Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 6461

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06461 Abstracts Collection – Negotiation and Market Engineering

Authors: Nicholas R. Jennings, Gregory Kersten, Axel Ockenfels, and Christof Weinhardt

Abstract

From 12.11.06 to 17.11.06, the Dagstuhl Seminar 06461 ``Negotiation and Market Engineering'' was held in the International Conference and Research Center (IBFI), Schloss Dagstuhl. During the seminar, several participants presented their current research, and ongoing work and open problems were discussed. Abstracts of the presentations given during the seminar as well as abstracts of seminar results and ideas are put together in this paper. The first section describes the seminar topics and goals in general. Links to extended abstracts or full papers are provided, if available.

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Nicholas R. Jennings, Gregory Kersten, Axel Ockenfels, and Christof Weinhardt. 06461 Abstracts Collection – Negotiation and Market Engineering. In Negotiation and Market Engineering. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 6461, pp. 1-14, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)

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@InProceedings{jennings_et_al:DagSemProc.06461.1,
  author =	{Jennings, Nicholas R. and Kersten, Gregory and Ockenfels, Axel and Weinhardt, Christof},
  title =	{{06461 Abstracts Collection – Negotiation and Market Engineering}},
  booktitle =	{Negotiation and Market Engineering},
  pages =	{1--14},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{6461},
  editor =	{Nick Jennings and Gregory Kersten and Axel Ockenfels and Christof Weinhardt},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.1},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-10117},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.1},
  annote =	{Keywords: Negotiations, Auctions, Decision Support Systems, Software Agents, Testbedding Markets}
}

Document

DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.2

06461 Executive Summary – Negotiation and Market Engineering

Authors: Nicholas R. Jennings, Gregory Kersten, Axel Ockenfels, and Christof Weinhardt

Abstract

This executive summary sketches the overall theme of the seminar held from November 12 to 17, 2006, at Schloss Dagstuhl.

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Nicholas R. Jennings, Gregory Kersten, Axel Ockenfels, and Christof Weinhardt. 06461 Executive Summary – Negotiation and Market Engineering. In Negotiation and Market Engineering. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 6461, pp. 1-2, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)

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@InProceedings{jennings_et_al:DagSemProc.06461.2,
  author =	{Jennings, Nicholas R. and Kersten, Gregory and Ockenfels, Axel and Weinhardt, Christof},
  title =	{{06461 Executive Summary – Negotiation and Market Engineering}},
  booktitle =	{Negotiation and Market Engineering},
  pages =	{1--2},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{6461},
  editor =	{Nick Jennings and Gregory Kersten and Axel Ockenfels and Christof Weinhardt},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.2},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-10101},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.2},
  annote =	{Keywords: Negotiations, Auctions, Decision Support Systems, Software Agents, Testbedding Markets}
}

Document

DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.3

A Bayesian Reputation System for Virtual Organizations

Authors: Jochen Haller

Abstract

Virtual Organizations (VOs) are an emerging business model in today’s Internet economy. Increased specialization and focusing on an organization’s core competencies requires such novel models to address business opportunities. In a VO, a set of sovereign, geographically dispersed organizations temporarily pool their resources to jointly address a business opportunity. A VO follows a phased lifecycle where speed is an essential requirement, especially in the initial identification and formation phases that deal with potential VO partner identification and selection. For instance a business opportunity in the form of a government issued tender in the collaborative engineering application domain to upgrade a passenger plane needs to be swiftly answered within a defined deadline. VO management tasks such as VO formation, partner selection and dismissal are duties of the VO manager role, in collaborative engineering typically performed by a system’s integrator. The VO manager’s final decision making which potential partners are invited to join the VO is crucial with respect to entire VO’s success. The possibility of a VO partner performing badly during the VO’s operational phase or announcing bankruptcy endangers the investment taken in integrating their processes and infrastructure for the purpose of the VO. A reputation system can provide additional decision support besides the a priori knowledge from quotations and bidding to avoid events such as VO partner replacement by helping to choose reliable partners in the first place. To achieve this, reputation, an objective trust measure, should be aggregated from multiple independent trust sources, inherently characterizing an organization’s reliability, so-called Trust Indicators (TIs). Such TIs can provide measurable trust values about an organization from heterogeneous domains, e.g. timely delivery of service, organizational stability or environmental risks due to building locations. To allow for the desired predictions of an organization’s future performance, a stochastic modeling approach is chosen. The talk will present: 1) a taxonomy of TIs for VO environments 2) a stochastic model to maintain TIs and their aggregation using Bayes networks 3) the inclusion of other subjective measures such as feedback

