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Liquidity providers (LPs) are essential figures in the operation of automated market makers (AMMs); in exchange for transaction fees, LPs lend the liquidity that allows AMMs to operate. While many prior works have studied the incentive structures of LPs in general, we currently lack a principled understanding of a special class of LPs known as Just-In-Time (JIT) LPs. These are strategic agents who momentarily supply liquidity for a single swap, in an attempt to extract disproportionately high fees relative to the remaining passive LPs. This paper provides the first formal, transaction-level model of JIT liquidity provision for a widespread class of AMMs known as Concentrated Liquidity Market Makers (CLMMs), as seen in Uniswap V3, for instance. We characterize the landscape of price impact and fee allocation in these systems, formulate and analyze a non-linear optimization problem faced by JIT LPs, and prove the existence of an optimal strategy. By fitting our optimal solution for JIT LPs to real-world CLMMs, we observe that in liquidity pools (particularly those with risky assets), there is a significant gap between observed and optimal JIT behavior. Existing JIT LPs often fail to account for price impact; doing so, we estimate they could increase earnings by up to 69% on average over small time windows. We also show that JIT liquidity, when deployed strategically, can improve market efficiency reducing slippage for traders, albeit at the cost of eroding passive LP profits by up to 44% per trade on average.