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Documents authored by Wang, Zeyu

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DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.SoCG.2026.84
The Voronoi Diagram of Four Lines in ℝ³

Authors: Evanthia Papadopoulou and Zeyu Wang

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 367, 42nd International Symposium on Computational Geometry (SoCG 2026)

Abstract
We consider the Voronoi diagram of lines in ℝ³ under the Euclidean metric, and give a full classification of its structure in the base case of four lines in general position. We first show that the number of vertices in the Voronoi diagram of four lines in general position is always even, between 0 and 8, and all such numbers can be realized. We identify a key structure for the diagram formation, called a twist, which is a pair of consecutive intersections among trisector branches; only two types of twists are possible, so-called full and partial twists. A full twist is a purely local structure, which can be inserted or removed without affecting the rest of the diagram. Assuming no full twists, the nearest and the farthest Voronoi diagrams of four lines, each have 15 distinct topologies, which are in one-to-one correspondence; the two-dimensional faces are all unbounded, and the total number of vertices is at most six. The unbounded features of the farthest diagram, encoded in a two-dimensional spherical map, are also in one-to-one correspondence. The identified topologies are all realizable. Any Voronoi diagram of four lines in general position in ℝ³ can be obtained from one of these topologies by inserting full twists; each twist induces a bounded face of exactly two vertices in both the nearest and farthest diagrams. We obtain the classification by an exhaustive search algorithm using some new structural and combinatorial observations of line Voronoi diagrams.
Cite as

Evanthia Papadopoulou and Zeyu Wang. The Voronoi Diagram of Four Lines in ℝ³. In 42nd International Symposium on Computational Geometry (SoCG 2026). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 367, pp. 84:1-84:17, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2026)

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@InProceedings{papadopoulou_et_al:LIPIcs.SoCG.2026.84,
  author =	{Papadopoulou, Evanthia and Wang, Zeyu},
  title =	{{The Voronoi Diagram of Four Lines in \mathbb{R}³}},
  booktitle =	{42nd International Symposium on Computational Geometry (SoCG 2026)},
  pages =	{84:1--84:17},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-418-5},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2026},
  volume =	{367},
  editor =	{Ahn, Hee-Kap and Hoffmann, Michael and Nayyeri, Amir},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.SoCG.2026.84},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-258916},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.SoCG.2026.84},
  annote =	{Keywords: Voronoi diagram, lines, three dimensions, structural properties}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ECOOP.2025.6
Detecting Functionality-Specific Vulnerabilities via Retrieving Individual Functionality-Equivalent APIs in Open-Source Repositories

Authors: Tianyu Chen, Zeyu Wang, Lin Li, Ding Li, Zongyang Li, Xiaoning Chang, Pan Bian, Guangtai Liang, Qianxiang Wang, and Tao Xie

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 333, 39th European Conference on Object-Oriented Programming (ECOOP 2025)

Abstract
Functionality-specific vulnerabilities, which mainly occur in Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) with specific functionalities, are crucial for software developers to detect and avoid. When detecting individual functionality-specific vulnerabilities, the existing two categories of approaches are ineffective because they consider only the API bodies and are unable to handle diverse implementations of functionality-equivalent APIs. To effectively detect functionality-specific vulnerabilities, we propose APISS, the first approach to utilize API doc strings and signatures instead of API bodies. APISS first retrieves functionality-equivalent APIs for APIs with existing vulnerabilities and then migrates Proof-of-Concepts (PoCs) of the existing vulnerabilities for newly detected vulnerable APIs. To retrieve functionality-equivalent APIs, we leverage a Large Language Model for API embedding to improve the accuracy and address the effectiveness and scalability issues suffered by the existing approaches. To migrate PoCs of the existing vulnerabilities for newly detected vulnerable APIs, we design a semi-automatic schema to substantially reduce manual costs. We conduct a comprehensive evaluation to empirically compare APISS with four state-of-the-art approaches of detecting vulnerabilities and two state-of-the-art approaches of retrieving functionality-equivalent APIs. The evaluation subjects include 180 widely used Java repositories using 10 existing vulnerabilities, along with their PoCs. The results show that APISS effectively retrieves functionality-equivalent APIs, achieving a Top-1 Accuracy of 0.81 while the best of the baselines under comparison achieves only 0.55. APISS is highly efficient: the manual costs are within 10 minutes per vulnerability and the end-to-end runtime overhead of testing one candidate API is less than 2 hours. APISS detects 179 new vulnerabilities and receives 60 new CVE IDs, bringing high value to security practice.
Cite as

Tianyu Chen, Zeyu Wang, Lin Li, Ding Li, Zongyang Li, Xiaoning Chang, Pan Bian, Guangtai Liang, Qianxiang Wang, and Tao Xie. Detecting Functionality-Specific Vulnerabilities via Retrieving Individual Functionality-Equivalent APIs in Open-Source Repositories. In 39th European Conference on Object-Oriented Programming (ECOOP 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 333, pp. 6:1-6:27, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{chen_et_al:LIPIcs.ECOOP.2025.6,
  author =	{Chen, Tianyu and Wang, Zeyu and Li, Lin and Li, Ding and Li, Zongyang and Chang, Xiaoning and Bian, Pan and Liang, Guangtai and Wang, Qianxiang and Xie, Tao},
  title =	{{Detecting Functionality-Specific Vulnerabilities via Retrieving Individual Functionality-Equivalent APIs in Open-Source Repositories}},
  booktitle =	{39th European Conference on Object-Oriented Programming (ECOOP 2025)},
  pages =	{6:1--6:27},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-373-7},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{333},
  editor =	{Aldrich, Jonathan and Silva, Alexandra},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ECOOP.2025.6},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-232999},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ECOOP.2025.6},
  annote =	{Keywords: Application Security, Vulnerability Detection, Large Language Model}
}
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