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Jochen Haller. A Bayesian Reputation System for Virtual Organizations. In Negotiation and Market Engineering. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 6461, pp. 1-8, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)

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@InProceedings{haller:DagSemProc.06461.3,
  author =	{Haller, Jochen},
  title =	{{A Bayesian Reputation System for Virtual Organizations}},
  booktitle =	{Negotiation and Market Engineering},
  pages =	{1--8},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{6461},
  editor =	{Nick Jennings and Gregory Kersten and Axel Ockenfels and Christof Weinhardt},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.3},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-9995},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.3},
  annote =	{Keywords: Reputation system, bayes network, trust management, virtual organisations}
}

Document

DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.4

A Comparison Between Mechanisms for Sequential Compute Resource Auctions

Authors: Andrew Byde

Abstract

This paper describes simulations designed to test the relative efficiency of two diÃ‚Â®erent sequential auction mechanisms for allocating compute resources between users in a shared data-center. Specifically we model the environment of a data center dedicated to CGI rendering in which animators delegate responsibility for acquiring adequate compute resources to bidding agents that automously bid on their behalf. For each of two possible auction types we apply a genetic algorithm to a broad class of bidding strategies to determine a near-optimal bidding strategy for a specified auction type, and use statistics of the performance of these strategies to determine the most suitable auction type for this domain.

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Andrew Byde. A Comparison Between Mechanisms for Sequential Compute Resource Auctions. In Negotiation and Market Engineering. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 6461, pp. 1-5, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)

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@InProceedings{byde:DagSemProc.06461.4,
  author =	{Byde, Andrew},
  title =	{{A Comparison Between Mechanisms for Sequential Compute Resource Auctions}},
  booktitle =	{Negotiation and Market Engineering},
  pages =	{1--5},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{6461},
  editor =	{Nick Jennings and Gregory Kersten and Axel Ockenfels and Christof Weinhardt},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.4},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-9914},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.4},
  annote =	{Keywords: Auction resource allocation}
}

Document

DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.5

A Decision Support System for Market Mechanisms Choice in e-Procurement

Authors: Carsten Block

Abstract

Since the rise of the Internet electronic markets have become an important component of e-procurement by bringing together demand and supply. E-markets are meeting venues for component suppliers and purchasers, who use exchange mechanisms to electronically support the procurement process. Exchange mechanisms can be conceived as market institutions providing sets of rules, which determine the functioning of the market and the permissible actions such as bidding deadlines, non-disclosure rules or bid-revocation constraints. In nowadays procurement landscape, mechanisms vary from electronic procurement catalogues, where requests and offers are publicly announced, to e-negotiations , where the participants bargain over the conditions of a trade using electronic message exchange and / or decision support platforms, to auctions, where one or two sides automate the process during which participants from the other side compete against each other (Kersten, Neumann, Vahidov, & Chen, 2006). The variety of procurement solutions already suggests that there is no single best solution for all imaginable sourcing activities. Instead, some mechanisms like e.g. an auction might be advantageous in certain situations while others are not (and vice versa). In this paper we present a knowledge-based system (KMS) aimed at supporting procurement staff in their decision making on which mechanism to choose best for a specific sourcing scenario.

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Carsten Block. A Decision Support System for Market Mechanisms Choice in e-Procurement. In Negotiation and Market Engineering. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 6461, pp. 1-4, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)

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@InProceedings{block:DagSemProc.06461.5,
  author =	{Block, Carsten},
  title =	{{A Decision Support System for Market Mechanisms Choice in e-Procurement}},
  booktitle =	{Negotiation and Market Engineering},
  pages =	{1--4},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{6461},
  editor =	{Nick Jennings and Gregory Kersten and Axel Ockenfels and Christof Weinhardt},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.5},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-9891},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.5},
  annote =	{Keywords: Negotiation, electronic auction, e-auction, decision support, DSS, strategic sourcing, SRM, procurement, knowledge base, expert system}
}

