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Coalition Formation Games (Dagstuhl Seminar 21331)

Authors: Edith Elkind, Judy Goldsmith, Anja Rey, and Jörg Rothe

Published in: Dagstuhl Reports, Volume 11, Issue 7 (2021)

Abstract

There are many situations in which individuals will choose to act as a group, or coalition. Examples include social clubs, political parties, partnership formation, and legislative voting. Coalition formation games are a class of cooperative games where the aim is to partition a set of agents into coalitions, according to some criteria, such as coalitional stability or maximization of social welfare. In our seminar we discussed applications, results, and new directions of research in the field of coalition formation games.

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Edith Elkind, Judy Goldsmith, Anja Rey, and Jörg Rothe. Coalition Formation Games (Dagstuhl Seminar 21331). In Dagstuhl Reports, Volume 11, Issue 7, pp. 1-15, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2021)

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@Article{elkind_et_al:DagRep.11.7.1,
  author =	{Elkind, Edith and Goldsmith, Judy and Rey, Anja and Rothe, J\"{o}rg},
  title =	{{Coalition Formation Games (Dagstuhl Seminar 21331)}},
  pages =	{1--15},
  journal =	{Dagstuhl Reports},
  ISSN =	{2192-5283},
  year =	{2021},
  volume =	{11},
  number =	{7},
  editor =	{Elkind, Edith and Goldsmith, Judy and Rey, Anja and Rothe, J\"{o}rg},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagRep.11.7.1},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-155885},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagRep.11.7.1},
  annote =	{Keywords: Coalition Formation, Cooperative Games}
}

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DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.04421.4

Preferences and Domination

Authors: Judy Goldsmith

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 4421, Algebraic Methods in Computational Complexity (2005)

Abstract

CP-nets are a succinct formalism for specifying preferences over a multi-featured domain. A CP-net consists of a directed graph, with nodes representing the features of the domain, and edges indicating conditional preferences. An instance in the domain is an assignment of values to the features. An instance alpha is preferred to an instance beta if there are a sequence of "improving flips" from alpha to beta, where an improving flip changes the value of one feature to a more-preferred value, based on the values of the parents of that feature. We say alpha dominates beta if such a sequence exists. We show that recognizing dominance is PSPACE hard for cyclic CP-nets.

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Judy Goldsmith. Preferences and Domination. In Algebraic Methods in Computational Complexity. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 4421, pp. 1-10, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2005)

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@InProceedings{goldsmith:DagSemProc.04421.4,
  author =	{Goldsmith, Judy},
  title =	{{Preferences and Domination}},
  booktitle =	{Algebraic Methods in Computational Complexity},
  pages =	{1--10},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2005},
  volume =	{4421},
  editor =	{Harry Buhrman and Lance Fortnow and Thomas Thierauf},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.04421.4},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-1038},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.04421.4},
  annote =	{Keywords: Preferences , CP-nets , PSPACE-complete , reductions}
}

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Coalition Formation Games (Dagstuhl Seminar 21331)

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Preferences and Domination

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