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False-name-Proof Combinatorial Auction Mechanisms

Authors: Makoto Yokoo

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 10101, Computational Foundations of Social Choice (2010)

Abstract

In Internet auctions, it is easy for a bidder to submit multiple bids under multiple identifiers (e.g., multiple e-mail addresses). If only one good is sold, a bidder cannot make any additional profit by using multiple bids. However, in combinatorial auctions, where multiple goods are sold simultaneously, submitting multiple bids under fictitious names can be profitable. A bid made under a fictitious name is called a {em false-name bid}. In this talk, I describe the summary of existing works and open problems on false-name bids.

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Makoto Yokoo. False-name-Proof Combinatorial Auction Mechanisms. In Computational Foundations of Social Choice. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 10101, pp. 1-4, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2010)

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@InProceedings{yokoo:DagSemProc.10101.3,
  author =	{Yokoo, Makoto},
  title =	{{False-name-Proof Combinatorial Auction Mechanisms}},
  booktitle =	{Computational Foundations of Social Choice},
  pages =	{1--4},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2010},
  volume =	{10101},
  editor =	{Felix Brandt and Vincent Conitzer and Lane A. Hemaspaandra and Jean-Francois Laslier and William S. Zwicker},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.10101.3},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-25621},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.10101.3},
  annote =	{Keywords: Combinatorial auctions, mechanism design, false-name bids}
}

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False-name-Proof Combinatorial Auction Mechanisms

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