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Reducing Costly Information Acquisition in Auctions

Authors: Kate Larson

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7271, Computational Social Systems and the Internet (2007)

Abstract

Most auction research assumes that potential bidders have private information about their willingness to pay for an item. In reality, bidders often have to go through a costly information-gathering process in order to learn their valuations. Recent attempts at modelling this phenomena has brought to light complex strategic behavior arising from information-gathering, and has shown that traditional approaches to auction and mechanism design are not able to overcome it.

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Kate Larson. Reducing Costly Information Acquisition in Auctions. In Computational Social Systems and the Internet. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7271, pp. 1-7, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)

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@InProceedings{larson:DagSemProc.07271.12,
  author =	{Larson, Kate},
  title =	{{Reducing Costly Information Acquisition in Auctions}},
  booktitle =	{Computational Social Systems and the Internet},
  pages =	{1--7},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{7271},
  editor =	{Peter Cramton and Rudolf M\"{u}ller and Eva Tardos and Moshe Tennenholtz},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.12},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-11592},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.12},
  annote =	{Keywords: Auctions, Information Gathering}
}

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Documents authored by Larson, Kate

Reducing Costly Information Acquisition in Auctions

Abstract

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