Document

DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.6

Adopting Agent-Based Situated Decision Support Framework for Managing One-to-many Negotiations with Multiple Potential Agreements

Authors: Rustam Vahidov

Abstract

Much effort has been spent in the design and evaluation of agent solutions to automate one-to-one negotiations. Recently, researchers have been expanding the agent-based models to address bi-lateral negotiations as well. In this work our interest is in one-to-many negotiations involving multiple potential agreements. This may involve selling products or services to customers through deal-making. The work aims at applying the framework for situated decision support developed recently to this problem. The major components of situated decision support system include sensors, effectors, manager, and active user interface. We illustrate the approach through simulations for the case used previously in our agent-assisted negotiation experiments.

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Rustam Vahidov. Adopting Agent-Based Situated Decision Support Framework for Managing One-to-many Negotiations with Multiple Potential Agreements. In Negotiation and Market Engineering. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 6461, pp. 1-5, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)

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@InProceedings{vahidov:DagSemProc.06461.6,
  author =	{Vahidov, Rustam},
  title =	{{Adopting Agent-Based Situated Decision Support Framework for Managing One-to-many Negotiations with Multiple Potential Agreements}},
  booktitle =	{Negotiation and Market Engineering},
  pages =	{1--5},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{6461},
  editor =	{Nick Jennings and Gregory Kersten and Axel Ockenfels and Christof Weinhardt},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.6},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-9870},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.6},
  annote =	{Keywords: Agent technology, one-to-many negotiations, situated decision support}
}

Document

DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.7

Decentralization and Mechanism Design for Online Machine Scheduling

Authors: Birgit Heydenreich, Rudolf Müller, and Marc Uetz

Abstract

We study the online version of the classical parallel machine scheduling problem to minimize the total weighted completion time from a new perspective: We assume that the data of each job, namely its release date $r_j$, its processing time $p_j$ and its weight $w_j$ is only known to the job itself, but not to the system. Furthermore, we assume a decentralized setting where jobs choose the machine on which they want to be processed themselves. We study this problem from the perspective of algorithmic mechanism design. We introduce the concept of a myopic best response equilibrium, a concept weaker than the dominant strategy equilibrium, but appropriate for online problems. We present a polynomial time, online scheduling mechanism that, assuming rational behavior of jobs, results in an equilibrium schedule that is 3.281-competitive. The mechanism deploys an online payment scheme that induces rational jobs to truthfully report their private data. We also show that the underlying local scheduling policy cannot be extended to a mechanism where truthful reports constitute a dominant strategy equilibrium.

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Birgit Heydenreich, Rudolf Müller, and Marc Uetz. Decentralization and Mechanism Design for Online Machine Scheduling. In Negotiation and Market Engineering. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 6461, pp. 1-4, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)

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@InProceedings{heydenreich_et_al:DagSemProc.06461.7,
  author =	{Heydenreich, Birgit and M\"{u}ller, Rudolf and Uetz, Marc},
  title =	{{Decentralization and Mechanism Design for Online Machine Scheduling}},
  booktitle =	{Negotiation and Market Engineering},
  pages =	{1--4},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{6461},
  editor =	{Nick Jennings and Gregory Kersten and Axel Ockenfels and Christof Weinhardt},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.7},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-10030},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.7},
  annote =	{Keywords: Scheduling, mechanism design, online algorithms}
}

Document

DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.8

Designing Reverse Auctions for B-2-B Procurement – Evidence from the German Industry

Authors: Tilman Eichstädt

Abstract

For a long time on-line reverse auctions have been proposed as an effective tool to improve the performance of corporate procurement. Five years after the end of the Internet and e-business hype, reverse auctions have become a standard procurement tool for large corporations. However, it has not been assessed as yet to what extent users actively apply the findings of auction theory to improve the design of reverse auctions. Based on a representative survey of companies using procurement auctions in Germany, the following paper reveals which auction designs are used in practice and to what extent more complex and sophisticated auction designs are adopted. By comparing the empirical results with the concepts of auction theory it is shown which levers can be pulled to improve the design of an auction. For auctions with many bidders, hybrid auctions seem to be promising as they can reasonably combine the benefits of different standard auction models. For auctions with only a few bidders, Dutch auctions might be superior to English auctions as they can create additional uncertainty and induce risk-averse bidders to bid more aggressively. In practice, however, it is very common that companies use different variations of the English auction such as rank or best/not best auctions rather than Dutch or hybrid auctions. Here it seems that framing effects rather than game-theoretic factors play an important role.

