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DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.MFCS.2022.60

Not All Strangers Are the Same: The Impact of Tolerance in Schelling Games

Authors: Panagiotis Kanellopoulos, Maria Kyropoulou, and Alexandros A. Voudouris

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 241, 47th International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS 2022)

Abstract

Schelling’s famous model of segregation assumes agents of different types, who would like to be located in neighborhoods having at least a certain fraction of agents of the same type. We consider natural generalizations that allow for the possibility of agents being tolerant towards other agents, even if they are not of the same type. In particular, we consider an ordering of the types, and make the realistic assumption that the agents are in principle more tolerant towards agents of types that are closer to their own according to the ordering. Based on this, we study the strategic games induced when the agents aim to maximize their utility, for a variety of tolerance levels. We provide a collection of results about the existence of equilibria, and their quality in terms of social welfare.

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Panagiotis Kanellopoulos, Maria Kyropoulou, and Alexandros A. Voudouris. Not All Strangers Are the Same: The Impact of Tolerance in Schelling Games. In 47th International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS 2022). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 241, pp. 60:1-60:14, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2022)

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@InProceedings{kanellopoulos_et_al:LIPIcs.MFCS.2022.60,
  author =	{Kanellopoulos, Panagiotis and Kyropoulou, Maria and Voudouris, Alexandros A.},
  title =	{{Not All Strangers Are the Same: The Impact of Tolerance in Schelling Games}},
  booktitle =	{47th International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS 2022)},
  pages =	{60:1--60:14},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-256-3},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2022},
  volume =	{241},
  editor =	{Szeider, Stefan and Ganian, Robert and Silva, Alexandra},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.MFCS.2022.60},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-168589},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.MFCS.2022.60},
  annote =	{Keywords: Schelling games, Equilibria, Price of anarchy, Price of stability}
}

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Not All Strangers Are the Same: The Impact of Tolerance in Schelling Games

Abstract

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