Search Results

Documents authored by Levi, Isaac

Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.07351.17
Probability Logic and Logical Probability

Authors: Isaac Levi

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7351, Formal Models of Belief Change in Rational Agents (2007)

Abstract
Authors like Keynes, H. Jeffreys and Carnap advocated using a concept of "logical probability". Logical probability had the following properties: (a) it was representable as a function from potential states of full belief (or "evidence") to states of subjective or credal probability judgment. (b) Such functions were alleged to be constrained by principles of probability logic. (c) All rational agents were supposed to be obliged to adopt the standard function that probability logic prescribed. In this essay, it is argued that these three requirements could be satisfied only if probability logic prescribed that credal probability should be numerically determinate. Keynes denied that it should numerically determinate and Carnap abandoned the idea that probability logic could supply a determinate function from states of full belief to numerically determinate credal states that all rational agents ought to adopt. The paper explains that once this is conceded, logical probability ought to be interpreted rather differently than it is customarily is.
Cite as

Isaac Levi. Probability Logic and Logical Probability. In Formal Models of Belief Change in Rational Agents. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7351, pp. 1-27, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)

Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{levi:DagSemProc.07351.17,
  author =	{Levi, Isaac},
  title =	{{Probability Logic and Logical Probability}},
  booktitle =	{Formal Models of Belief Change in Rational Agents},
  pages =	{1--27},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{7351},
  editor =	{Giacomo Bonanno and James Delgrande and J\'{e}r\^{o}me Lang and Hans Rott},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.07351.17},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-12105},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.07351.17},
  annote =	{Keywords: Probability, full belief, logic, evidence}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.05321.1
05321 – Panel on belief change

Authors: Isaac Levi, Giacomo Bonanno, Bernard Walliser, Didier Dubois, Hans Rott, James Delgrande, and Jérôme Lang

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 5321, Belief Change in Rational Agents: Perspectives from Artificial Intelligence, Philosophy, and Economics (2005)

Abstract
This document gathers the panelists' contribution.
Cite as

Isaac Levi, Giacomo Bonanno, Bernard Walliser, Didier Dubois, Hans Rott, James Delgrande, and Jérôme Lang. 05321 – Panel on belief change. In Belief Change in Rational Agents: Perspectives from Artificial Intelligence, Philosophy, and Economics. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 5321, pp. 1-12, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2005)

Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{levi_et_al:DagSemProc.05321.1,
  author =	{Levi, Isaac and Bonanno, Giacomo and Walliser, Bernard and Dubois, Didier and Rott, Hans and Delgrande, James and Lang, J\'{e}r\^{o}me},
  title =	{{05321 – Panel on belief change}},
  booktitle =	{Belief Change in Rational Agents: Perspectives from Artificial Intelligence, Philosophy, and Economics},
  pages =	{1--12},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2005},
  volume =	{5321},
  editor =	{James Delgrande and Jerome Lang and Hans Rott and Jean-Marc Tallon},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.05321.1},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-3580},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.05321.1},
  annote =	{Keywords: Belief revision, iterated belief revision, update, merging, dynamic logic, possibility theory, conditionals, social choice, distance, complexity}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.05321.10
Degrees of Belief

Authors: Isaac Levi

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 5321, Belief Change in Rational Agents: Perspectives from Artificial Intelligence, Philosophy, and Economics (2005)

Abstract
A discussion of three kinds of degree of belief: subjective (credal) probability, degree of belief in the maximizing sense (expected epistemic utility) and degree of belief in the satisficing sense (Shackle type degrees of belief). The relations between these concepts and full belief (absolute certainty) and other qualitative assessments of belief (mere belief or plain belief) will be considered.
Cite as

Isaac Levi. Degrees of Belief. In Belief Change in Rational Agents: Perspectives from Artificial Intelligence, Philosophy, and Economics. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 5321, pp. 1-35, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2005)

Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{levi:DagSemProc.05321.10,
  author =	{Levi, Isaac},
  title =	{{Degrees of Belief}},
  booktitle =	{Belief Change in Rational Agents: Perspectives from Artificial Intelligence, Philosophy, and Economics},
  pages =	{1--35},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2005},
  volume =	{5321},
  editor =	{James Delgrande and Jerome Lang and Hans Rott and Jean-Marc Tallon},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.05321.10},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-3271},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.05321.10},
  annote =	{Keywords: Inductive expansion, credal probability, maximizing and satisficing, full belief.}
}
Questions / Remarks / Feedback
X

Feedback for Dagstuhl Publishing


Thanks for your feedback!

Feedback submitted

Could not send message

Please try again later or send an E-mail
© 2023-2024 Schloss Dagstuhl – LZI GmbH Imprint Privacy Contact