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Tilman Eichstädt. Designing Reverse Auctions for B-2-B Procurement – Evidence from the German Industry. In Negotiation and Market Engineering. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 6461, pp. 1-9, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)

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@InProceedings{eichstadt:DagSemProc.06461.8,
  author =	{Eichst\"{a}dt, Tilman},
  title =	{{Designing Reverse Auctions for B-2-B Procurement – Evidence from the German Industry}},
  booktitle =	{Negotiation and Market Engineering},
  pages =	{1--9},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{6461},
  editor =	{Nick Jennings and Gregory Kersten and Axel Ockenfels and Christof Weinhardt},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.8},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-9944},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.8},
  annote =	{Keywords: Auctions, auction design, procurement, hybrid auctions, framing effects,}
}

Document

DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.9

Engineering Grid Markets

Authors: Dirk Neumann

Abstract

Grids denote a promising concept to pool computer resources for joint computations. Facing increasingly more complex and demanding resources, Grids are deemed the solution to those problems by a more efficient and flexible usage of already existing resources. From a technical perspective Grid middleware have made significant progress. While in former implementations it was only possible to share idle resources (e.g. using Condor), new Grid middleware allow advance reservation of resources that are once committed not usable locally for the committed time (e.g. GRAM in Globus Toolkit 4.0). Advance reservation thus allows the sharing of not only idle resources but of all designated resources. The contribution of this paper is threefold. Firstly, this paper derives a requirement list stemming from Grid applications that need to be fulfilled by the market-based Grid. Secondly, the paper compares related work with the above requirements. Thirdly, and most importantly, this paper provides a fully-fledged market mechanism that is tailored to the use in service-oriented Grids.

Cite as

Dirk Neumann. Engineering Grid Markets. In Negotiation and Market Engineering. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 6461, pp. 1-13, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)

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@InProceedings{neumann:DagSemProc.06461.9,
  author =	{Neumann, Dirk},
  title =	{{Engineering Grid Markets}},
  booktitle =	{Negotiation and Market Engineering},
  pages =	{1--13},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{6461},
  editor =	{Nick Jennings and Gregory Kersten and Axel Ockenfels and Christof Weinhardt},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.9},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-10042},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.9},
  annote =	{Keywords: Market Engineering, Grid Computing, Combinatorial Exchange}
}

Document

DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.10

Experimental research on bilateral negotiations

Authors: Jesus Rios, Stefan Strecker, JinBeak Kim, Simone Ludwig, and Eva Chen

Abstract

Research on bilateral negotiations

Cite as

Jesus Rios, Stefan Strecker, JinBeak Kim, Simone Ludwig, and Eva Chen. Experimental research on bilateral negotiations. In Negotiation and Market Engineering. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 6461, pp. 1-2, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)

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@InProceedings{rios_et_al:DagSemProc.06461.10,
  author =	{Rios, Jesus and Strecker, Stefan and Kim, JinBeak and Ludwig, Simone and Chen, Eva},
  title =	{{Experimental research on bilateral negotiations}},
  booktitle =	{Negotiation and Market Engineering},
  pages =	{1--2},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{6461},
  editor =	{Nick Jennings and Gregory Kersten and Axel Ockenfels and Christof Weinhardt},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.10},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-10063},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.10},
  annote =	{Keywords: Negotiations, decision support}
}

Document

DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.11

MACE: A Multi-Attribute Combinatorial Exchange

Authors: Björn Schnizler

Abstract

The Grid is a promising technology for providing access to distributed high-end computational capabilities. Thus, computational tasks can be performed spontaneously by other resources in the Grid that are not under the user's control. However, one of the key problems in the Grid is deciding which jobs are to be allocated to which resources at what time. In this context, the use of market mechanisms for scheduling and allocating Grid resources is a promising approach toward solving these problems. This paper proposes an auction mechanism for allocating and scheduling computer resources such as processors or storage space which have multiple quality attributes. The mechanism is evaluated according to its economic and computational performance as well as its practical applicability by means of a simulation.

