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Documents authored by Gimpel, Henner


Document
Market Engineering: An Interdisciplinary Research Challenge

Authors: Christof Weinhardt and Henner Gimpel

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 6461, Negotiation and Market Engineering (2007)


Abstract
Market engineering is making markets work. Markets are information processing and information producing information systems which mediate allocation of resources within or between organizations. Setting up and operating a market in a way that it works effectively and efficiently is an art and a science. This paper outlines challenges in this interdisciplinary field of research and presents frameworks for assessing markets.

Cite as

Christof Weinhardt and Henner Gimpel. Market Engineering: An Interdisciplinary Research Challenge. In Negotiation and Market Engineering. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 6461, pp. 1-15, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)


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@InProceedings{weinhardt_et_al:DagSemProc.06461.12,
  author =	{Weinhardt, Christof and Gimpel, Henner},
  title =	{{Market Engineering: An Interdisciplinary Research Challenge}},
  booktitle =	{Negotiation and Market Engineering},
  pages =	{1--15},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{6461},
  editor =	{Nick Jennings and Gregory Kersten and Axel Ockenfels and Christof Weinhardt},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.12},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-9880},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.12},
  annote =	{Keywords: Markets, Auctions, Negotiations, Economic Engineering, Market Engineering}
}
Document
Negotiation Fever: Loss Aversion in Multi-Issue Negotiations

Authors: Henner Gimpel

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 6461, Negotiation and Market Engineering (2007)


Abstract
Negotiating parties oftentimes do not reach mutually beneficial agreements. A considerable body of research on negotiation analysis compiled a set of so called common biases in negotiations that systematically affect the cognition and behavior of negotiators and thereby influence agreements. The present work adds an additional effect, the attachment effect. This effect biases decision makers in bilateral multi-issue negotiations and influences their preferences via reference points---negotiators get caught in a kind of negotiation fever.

Cite as

Henner Gimpel. Negotiation Fever: Loss Aversion in Multi-Issue Negotiations. In Negotiation and Market Engineering. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 6461, pp. 1-4, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)


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@InProceedings{gimpel:DagSemProc.06461.13,
  author =	{Gimpel, Henner},
  title =	{{Negotiation Fever: Loss Aversion in Multi-Issue Negotiations}},
  booktitle =	{Negotiation and Market Engineering},
  pages =	{1--4},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{6461},
  editor =	{Nick Jennings and Gregory Kersten and Axel Ockenfels and Christof Weinhardt},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.13},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-9982},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.13},
  annote =	{Keywords: Negotiation Analysis, Consumer Preferences, Behavioral Economics, Experimental Economics, Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion}
}
Document
Reference-Dependent Preferences in Multi-Issue Bargaining

Authors: Henner Gimpel

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 5011, Computing and Markets (2005)


Abstract
Game theoretic bargaining models usually assume parties to have exogenously given preferences from the beginning of a negotiation on. Preferences in these models do not depend on the history of offers made during a negotiation. This paper argues that preferences are based on issue-wise reference points changing during the bargaining process as result of the counterpartys offers.

Cite as

Henner Gimpel. Reference-Dependent Preferences in Multi-Issue Bargaining. In Computing and Markets. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 5011, pp. 1-5, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2005)


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@InProceedings{gimpel:DagSemProc.05011.13,
  author =	{Gimpel, Henner},
  title =	{{Reference-Dependent Preferences in Multi-Issue Bargaining}},
  booktitle =	{Computing and Markets},
  pages =	{1--5},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2005},
  volume =	{5011},
  editor =	{Daniel Lehmann and Rudolf M\"{u}ller and Tuomas Sandholm},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.05011.13},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-2038},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.05011.13},
  annote =	{Keywords: compact representation of games, congestion games, local-effect games, action-graph gamescomputational markets; auctions; bidding strategiesNegotiatio}
}
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