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DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2009.2330

Nash Equilibrium in Generalised Muller Games

Authors: Soumya Paul and Sunil Simon

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 4, IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (2009)

Abstract

We suggest that extending Muller games with preference ordering for players is a natural way to reason about unbounded duration games. In this context, we look at the standard solution concept of Nash equilibrium for non-zero sum games. We show that Nash equilibria always exists for such generalised Muller games on finite graphs and present a procedure to compute an equilibrium strategy profile. We also give a procedure to compute a subgame perfect equilibrium when it exists in such games.

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Soumya Paul and Sunil Simon. Nash Equilibrium in Generalised Muller Games. In IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science. Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 4, pp. 335-346, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2009)

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@InProceedings{paul_et_al:LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2009.2330,
  author =	{Paul, Soumya and Simon, Sunil},
  title =	{{Nash Equilibrium in Generalised Muller Games}},
  booktitle =	{IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science},
  pages =	{335--346},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-939897-13-2},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2009},
  volume =	{4},
  editor =	{Kannan, Ravi and Narayan Kumar, K.},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2009.2330},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-23304},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2009.2330},
  annote =	{Keywords: Infinite games on graphs, Muller games, Nash equilibrium, subgame perfect equilibrium}
}

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Nash Equilibrium in Generalised Muller Games

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