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Documents authored by Spooner, Nicholas

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Track A: Algorithms, Complexity and Games
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2026.6
Quantum Advantage in Proof Systems Without Entanglement

Authors: Krishna Agaram, Nicholas Spooner, and Yuxi Zheng

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 374, 53rd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2026)

Abstract
The study of interactive proofs in the quantum setting has yielded profound insights in complexity theory and quantum information. A curious feature of these results is that the advantage, in terms of computational power, of quantum models over their classical counterparts is usually due to entanglement phenomena rather than quantum communication with the verifier. For example, it is known that QIP = IP = PSPACE, and QMIP with unentangled provers is equal to NEXP = MIP; on the other hand, MIP* = RE. In this work we initiate the general study of (quantum) positional multi-prover interactive proofs ((Q)PMIP), in which provers and verifiers positioned in space communicate freely save for the constraints imposed by the speed of light. We investigate how the class of languages decidable by (Q)PMIPs depends on the arrangement of the verifiers and (honest) provers. In the case of classical PMIPs, we show a dichotomy: if the arrangement satisfies what we call the "min-ball" condition, then the class is NEXP, otherwise it is PSPACE. We then exhibit an arrangement that does not satisfy the min-ball condition for which there is a quantum PMIP for EXP in the no pre-shared entanglement model. Our construction is based on positional cryptography and MIPs with no-signaling soundness. We introduce a new positional primitive, the positional hardcore bit, which allows a pair of spatially separated players to transmit a random bit to a particular location while guaranteeing that it remains strongly unguessable elsewhere.
Cite as

Krishna Agaram, Nicholas Spooner, and Yuxi Zheng. Quantum Advantage in Proof Systems Without Entanglement. In 53rd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2026). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 374, pp. 6:1-6:21, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2026)

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@InProceedings{agaram_et_al:LIPIcs.ICALP.2026.6,
  author =	{Agaram, Krishna and Spooner, Nicholas and Zheng, Yuxi},
  title =	{{Quantum Advantage in Proof Systems Without Entanglement}},
  booktitle =	{53rd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2026)},
  pages =	{6:1--6:21},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-428-4},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2026},
  volume =	{374},
  editor =	{Bhattacharya, Sayan and Nanongkai, Danupon and Benedikt, Michael and Puppis, Gabriele},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2026.6},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-263957},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2026.6},
  annote =	{Keywords: Quantum interactive proofs, positional cryptography, multi-prover interactive proofs, no-signaling soundness}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.TQC.2023.2
On the Necessity of Collapsing for Post-Quantum and Quantum Commitments

Authors: Marcel Dall'Agnol and Nicholas Spooner

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 266, 18th Conference on the Theory of Quantum Computation, Communication and Cryptography (TQC 2023)

Abstract
Collapse binding and collapsing were proposed by Unruh (Eurocrypt '16) as post-quantum strengthenings of computational binding and collision resistance, respectively. These notions have been very successful in facilitating the "lifting" of classical security proofs to the quantum setting. A basic and natural question remains unanswered, however: are they the weakest notions that suffice for such lifting? In this work we answer this question in the affirmative by giving a classical commit-and-open protocol which is post-quantum secure if and only if the commitment scheme (resp. hash function) used is collapse binding (resp. collapsing). We also generalise the definition of collapse binding to quantum commitment schemes, and prove that the equivalence carries over when the sender in this commit-and-open protocol communicates quantum information. As a consequence, we establish that a variety of "weak" binding notions (sum binding, CDMS binding and unequivocality) are in fact equivalent to collapse binding, both for post-quantum and quantum commitments. Finally, we prove a "win-win" result, showing that a post-quantum computationally binding commitment scheme that is not collapse binding can be used to build an equivocal commitment scheme (which can, in turn, be used to build one-shot signatures and other useful quantum primitives). This strengthens a result due to Zhandry (Eurocrypt '19) showing that the same object yields quantum lightning.
Cite as