Cite as

Björn Schnizler. MACE: A Multi-Attribute Combinatorial Exchange. In Negotiation and Market Engineering. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 6461, pp. 1-2, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)

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@InProceedings{schnizler:DagSemProc.06461.11,
  author =	{Schnizler, Bj\"{o}rn},
  title =	{{MACE: A Multi-Attribute Combinatorial Exchange}},
  booktitle =	{Negotiation and Market Engineering},
  pages =	{1--2},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{6461},
  editor =	{Nick Jennings and Gregory Kersten and Axel Ockenfels and Christof Weinhardt},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.11},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-10095},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.11},
  annote =	{Keywords: Auctions and Bidding, Integer Programming, Combinatorial Exchange, Market Engineering, Grid}
}

Document

DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.12

Market Engineering: An Interdisciplinary Research Challenge

Authors: Christof Weinhardt and Henner Gimpel

Abstract

Market engineering is making markets work. Markets are information processing and information producing information systems which mediate allocation of resources within or between organizations. Setting up and operating a market in a way that it works effectively and efficiently is an art and a science. This paper outlines challenges in this interdisciplinary field of research and presents frameworks for assessing markets.

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Christof Weinhardt and Henner Gimpel. Market Engineering: An Interdisciplinary Research Challenge. In Negotiation and Market Engineering. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 6461, pp. 1-15, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)

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@InProceedings{weinhardt_et_al:DagSemProc.06461.12,
  author =	{Weinhardt, Christof and Gimpel, Henner},
  title =	{{Market Engineering: An Interdisciplinary Research Challenge}},
  booktitle =	{Negotiation and Market Engineering},
  pages =	{1--15},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{6461},
  editor =	{Nick Jennings and Gregory Kersten and Axel Ockenfels and Christof Weinhardt},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.12},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-9880},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.12},
  annote =	{Keywords: Markets, Auctions, Negotiations, Economic Engineering, Market Engineering}
}

Document

DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.13

Negotiation Fever: Loss Aversion in Multi-Issue Negotiations

Authors: Henner Gimpel

Abstract

Negotiating parties oftentimes do not reach mutually beneficial agreements. A considerable body of research on negotiation analysis compiled a set of so called common biases in negotiations that systematically affect the cognition and behavior of negotiators and thereby influence agreements. The present work adds an additional effect, the attachment effect. This effect biases decision makers in bilateral multi-issue negotiations and influences their preferences via reference points---negotiators get caught in a kind of negotiation fever.

Cite as

Henner Gimpel. Negotiation Fever: Loss Aversion in Multi-Issue Negotiations. In Negotiation and Market Engineering. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 6461, pp. 1-4, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)

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@InProceedings{gimpel:DagSemProc.06461.13,
  author =	{Gimpel, Henner},
  title =	{{Negotiation Fever: Loss Aversion in Multi-Issue Negotiations}},
  booktitle =	{Negotiation and Market Engineering},
  pages =	{1--4},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{6461},
  editor =	{Nick Jennings and Gregory Kersten and Axel Ockenfels and Christof Weinhardt},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.13},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-9982},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.13},
  annote =	{Keywords: Negotiation Analysis, Consumer Preferences, Behavioral Economics, Experimental Economics, Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion}
}

Document

DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.14

Negotiation or Auction? The NorA project

Authors: Eva Chen, Bo Yu, and Klaus Kolitz

Abstract

Negotiation or Auction? The NorA project

Cite as

Eva Chen, Bo Yu, and Klaus Kolitz. Negotiation or Auction? The NorA project. In Negotiation and Market Engineering. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 6461, pp. 1-3, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)

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@InProceedings{chen_et_al:DagSemProc.06461.14,
  author =	{Chen, Eva and Yu, Bo and Kolitz, Klaus},
  title =	{{Negotiation or Auction? The NorA project}},
  booktitle =	{Negotiation and Market Engineering},
  pages =	{1--3},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{6461},
  editor =	{Nick Jennings and Gregory Kersten and Axel Ockenfels and Christof Weinhardt},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.14},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-9928},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.14},
  annote =	{Keywords: Negotiation, auction, mechanism, and markets}
}

Document

DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.15

Nonlinear Transaction Pricing in the Securities Trading Value Chain

Authors: Matthias Burghardt

Abstract

Most of the research on transaction costs in the market microstructure literature focuses on implicit transaction costs. Research on the design of price schedules for explicit transaction fees is rare. This paper analyzes and classifies different price schedules and discusses their application to the market transaction business. The discussion highlights design issues and the need for a structured approach for price schedule design in the context of market engineering. In order to get some insights into customer order behavior, we conduct a trading experiment where participants trade virtual stocks on an electronic platform within a time period of three weeks. During three weeks, participants face transaction fees of different types. Order frequency and volume is measured and related to the price schedule in place. We find that both variables are influenced by transaction fees. We also try to identify price elasticities for groups with different income and use this information for a structured approach towards a nonlinear price schedule design.

