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Documents authored by Yung, Moti

Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagRep.9.11.1
Biggest Failures in Security (Dagstuhl Seminar 19451)

Authors: Frederik Armknecht, Ingrid Verbauwhede, Melanie Volkamer, and Moti Yung

Published in: Dagstuhl Reports, Volume 9, Issue 11 (2020)

Abstract
In the present era of ubiquitous digitalization, security is a concern for everyone. Despite enormous efforts, securing IT systems still remains an open challenge for community and industry. One of the main reasons is that the variety and complexity of IT systems keeps increasing, making it practically impossible for security experts to grasp the full system. A further problem is that security has become an interdisciplinary challenge. While interdisciplinary research does exist already, it is mostly restricted to collaborations between two individual disciplines and has been rather bottom-up by focusing on very specific problems. The idea of the Dagstuhl Seminar was to go one step back and to follow a comprehensive top-down approach instead. The goal was to identify the "biggest failures" in security and to get a comprehensive understanding on their overall impact on security. To this end, the Dagstuhl Seminar was roughly divided into two parts. First, experienced experts from different disciplines gave overview talks on the main problems of their field. Based on these, overlapping topics but also common research interests among the participants have been identified. Afterwards, individual working groups have been formed to work on the identified questions.
Cite as

Frederik Armknecht, Ingrid Verbauwhede, Melanie Volkamer, and Moti Yung. Biggest Failures in Security (Dagstuhl Seminar 19451). In Dagstuhl Reports, Volume 9, Issue 11, pp. 1-23, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2020)

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@Article{armknecht_et_al:DagRep.9.11.1,
  author =	{Armknecht, Frederik and Verbauwhede, Ingrid and Volkamer, Melanie and Yung, Moti},
  title =	{{Biggest Failures in Security (Dagstuhl Seminar 19451)}},
  pages =	{1--23},
  journal =	{Dagstuhl Reports},
  ISSN =	{2192-5283},
  year =	{2020},
  volume =	{9},
  number =	{11},
  editor =	{Armknecht, Frederik and Verbauwhede, Ingrid and Volkamer, Melanie and Yung, Moti},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagRep.9.11.1},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-119818},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagRep.9.11.1},
  annote =	{Keywords: Cryptography, Hardware, Security engineering, Software engineering, Usability, Human Computer interaction (HCI), Human and societal aspects of security and privacy, Usable security or human factors in security, Security evaluation and certification}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2016.30
Functional Commitment Schemes: From Polynomial Commitments to Pairing-Based Accumulators from Simple Assumptions

Authors: Benoît Libert, Somindu C. Ramanna, and Moti Yung

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 55, 43rd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2016)

Abstract
We formalize a cryptographic primitive called functional commitment (FC) which can be viewed as a generalization of vector commitments (VCs), polynomial commitments and many other special kinds of commitment schemes. A non-interactive functional commitment allows committing to a message in such a way that the committer has the flexibility of only revealing a function of the committed message during the opening phase. We provide constructions for the functionality of linear functions, where messages consist of vectors over some domain and commitments can later be opened to a specific linear function of the vector coordinates. An opening for a function thus generates a witness for the fact that the function indeed evaluates to a given value for the committed message. One security requirement is called function binding and requires that no adversary be able to open a commitment to two different evaluations for the same function. We propose a construction of functional commitment for linear functions based on constantsize assumptions in composite order groups endowed with a bilinear map. The construction has commitments and openings of constant size (i.e., independent of n or function description) and is perfectly hiding - the underlying message is information theoretically hidden. Our security proofs build on the Déjà Q framework of Chase and Meiklejohn (Eurocrypt 2014) and its extension by Wee (TCC 2016) to encryption primitives, thus relying on constant-size subgroup decisional assumptions. We show that FC for linear functions are sufficiently powerful to solve four open problems. They, first, imply polynomial commitments, and, then, give cryptographic accumulators (i.e., an algebraic hash function which makes it possible to efficiently prove that some input belongs to a hashed set). In particular, specializing our FC construction leads to the first pairing-based polynomial commitments and accumulators for large universes known to achieve security under simple assumptions. We also substantially extend our pairing-based accumulator to handle subset queries which requires a non-trivial extension of the Déjà Q framework.
Cite as

Benoît Libert, Somindu C. Ramanna, and Moti Yung. Functional Commitment Schemes: From Polynomial Commitments to Pairing-Based Accumulators from Simple Assumptions. In 43rd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2016). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 55, pp. 30:1-30:14, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2016)

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@InProceedings{libert_et_al:LIPIcs.ICALP.2016.30,
  author =	{Libert, Beno\^{i}t and Ramanna, Somindu C. and Yung, Moti},
  title =	{{Functional Commitment Schemes: From Polynomial Commitments to Pairing-Based Accumulators from Simple Assumptions}},
  booktitle =	{43rd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2016)},
  pages =	{30:1--30:14},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-013-2},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2016},
  volume =	{55},
  editor =	{Chatzigiannakis, Ioannis and Mitzenmacher, Michael and Rabani, Yuval and Sangiorgi, Davide},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2016.30},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-63096},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2016.30},
  annote =	{Keywords: Cryptography, commitment schemes, functional commitments, accumulators, provable security, pairing-based, simple assumptions.}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemRep.355
Cryptography (Dagstuhl Seminar 02391)

Authors: Ueli Maurer, Adi Shamir, Jacques Stern, and Moti Yung

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Reports. Dagstuhl Seminar Reports, Volume 1 (2021)

Abstract
Cite as

Ueli Maurer, Adi Shamir, Jacques Stern, and Moti Yung. Cryptography (Dagstuhl Seminar 02391). Dagstuhl Seminar Report 355, pp. 1-21, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2003)

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@TechReport{maurer_et_al:DagSemRep.355,
  author =	{Maurer, Ueli and Shamir, Adi and Stern, Jacques and Yung, Moti},
  title =	{{Cryptography (Dagstuhl Seminar 02391)}},
  pages =	{1--21},
  ISSN =	{1619-0203},
  year =	{2003},
  type = 	{Dagstuhl Seminar Report},
  number =	{355},
  institution =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemRep.355},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-152357},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemRep.355},
}
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