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License Auctions with Royalty Contracts for (Winners and) Losers

Authors: Elmar Wolfstetter and Thomas Giebe

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7271, Computational Social Systems and the Internet (2007)

Abstract

This paper revisits the licensing of a non--drastic process innovation by an outside innovator to a Cournot oligopoly. We propose a new mechanism that combines a restrictive license auction with royalty licensing. This mechanism is more profitable than standard license auctions, auctioning royalty contracts, fixed--fee licensing, pure royalty licensing, and two-part tariffs. The key features are that royalty contracts are auctioned and that losers of the auction are granted the option to sign a royalty contract. Remarkably, combining royalties for winners and losers makes the integer constraint concerning the number of licenses irrelevant.

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Elmar Wolfstetter and Thomas Giebe. License Auctions with Royalty Contracts for (Winners and) Losers. In Computational Social Systems and the Internet. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7271, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)

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@InProceedings{wolfstetter_et_al:DagSemProc.07271.9,
  author =	{Wolfstetter, Elmar and Giebe, Thomas},
  title =	{{License Auctions with Royalty Contracts for (Winners and) Losers}},
  booktitle =	{Computational Social Systems and the Internet},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{7271},
  editor =	{Peter Cramton and Rudolf M\"{u}ller and Eva Tardos and Moshe Tennenholtz},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.9},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-11514},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.9},
  annote =	{Keywords: Auctions, Patents, Licensing}
}

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Documents authored by Giebe, Thomas

License Auctions with Royalty Contracts for (Winners and) Losers

Abstract

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