Cite as

Matthias Burghardt. Nonlinear Transaction Pricing in the Securities Trading Value Chain. In Negotiation and Market Engineering. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 6461, pp. 1-15, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)

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@InProceedings{burghardt:DagSemProc.06461.15,
  author =	{Burghardt, Matthias},
  title =	{{Nonlinear Transaction Pricing in the Securities Trading Value Chain}},
  booktitle =	{Negotiation and Market Engineering},
  pages =	{1--15},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{6461},
  editor =	{Nick Jennings and Gregory Kersten and Axel Ockenfels and Christof Weinhardt},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.15},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-9904},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.15},
  annote =	{Keywords: Nonlinear Pricing, Securities Trading, Exchanges, Transaction Fee Experiment}
}

Document

DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.16

On Comparison of Mechanisms of Economic and Social Exchanges: The Times Model

Authors: Gregory Kersten, Eva Chen, Dirk Neumann, Rustam Vahidov, and Christof Weinhardt

Abstract

An e-market system is a concrete implementation of a market institution; it embeds one or more exchange mechanisms. The mechanisms are – from the economic point of view – disembodied objects (models and procedures) which control access to and regulate execution of transactions. E-market systems are also information systems which are information and communication technologies artifacts. They interact with their users; have different features and tools for searching, processing and displaying information. This work puts forward an argument that the study of e-markets must incorporate both the behavioural economic as well as the information systems perspectives. To this end the paper proposes a conceptual framework that integrates the two. This framework is used to formulate a model, which incorporates the essential features of exchange mechanisms, as well as their implementations as IS artefacts. The focus of attention is on two classes of mechanisms, namely auctions and negotiations. They both may serve the same purpose and their various types have been embedded in many e-market systems.

Cite as

Gregory Kersten, Eva Chen, Dirk Neumann, Rustam Vahidov, and Christof Weinhardt. On Comparison of Mechanisms of Economic and Social Exchanges: The Times Model. In Negotiation and Market Engineering. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 6461, pp. 1-29, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)

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@InProceedings{kersten_et_al:DagSemProc.06461.16,
  author =	{Kersten, Gregory and Chen, Eva and Neumann, Dirk and Vahidov, Rustam and Weinhardt, Christof},
  title =	{{On Comparison of Mechanisms of Economic and Social Exchanges: The Times Model}},
  booktitle =	{Negotiation and Market Engineering},
  pages =	{1--29},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{6461},
  editor =	{Nick Jennings and Gregory Kersten and Axel Ockenfels and Christof Weinhardt},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.16},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-10008},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.16},
  annote =	{Keywords: Electronic markets, information systems, exchange mechanisms, auctions, negotiations, system assessment}
}

Document

DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.17

On the Design of Simple Multi-unit Online Auctions

Authors: Thomas Kittsteiner and Axel Ockenfels

Abstract

The increased use of online market places (like eBay) by professional traders and small businesses goes along with an increase in demand for online multi-unit auction designs. A seller with many objects for sale might consider it inconvenient to initiate and monitor a single auction for each individual item and thus might favour the use of a multi-unit auction. However, the design of online multi-unit auctions can be substantially more difficult than that of single-unit auctions. In fact, the theoretical as well as empirical literature on multi-unit auctions is much less developed. New difficulties such as market power and computational complexities arise when objects are heterogeneous or bidders demand multiple items. In addition, there is a conflict between simplicity of auction rules and their efficiency (and revenue). If objects for sale are complements, to obtain the optimal performance (at least from a theoretical point of view) the auction design usually requires that bidders specify their preferences on any possible package of the N objects. Thus each bidder has to submit $2^{N}-1$ numbers (as he might value any subset of the items for sale differently) . Especially for a large number of objects such an auction is often infeasible. Multi-unit auction design is considerably simpler if one can assume that each bidder just demands one object (or, more generally, if objects are substitutes). As we will argue below, under this unit-demand assumption, the standard single-unit auction format used on eBay can be naturally extended to a multi-unit design. In what follows we will first describe the single-unit auction format used by eBay and then demonstrate how it can be adjusted to allow for the simultaneous sale of many objects. We will discuss some of the drawbacks of this multi-unit design and offer another simple design that can circumvent some of these.

