3 Search Results for "Mauras, Simon"

Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.105
Fixed-Parameter Tractable Submodular Maximization over a Matroid

Authors: Shamisa Nematollahi, Adrian Vladu, and Junyao Zhao

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 362, 17th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2026)

Abstract
In this paper, we design fixed-parameter tractable (FPT) algorithms for (non-monotone) submodular maximization subject to a matroid constraint, where the matroid rank r is treated as a fixed parameter that is independent of the total number of elements n. We provide two FPT algorithms: one for the offline setting and another for the random-order streaming setting. Our streaming algorithm achieves a 1/2-ε approximation using Õ(r/poly(ε)) memory, while our offline algorithm obtains a 1-(1)/(e)-ε approximation with n⋅ 2^{Õ(r/poly(ε))} runtime and Õ(r/poly(ε)) memory. Both approximation factors are near-optimal in their respective settings, given existing hardness results. In particular, our offline algorithm demonstrates that - unlike in the polynomial-time regime - there is essentially no separation between monotone and non-monotone submodular maximization under a matroid constraint in the FPT framework.
Cite as

Shamisa Nematollahi, Adrian Vladu, and Junyao Zhao. Fixed-Parameter Tractable Submodular Maximization over a Matroid. In 17th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2026). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 362, pp. 105:1-105:22, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2026)

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@InProceedings{nematollahi_et_al:LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.105,
  author =	{Nematollahi, Shamisa and Vladu, Adrian and Zhao, Junyao},
  title =	{{Fixed-Parameter Tractable Submodular Maximization over a Matroid}},
  booktitle =	{17th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2026)},
  pages =	{105:1--105:22},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-410-9},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2026},
  volume =	{362},
  editor =	{Saraf, Shubhangi},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.105},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-253924},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.105},
  annote =	{Keywords: Submodular maximization, matroids, parameterized complexity, streaming algorithms}
}
Document
Track A: Algorithms, Complexity and Games
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2025.125
Unbalanced Random Matching Markets with Partial Preferences

Authors: Aditya Potukuchi and Shikha Singh

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 334, 52nd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2025)

Abstract
Properties of stable matchings in the popular random-matching-market model have been studied for over 50 years. In a random matching market, each agent has complete preferences drawn uniformly and independently at random. Wilson (1972), Knuth (1976) and Pittel (1989) proved that in balanced random matching markets, the proposers are matched to their ln nth choice on average. In this paper, we consider competitive markets with n jobs and n+k candidates, and partial lists where each agent only ranks their top d choices. Despite the long history of the problem, the following fundamental question remains unanswered for these generalized markets: what is the tight threshold on list length d that results in a perfect stable matching with high probability? In this paper, we answer this question exactly - we prove a sharp threshold d₀ = ln n ⋅ ln (n+k)/(k+1) on the existence of perfect stable matchings when k = o(n). That is, we show that if d < (1-ε) d₀, then no stable matching matches all jobs; moreover, if d > (1+ ε) d₀, then all jobs are matched in every stable matching with high probability. This bound improves and generalizes recent results by Kanoria, Min and Qian (2021). Furthermore, we extend the line of work studying the effect of imbalance on the expected rank of the proposers (termed the "stark effect of competition"). We establish the regime in unbalanced markets that forces this stark effect to take shape in markets with partial preferences.
Cite as

Aditya Potukuchi and Shikha Singh. Unbalanced Random Matching Markets with Partial Preferences. In 52nd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 334, pp. 125:1-125:16, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{potukuchi_et_al:LIPIcs.ICALP.2025.125,
  author =	{Potukuchi, Aditya and Singh, Shikha},
  title =	{{Unbalanced Random Matching Markets with Partial Preferences}},
  booktitle =	{52nd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2025)},
  pages =	{125:1--125:16},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-372-0},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{334},
  editor =	{Censor-Hillel, Keren and Grandoni, Fabrizio and Ouaknine, Jo\"{e}l and Puppis, Gabriele},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2025.125},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-235025},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2025.125},
  annote =	{Keywords: stable matching, probabilistic method, Gale-Shapley algorithm}
}
Document
Track A: Algorithms, Complexity and Games
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2023.58
Truthful Matching with Online Items and Offline Agents

Authors: Michal Feldman, Federico Fusco, Simon Mauras, and Rebecca Reiffenhäuser

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 261, 50th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2023)

Abstract
We study truthful mechanisms for welfare maximization in online bipartite matching. In our (multi-parameter) setting, every buyer is associated with a (possibly private) desired set of items, and has a private value for being assigned an item in her desired set. Unlike most online matching settings, where agents arrive online, in our setting the items arrive online in an adversarial order while the buyers are present for the entire duration of the process. This poses a significant challenge to the design of truthful mechanisms, due to the ability of buyers to strategize over future rounds. We provide an almost full picture of the competitive ratios in different scenarios, including myopic vs. non-myopic agents, tardy vs. prompt payments, and private vs. public desired sets. Among other results, we identify the frontier up to which the celebrated e/(e-1) competitive ratio for the vertex-weighted online matching of Karp, Vazirani and Vazirani extends to truthful agents and online items.
Cite as

Michal Feldman, Federico Fusco, Simon Mauras, and Rebecca Reiffenhäuser. Truthful Matching with Online Items and Offline Agents. In 50th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2023). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 261, pp. 58:1-58:20, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2023)

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@InProceedings{feldman_et_al:LIPIcs.ICALP.2023.58,
  author =	{Feldman, Michal and Fusco, Federico and Mauras, Simon and Reiffenh\"{a}user, Rebecca},
  title =	{{Truthful Matching with Online Items and Offline Agents}},
  booktitle =	{50th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2023)},
  pages =	{58:1--58:20},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-278-5},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2023},
  volume =	{261},
  editor =	{Etessami, Kousha and Feige, Uriel and Puppis, Gabriele},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2023.58},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-181106},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2023.58},
  annote =	{Keywords: Online matching, Karp-Vazirani-Vazirani, truthfulness}
}
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