Junya and Wada, Koichi and Yamauchi, Yukiko},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2023.4},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-194940},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2023.4},
  annote =	{Keywords: Auditability, atomic register, fault tolerance, consensus number}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/OASIcs.FAB.2022.5
Fork Accountability in Tenderbake

Authors: Antonella Del Pozzo and Thibault Rieutord

Published in: OASIcs, Volume 101, 5th International Symposium on Foundations and Applications of Blockchain 2022 (FAB 2022)

Abstract
This work investigates the Fork Accountability problem in the BFT-Consensus-based Blockchain context. When there are more attackers than the tolerated ones, BFT-Consensus may fail in delivering safety. When this occurs, Fork Accountability aims to account for the responsible processes for that safety violation. As a case study, we consider Tenderbake when the assumption on the maximum number of Byzantine validators - participants involved in creating the next block - does not hold anymore. When a fork occurs, there are more than one-third of Byzantine validators, and we aim to account for the responsible validators to remove them from the system. In this work, we compare three different approaches to implementing accountability in the case of a fork. In particular, we show that in the case of a fork, if we do not modify Tenderbake or we enrich it with a reliable broadcast communication abstraction, then we can account Byzantine processes only in particular scenarios. Contrarily, if we change Tenderbake such that the exchanged messages also carry extra information (which size is proportional to the duration of the current consensus computation), then we can account for Byzantine processes in all kinds of scenarios; however, at the cost of unbounded message size and unbounded local memory.
Cite as

Antonella Del Pozzo and Thibault Rieutord. Fork Accountability in Tenderbake. In 5th International Symposium on Foundations and Applications of Blockchain 2022 (FAB 2022). Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs), Volume 101, pp. 5:1-5:22, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2022)

Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{delpozzo_et_al:OASIcs.FAB.2022.5,
  author =	{Del Pozzo, Antonella and Rieutord, Thibault},
  title =	{{Fork Accountability in Tenderbake}},
  booktitle =	{5th International Symposium on Foundations and Applications of Blockchain 2022 (FAB 2022)},
  pages =	{5:1--5:22},
  series =	{Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-248-8},
  ISSN =	{2190-6807},
  year =	{2022},
  volume =	{101},
  editor =	{Tucci-Piergiovanni, Sara and Crooks, Natacha},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/OASIcs.FAB.2022.5},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-162723},
  doi =		{10.4230/OASIcs.FAB.2022.5},
  annote =	{Keywords: Blockchain, BFT-Consensus, Fork Accountability}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2021.6
On Finality in Blockchains

Authors: Emmanuelle Anceaume, Antonella Del Pozzo, Thibault Rieutord, and Sara Tucci-Piergiovanni

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 217, 25th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2021)

Abstract
This paper focuses on blockchain finality, which refers to the time when it becomes impossible to remove a block that has previously been appended to the blockchain. Blockchain finality can be deterministic or probabilistic, immediate or eventual. To favor availability against consistency in the face of partitions, most blockchains only offer probabilistic eventual finality: blocks may be revoked after being appended to the blockchain, yet with decreasing probability as they sink deeper into the chain. Other blockchains favor consistency by leveraging the immediate finality of Consensus - a block appended is never revoked - at the cost of additional synchronization. The quest for "good" deterministic finality properties for blockchains is still in its infancy, though. Our motivation is to provide a thorough study of several possible deterministic finality properties and explore their solvability. This is achieved by introducing the notion of bounded revocation, which informally says that the number of blocks that can be revoked from the current blockchain is bounded. Based on the requirements we impose on this revocation number, we provide reductions between different forms of eventual finality, Consensus and Eventual Consensus. From these reductions, we show some related impossibility results in presence of Byzantine processes, and provide non-trivial results. In particular, we provide an algorithm that solves a weak form of eventual finality in an asynchronous system in presence of an unbounded number of Byzantine processes. We also provide an algorithm that solves eventual finality with a bounded revocation number in an eventually synchronous environment in presence of less than half of Byzantine processes. The simplicity of the arguments should better guide blockchain designs and link them to clear formal properties of finality.
Cite as

Emmanuelle Anceaume, Antonella Del Pozzo, Thibault Rieutord, and Sara Tucci-Piergiovanni. On Finality in Blockchains. In 25th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2021). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 217, pp. 6:1-6:19, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2022)

Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{anceaume_et_al:LIPIcs.OPODIS.2021.6,
  author =	{Anceaume, Emmanuelle and Del Pozzo, Antonella and Rieutord, Thibault and Tucci-Piergiovanni, Sara},
  title =	{{On Finality in Blockchains}},
  booktitle =	{25th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2021)},
  pages =	{6:1--6:19},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-219-8},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2022},
  volume =	{217},
  editor =	{Bramas, Quentin and Gramoli, Vincent and Milani, Alessia},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2021.6},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-157810},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2021.6},
  annote =	{Keywords: Blockchain, consistency properties, Byzantine tolerant implementations}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/OASIcs.FAB.2021.1
Tenderbake - A Solution to Dynamic Repeated Consensus for Blockchains

Authors: Lăcrămioara Aştefănoaei, Pierre Chambart, Antonella Del Pozzo, Thibault Rieutord, Sara Tucci-Piergiovanni, and Eugen Zălinescu

Published in: OASIcs, Volume 92, 4th International Symposium on Foundations and Applications of Blockchain 2021 (FAB 2021)

Abstract
First-generation blockchains provide probabilistic finality: a block can be revoked, albeit the probability decreases as the block "sinks" deeper into the chain. Recent proposals revisited committee-based BFT consensus to provide deterministic finality: as soon as a block is validated, it is never revoked. A distinguishing characteristic of these second-generation blockchains over classical BFT protocols is that committees change over time as the participation and the blockchain state evolve. In this paper, we push forward in this direction by proposing a formalization of the Dynamic Repeated Consensus problem and by providing generic procedures to solve it in the context of blockchains. Our approach is modular in that one can plug in different synchronizers and single-shot consensus. To offer a complete solution, we provide a concrete instantiation, called {{Tenderbake}}, and present a blockchain synchronizer and a single-shot consensus algorithm, working in a Byzantine and partially synchronous system model with eventually synchronous clocks. In contrast to recent proposals, our methodology is driven by the need to bound the message buffers. This is essential in preventing spamming and run-time memory errors. Moreover, {{Tenderbake}} processes can synchronize with each other without exchanging messages, leveraging instead the information stored in the blockchain.
Cite as

Lăcrămioara Aştefănoaei, Pierre Chambart, Antonella Del Pozzo, Thibault Rieutord, Sara Tucci-Piergiovanni, and Eugen Zălinescu. Tenderbake - A Solution to Dynamic Repeated Consensus for Blockchains. In 4th International Symposium on Foundations and Applications of Blockchain 2021 (FAB 2021). Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs), Volume 92, pp. 1:1-1:23, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2021)

Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{astefanoaei_et_al:OASIcs.FAB.2021.1,
  author =	{A\c{s}tef\u{a}noaei, L\u{a}cr\u{a}mioara and Chambart, Pierre and Del Pozzo, Antonella and Rieutord, Thibault and Tucci-Piergiovanni, Sara and Z\u{a}linescu, Eugen},
  title =	{{Tenderbake - A Solution to Dynamic Repeated Consensus for Blockchains}},
  booktitle =	{4th International Symposium on Foundations and Applications of Blockchain 2021 (FAB 2021)},
  pages =	{1:1--1:23},
  series =	{Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-196-2},
  ISSN =	{2190-6807},
  year =	{2021},
  volume =	{92},
  editor =	{Gramoli, Vincent and Sadoghi, Mohammad},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/OASIcs.FAB.2021.1},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-139877},
  doi =		{10.4230/OASIcs.FAB.2021.1},
  annote =	{Keywords: Blockchain, BFT-Consensus, Dynamic Repeated Consensus}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2020.4
On Fairness in Committee-Based Blockchains

Authors: Yackolley Amoussou-Guenou, Antonella Del Pozzo, Maria Potop-Butucaru, and Sara Tucci-Piergiovanni

Published in: OASIcs, Volume 82, 2nd International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2020)

