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Strong Price of Anarchy for Machine Load Balancing

Authors: Amos Fiat, Meital Levy, Haim Kaplan, and Svetlana Olonetsky

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7261, Fair Division (2007)


Abstract
As defined by Aumann in 1959, a strong equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium that is resilient to deviations by coalitions. We give tight bounds on the strong price of anarchy for load balancing on related machines. We also give tight bounds for $k$-strong equilibria, where the size of a deviating coalition is at most $k$, for unrelated machines.

Cite as

Amos Fiat, Meital Levy, Haim Kaplan, and Svetlana Olonetsky. Strong Price of Anarchy for Machine Load Balancing. In Fair Division. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7261, pp. 1-19, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)


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@InProceedings{fiat_et_al:DagSemProc.07261.12,
  author =	{Fiat, Amos and Levy, Meital and Kaplan, Haim and Olonetsky, Svetlana},
  title =	{{Strong Price of Anarchy  for  Machine Load Balancing}},
  booktitle =	{Fair Division},
  pages =	{1--19},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{7261},
  editor =	{Steven Brams and Kirk Pruhs and Gerhard Woeginger},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.07261.12},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-12256},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.07261.12},
  annote =	{Keywords: Game theory, Strong Nash equilibria, Load balancing, Price of Anarchy}
}
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