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Using Options with Set Exercise Prices to Reduce Bidder Exposure in Sequential Auctions

Authors: Lonneke Mous, Valentin Robu, and Han La Poutre

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 8461, Planning in Multiagent Systems (2009)

Abstract

The exposure problem appears whenever an agent with complementary valuations bids to acquire a bundle of items sold sequentially, in separate auctions. In this talk, we review a possible solution that can help solve this problem, which involves selling options for the items, instead of the items themselves. We provide a brief overview of the state of the art in this field and discuss, based on our recent results, under which conditions using option mechanisms would be desirable for both buyers and sellers, by comparison to direct auctioning of items. We conclude with a brief discussion of further research directions in this field, as well as the relation to other techniques proposed to address the problem, such as leveled commitment mechanisms.

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Lonneke Mous, Valentin Robu, and Han La Poutre. Using Options with Set Exercise Prices to Reduce Bidder Exposure in Sequential Auctions. In Planning in Multiagent Systems. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 8461, pp. 1-35, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2009)

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@InProceedings{mous_et_al:DagSemProc.08461.5,
  author =	{Mous, Lonneke and Robu, Valentin and La Poutre, Han},
  title =	{{Using Options with Set Exercise Prices to Reduce Bidder Exposure in Sequential Auctions}},
  booktitle =	{Planning in Multiagent Systems},
  pages =	{1--35},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2009},
  volume =	{8461},
  editor =	{J\"{u}rgen Dix and Edmund H. Durfee and Cees Witteveen},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.08461.5},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-18724},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.08461.5},
  annote =	{Keywords: Options, sequential auctions, multi-agent systems, exposure problem, bidding strategies, mechanism design, leveled commitment}
}

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DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.08391.4

08391 Group Summary – The Berners-Lee Hypothesis: Power laws and Group Structure in Flickr

Authors: Andrea Baldassarri, Alain Barrat, Andrea Capocci, Harry Halpin, Ulrike Lehner, Jose Ramasco, Valentin Robu, and Dario Taraborelli

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 8391, Social Web Communities (2008)

Abstract

An intriguing hypothesis, first suggested by Tim Berners-Lee, is that the structure of online groups should conform to a power law distribution. We relate this hypothesis to earlier work around the Dunbar Number, which is a supposed limit to the number of social contacts a user can have in a group. As preliminary results, we show that the number of contacts of a typical Flickr user, the number of groups a user belongs to, and the size of Flickr groups all follow power law distributions. Furthermore, we find some unexpected differences in the internal structure of public and private Flickr groups. For further research, we further operationalize the Berners-Lee hypothesis to suppose that users with a group membership distribution that follows a power law will produce more content for social Web systems.

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Andrea Baldassarri, Alain Barrat, Andrea Capocci, Harry Halpin, Ulrike Lehner, Jose Ramasco, Valentin Robu, and Dario Taraborelli. 08391 Group Summary – The Berners-Lee Hypothesis: Power laws and Group Structure in Flickr. In Social Web Communities. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 8391, pp. 1-11, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2008)

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@InProceedings{baldassarri_et_al:DagSemProc.08391.4,
  author =	{Baldassarri, Andrea and Barrat, Alain and Capocci, Andrea and Halpin, Harry and Lehner, Ulrike and Ramasco, Jose and Robu, Valentin and Taraborelli, Dario},
  title =	{{08391 Group Summary – The Berners-Lee Hypothesis: Power laws and Group Structure in Flickr}},
  booktitle =	{Social Web Communities},
  pages =	{1--11},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2008},
  volume =	{8391},
  editor =	{Harith Alani and Steffen Staab and Gerd Stumme},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.08391.4},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-17893},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.08391.4},
  annote =	{Keywords: Social group flickr powerlaw}
}

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Documents authored by Robu, Valentin

Using Options with Set Exercise Prices to Reduce Bidder Exposure in Sequential Auctions

Abstract

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08391 Group Summary – The Berners-Lee Hypothesis: Power laws and Group Structure in Flickr

Abstract

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