Abstract
Committee-based blockchains are among the most popular alternatives of proof-of-work based blockchains, such as Bitcoin. They provide strong consistency (no fork) under classical assumptions, and avoid using energy-consuming mechanisms to add new blocks in the blockchain. For each block, these blockchains use a committee that executes Byzantine-fault tolerant distributed consensus to decide the next block they will add in the blockchain. Unlike Bitcoin, where there is only one creator per block, in committee-based blockchain any block is cooperatively created. In order to incentivize committee members to participate in the creation of new blocks, rewarding schemes have to be designed. In this paper, we study the fairness of rewarding in committee-based blockchains and we provide necessary and sufficient conditions on the system communication under which it is possible to have a fair reward mechanism.
Cite as

Yackolley Amoussou-Guenou, Antonella Del Pozzo, Maria Potop-Butucaru, and Sara Tucci-Piergiovanni. On Fairness in Committee-Based Blockchains. In 2nd International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2020). Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs), Volume 82, pp. 4:1-4:15, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2021)

Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{amoussouguenou_et_al:OASIcs.Tokenomics.2020.4,
  author =	{Amoussou-Guenou, Yackolley and Del Pozzo, Antonella and Potop-Butucaru, Maria and Tucci-Piergiovanni, Sara},
  title =	{{On Fairness in Committee-Based Blockchains}},
  booktitle =	{2nd International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2020)},
  pages =	{4:1--4:15},
  series =	{Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-157-3},
  ISSN =	{2190-6807},
  year =	{2021},
  volume =	{82},
  editor =	{Anceaume, Emmanuelle and Bisi\`{e}re, Christophe and Bouvard, Matthieu and Bramas, Quentin and Casamatta, Catherine},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2020.4},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-135261},
  doi =		{10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2020.4},
  annote =	{Keywords: Blockchain, Consensus, Committee, Fairness, Proof-of-Stake, Reward, Selection}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2018.16
Correctness of Tendermint-Core Blockchains

Authors: Yackolley Amoussou-Guenou, Antonella Del Pozzo, Maria Potop-Butucaru, and Sara Tucci-Piergiovanni

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 125, 22nd International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2018)

Abstract
Tendermint-core blockchains (e.g. Cosmos) are considered today one of the most viable alternatives for the highly energy consuming proof-of-work blockchains such as Bitcoin and Ethereum. Their particularity is that they aim at offering strong consistency (no forks) in an open system combining two ingredients (i) a set of validators that generate blocks via a variant of Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerant (PBFT) consensus protocol and (ii) a selection strategy that dynamically selects nodes to be validators for the next block via a proof-of-stake mechanism. The exact assumptions on the system model under which Tendermint underlying algorithms are correct and the exact properties Tendermint verifies, however, have never been formally analyzed. The contribution of this paper is as follows. First, while formalizing Tendermint algorithms we precisely characterize the system model and the exact problem solved by Tendermint, then, we prove that in eventual synchronous systems a modified version of Tendermint solves (i) under additional assumptions, a variant of one-shot consensus for the validation of one single block and (ii) a variant of the repeated consensus problem for multiple blocks. These results hold even if the set of validators is hit by Byzantine failures, provided that for each one-shot consensus instance less than one third of the validators is Byzantine.
Cite as

Yackolley Amoussou-Guenou, Antonella Del Pozzo, Maria Potop-Butucaru, and Sara Tucci-Piergiovanni. Correctness of Tendermint-Core Blockchains. In 22nd International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2018). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 125, pp. 16:1-16:16, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2019)

Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{amoussouguenou_et_al:LIPIcs.OPODIS.2018.16,
  author =	{Amoussou-Guenou, Yackolley and Del Pozzo, Antonella and Potop-Butucaru, Maria and Tucci-Piergiovanni, Sara},
  title =	{{Correctness of Tendermint-Core Blockchains}},
  booktitle =	{22nd International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2018)},
  pages =	{16:1--16:16},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-098-9},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2019},
  volume =	{125},
  editor =	{Cao, Jiannong and Ellen, Faith and Rodrigues, Luis and Ferreira, Bernardo},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2018.16},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-100764},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2018.16},
  annote =	{Keywords: Blockchain, Consensus, Proof-of-Stake, Fairness}
}
Questions / Remarks / Feedback
X

Feedback for Dagstuhl Publishing


Thanks for your feedback!

Feedback submitted

Could not send message

Please try again later or send an E-mail
© 2023-2024 Schloss Dagstuhl – LZI GmbH Imprint Privacy Contact