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Documents authored by Murray, Toby

Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ITP.2024.23
A Generalised Union of Rely-Guarantee and Separation Logic Using Permission Algebras

Authors: Vincent Jackson, Toby Murray, and Christine Rizkallah

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 309, 15th International Conference on Interactive Theorem Proving (ITP 2024)

Abstract
This paper describes GenRGSep, an Isabelle/HOL library for the development of RGSep logics using a general algebraic state model. In particular, we develop an algebraic state models based on resource algebras that assume neither the presence of unit resources or the cancellativity law. If a new resource model is required, its components need only be proven an instance of a permission algebra, and then they can be composed together using tuples and functions. The proof of soundness is performed by Vafeiadis' operational soundness method. This method was originally formulated with respect to a concrete heap model. This paper adapts it to account for the absence of both units as well as the cancellativity law.
Cite as

Vincent Jackson, Toby Murray, and Christine Rizkallah. A Generalised Union of Rely-Guarantee and Separation Logic Using Permission Algebras. In 15th International Conference on Interactive Theorem Proving (ITP 2024). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 309, pp. 23:1-23:16, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2024)

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@InProceedings{jackson_et_al:LIPIcs.ITP.2024.23,
  author =	{Jackson, Vincent and Murray, Toby and Rizkallah, Christine},
  title =	{{A Generalised Union of Rely-Guarantee and Separation Logic Using Permission Algebras}},
  booktitle =	{15th International Conference on Interactive Theorem Proving (ITP 2024)},
  pages =	{23:1--23:16},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-337-9},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2024},
  volume =	{309},
  editor =	{Bertot, Yves and Kutsia, Temur and Norrish, Michael},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITP.2024.23},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-207510},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ITP.2024.23},
  annote =	{Keywords: verification, concurrency, rely-guarantee, separation logic, resource algebras}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ITP.2019.27
Verifying That a Compiler Preserves Concurrent Value-Dependent Information-Flow Security

Authors: Robert Sison and Toby Murray

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 141, 10th International Conference on Interactive Theorem Proving (ITP 2019)

Abstract
It is common to prove by reasoning over source code that programs do not leak sensitive data. But doing so leaves a gap between reasoning and reality that can only be filled by accounting for the behaviour of the compiler. This task is complicated when programs enforce value-dependent information-flow security properties (in which classification of locations can vary depending on values in other locations) and complicated further when programs exploit shared-variable concurrency. Prior work has formally defined a notion of concurrency-aware refinement for preserving value-dependent security properties. However, that notion is considerably more complex than standard refinement definitions typically applied in the verification of semantics preservation by compilers. To date it remains unclear whether it can be applied to a realistic compiler, because there exist no general decomposition principles for separating it into smaller, more familiar, proof obligations. In this work, we provide such a decomposition principle, which we show can almost halve the complexity of proving secure refinement. Further, we demonstrate its applicability to secure compilation, by proving in Isabelle/HOL the preservation of value-dependent security by a proof-of-concept compiler from an imperative While language to a generic RISC-style assembly language, for programs with shared-memory concurrency mediated by locking primitives. Finally, we execute our compiler in Isabelle on a While language model of the Cross Domain Desktop Compositor, demonstrating to our knowledge the first use of a compiler verification result to carry an information-flow security property down to the assembly-level model of a non-trivial concurrent program.
Cite as

Robert Sison and Toby Murray. Verifying That a Compiler Preserves Concurrent Value-Dependent Information-Flow Security. In 10th International Conference on Interactive Theorem Proving (ITP 2019). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 141, pp. 27:1-27:19, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2019)

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@InProceedings{sison_et_al:LIPIcs.ITP.2019.27,
  author =	{Sison, Robert and Murray, Toby},
  title =	{{Verifying That a Compiler Preserves Concurrent Value-Dependent Information-Flow Security}},
  booktitle =	{10th International Conference on Interactive Theorem Proving (ITP 2019)},
  pages =	{27:1--27:19},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-122-1},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2019},
  volume =	{141},
  editor =	{Harrison, John and O'Leary, John and Tolmach, Andrew},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITP.2019.27},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-110829},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ITP.2019.27},
  annote =	{Keywords: Secure compilation, Information flow security, Concurrency, Verification}
}
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