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Documents authored by Pereira, Olivier


Document
Simulation based security in the applied pi calculus

Authors: Stéphanie Delaune, Steve Kremer, and Olivier Pereira

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 4, IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (2009)


Abstract
We present a symbolic framework for refinement and composition of security protocols. The framework uses the notion of ideal functionalities. These are abstract systems which are secure by construction and which can be combined into larger systems. They can be separately refined in order to obtain concrete protocols implementing them. Our work builds on ideas from the ``trusted party paradigm'' used in computational cryptography models. The underlying language we use is the applied pi calculus which is a general language for specifying security protocols. In our framework we can express the different standard flavours of simulation-based security which happen to all coincide. We illustrate our framework on an authentication functionality which can be realized using the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol. For this we need to define an ideal functionality for asymmetric encryption and its realization. We show a joint state result for this functionality which allows composition (even though the same key material is reused) using a tagging mechanism.

Cite as

Stéphanie Delaune, Steve Kremer, and Olivier Pereira. Simulation based security in the applied pi calculus. In IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science. Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 4, pp. 169-180, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2009)


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@InProceedings{delaune_et_al:LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2009.2316,
  author =	{Delaune, St\'{e}phanie and Kremer, Steve and Pereira, Olivier},
  title =	{{Simulation based security in the applied pi calculus}},
  booktitle =	{IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science},
  pages =	{169--180},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-939897-13-2},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2009},
  volume =	{4},
  editor =	{Kannan, Ravi and Narayan Kumar, K.},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2009.2316},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-23163},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2009.2316},
  annote =	{Keywords: Simulation based security, applied pi calculus, joint state theorem, authentication protocols}
}
Document
Modeling Computational Security in Long-Lived Systems

Authors: Ran Canetti, Ling Cheung, Dilsun Kaynar, Nancy Lynch, and Olivier Pereira

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 8491, Theoretical Foundations of Practical Information Security (2009)


Abstract
For many cryptographic protocols, security relies on the assumption that adversarial entities have limited computational power. This type of security degrades progressively over the lifetime of a protocol. However, some cryptographic services, such as timestamping services or digital archives, are emph{long-lived} in nature; they are expected to be secure and operational for a very long time (ie super-polynomial). In such cases, security cannot be guaranteed in the traditional sense: a computationally secure protocol may become insecure if the attacker has a super-polynomial number of interactions with the protocol. This paper proposes a new paradigm for the analysis of long-lived security protocols. We allow entities to be active for a potentially unbounded amount of real time, provided they perform only a polynomial amount of work emph{per unit of real time}. Moreover, the space used by these entities is allocated dynamically and must be polynomially bounded. We propose a new notion of emph{long-term implementation}, which is an adaptation of computational indistinguishability to the long-lived setting. We show that long-term implementation is preserved under polynomial parallel composition and exponential sequential composition. We illustrate the use of this new paradigm by analyzing some security properties of the long-lived timestamping protocol of Haber and Kamat.

Cite as

Ran Canetti, Ling Cheung, Dilsun Kaynar, Nancy Lynch, and Olivier Pereira. Modeling Computational Security in Long-Lived Systems. In Theoretical Foundations of Practical Information Security. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 8491, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2009)


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@InProceedings{canetti_et_al:DagSemProc.08491.3,
  author =	{Canetti, Ran and Cheung, Ling and Kaynar, Dilsun and Lynch, Nancy and Pereira, Olivier},
  title =	{{Modeling Computational Security in Long-Lived Systems}},
  booktitle =	{Theoretical Foundations of Practical Information Security},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2009},
  volume =	{8491},
  editor =	{Ran Canetti and Shafi Goldwasser and G\"{u}nter M\"{u}ller and Rainer Steinwandt},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.08491.3},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-18908},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.08491.3},
  annote =	{Keywords: Long lived security; universally composable security;}
}
Document
Simulation-based analysis of E2E voting systems

Authors: Olivier de Marneffe, Olivier Pereira, and Jean-Jacques Quisquater

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7311, Frontiers of Electronic Voting (2008)


Abstract
End-to-end auditable voting systems are expected to guarantee very interesting, and often sophisticated security properties, including correctness, privacy, fairness, receipt-freeness, dots However, for many well-known protocols, these properties have never been analyzed in a systematic way. In this paper, we investigate the use of techniques from the simulation-based security tradition for the analysis of these protocols, through a case-study on the ThreeBallot protocol. Our analysis shows that the ThreeBallot protocol fails to emulate some natural voting functionality, reflecting the lack of election fairness guarantee from this protocol. Guided by the reasons that make our security proof fail, we propose a simple variant of the ThreeBallot protocol and show that this variant emulates our functionality.

Cite as

Olivier de Marneffe, Olivier Pereira, and Jean-Jacques Quisquater. Simulation-based analysis of E2E voting systems. In Frontiers of Electronic Voting. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7311, pp. 1-14, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2008)


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@InProceedings{demarneffe_et_al:DagSemProc.07311.8,
  author =	{de Marneffe, Olivier and Pereira, Olivier and Quisquater, Jean-Jacques},
  title =	{{Simulation-based analysis of E2E voting systems}},
  booktitle =	{Frontiers of Electronic Voting},
  pages =	{1--14},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2008},
  volume =	{7311},
  editor =	{David Chaum and Miroslaw Kutylowski and Ronald L. Rivest and Peter Y. A. Ryan},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.07311.8},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-12970},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.07311.8},
  annote =	{Keywords: UC framework, simulatability, security proof, ThreeBallot}
}
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