Marcel Dall'Agnol and Nicholas Spooner. On the Necessity of Collapsing for Post-Quantum and Quantum Commitments. In 18th Conference on the Theory of Quantum Computation, Communication and Cryptography (TQC 2023). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 266, pp. 2:1-2:23, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2023)

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@InProceedings{dallagnol_et_al:LIPIcs.TQC.2023.2,
  author =	{Dall'Agnol, Marcel and Spooner, Nicholas},
  title =	{{On the Necessity of Collapsing for Post-Quantum and Quantum Commitments}},
  booktitle =	{18th Conference on the Theory of Quantum Computation, Communication and Cryptography (TQC 2023)},
  pages =	{2:1--2:23},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-283-9},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2023},
  volume =	{266},
  editor =	{Fawzi, Omar and Walter, Michael},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.TQC.2023.2},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-183127},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.TQC.2023.2},
  annote =	{Keywords: Quantum cryptography, Commitment schemes, Hash functions, Quantum rewinding}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2017.40
Interactive Oracle Proofs with Constant Rate and Query Complexity

Authors: Eli Ben-Sasson, Alessandro Chiesa, Ariel Gabizon, Michael Riabzev, and Nicholas Spooner

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 80, 44th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2017)

Abstract
We study interactive oracle proofs (IOPs) [BCS16,RRR16], which combine aspects of probabilistically checkable proofs (PCPs) and interactive proofs (IPs). We present IOP constructions and techniques that enable us to obtain tradeoffs in proof length versus query complexity that are not known to be achievable via PCPs or IPs alone. Our main results are: 1. Circuit satisfiability has 3-round IOPs with linear proof length (counted in bits) and constant query complexity. 2. Reed-Solomon codes have 2-round IOPs of proximity with linear proof length and constant query complexity. 3. Tensor product codes have 1-round IOPs of proximity with sublinear proof length and constant query complexity. For all the above, known PCP constructions give quasilinear proof length and constant query complexity [BS08,Din07]. Also, for circuit satisfiability, [BKKMS13] obtain PCPs with linear proof length but sublinear (and super-constant) query complexity. As in [BKKMS13], we rely on algebraic-geometry codes to obtain our first result; but, unlike that work, our use of such codes is much "lighter" because we do not rely on any automorphisms of the code. We obtain our results by proving and combining "IOP-analogues" of tools underlying numerous IPs and PCPs: * Interactive proof composition. Proof composition [AS98] is used to reduce the query complexity of PCP verifiers, at the cost of increasing proof length by an additive factor that is exponential in the verifier's randomness complexity. We prove a composition theorem for IOPs where this additive factor is linear. * Sublinear sumcheck. The sumcheck protocol [LFKN92] is an IP that enables the verifier to check the sum of values of a low-degree multi-variate polynomial on an exponentially-large hypercube, but the verifier's running time depends linearly on the bound on individual degrees. We prove a sumcheck protocol for IOPs where this dependence is sublinear (e.g., polylogarithmic). Our work demonstrates that even constant-round IOPs are more efficient than known PCPs and IPs.
Cite as

Eli Ben-Sasson, Alessandro Chiesa, Ariel Gabizon, Michael Riabzev, and Nicholas Spooner. Interactive Oracle Proofs with Constant Rate and Query Complexity. In 44th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2017). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 80, pp. 40:1-40:15, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2017)

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@InProceedings{bensasson_et_al:LIPIcs.ICALP.2017.40,
  author =	{Ben-Sasson, Eli and Chiesa, Alessandro and Gabizon, Ariel and Riabzev, Michael and Spooner, Nicholas},
  title =	{{Interactive Oracle Proofs with Constant Rate and Query Complexity}},
  booktitle =	{44th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2017)},
  pages =	{40:1--40:15},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-041-5},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2017},
  volume =	{80},
  editor =	{Chatzigiannakis, Ioannis and Indyk, Piotr and Kuhn, Fabian and Muscholl, Anca},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2017.40},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-74713},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2017.40},
  annote =	{Keywords: probabilistically checkable proofs, interactive proofs, proof composition, sumcheck}
}
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