Cite as

Thomas Kittsteiner and Axel Ockenfels. On the Design of Simple Multi-unit Online Auctions. In Negotiation and Market Engineering. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 6461, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)

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@InProceedings{kittsteiner_et_al:DagSemProc.06461.17,
  author =	{Kittsteiner, Thomas and Ockenfels, Axel},
  title =	{{On the Design of Simple Multi-unit Online Auctions}},
  booktitle =	{Negotiation and Market Engineering},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{6461},
  editor =	{Nick Jennings and Gregory Kersten and Axel Ockenfels and Christof Weinhardt},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.17},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-10058},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.17},
  annote =	{Keywords: Multi-Unit Auctions, Internet Auctions, Market Engineering, eBay}
}

Document

DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.18

Optimal Bidding Strategies for Simultaneous Vickrey Auctions with Perfect Substitutes

Authors: Enrico H. Gerding, Rajdeep K. Dash, David C. K. Yuen, and Nicholas R. Jennings

Abstract

We derive optimal bidding strategies for a global bidder who participates in multiple, simultaneous second-price auctions with perfect substitutes. We prove that, if everyone else bids locally in a single auction, the global bidder should always place non-zero bids in all available auctions, provided there are no budget constraints. With a budget, however, the optimal strategy is to bid locally if this budget is equal or less than the valuation. Furthermore, for a wide range of valuation distributions, we prove that the problem of finding the optimal bids reduces to two dimensions if all auctions are identical. Moreoever, we address markets with both sequential and simultaneous auctions, non-identical auctions, and the allocative efficiency of the market. Finally, by combining analystical and simulation results, we analyse equilibrium strategies in case of several global bidders. However, a stable solution is then only found if there are local bidders as well.

Cite as

Enrico H. Gerding, Rajdeep K. Dash, David C. K. Yuen, and Nicholas R. Jennings. Optimal Bidding Strategies for Simultaneous Vickrey Auctions with Perfect Substitutes. In Negotiation and Market Engineering. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 6461, pp. 1-8, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)

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@InProceedings{gerding_et_al:DagSemProc.06461.18,
  author =	{Gerding, Enrico H. and Dash, Rajdeep K. and Yuen, David C. K. and Jennings, Nicholas R.},
  title =	{{Optimal Bidding Strategies for Simultaneous Vickrey Auctions with Perfect Substitutes}},
  booktitle =	{Negotiation and Market Engineering},
  pages =	{1--8},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{6461},
  editor =	{Nick Jennings and Gregory Kersten and Axel Ockenfels and Christof Weinhardt},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.18},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-9934},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.18},
  annote =	{Keywords: Bidding strategies, Vickrey Auctions, Perfect Substitutes, Simultaneous Auctions, Budget Constraint, Global Bidder}
}

Document

DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.19

Payoff levels, loss avoidance, and equilibrium selection in the Stag Hunt: an experimental study

Authors: Nicholas Feltovich, Atsushi Iwasaki, and Sobei H. Oda

Abstract

Game theorists typically assume that changing a game's payoff levels--by adding the same constant to, or subtracting it from, all payoffs--should not affect behavior. However, this invariance is an empirical question when "payoffs" are actually money amounts rather than utility amounts. In particular, if individuals treat gains and losses differently, then payoff-level changes may matter when they result in positive payoffs becoming negative, or vice versa. We report the results of a human-subjects experiment designed to test for two types of "loss avoidance": certain-loss avoidance (avoiding a strategy leading to a sure loss, in favor of an alternative that might lead to a gain) and possible-loss avoidance (avoiding a strategy leading to a possible loss, in favor of an alternative that leads to a sure gain). Subjects in the experiment play three versions of a game called Stag Hunt, which are identical up to the level of payoffs, under a variety of treatments. We find differences in behavior across the three games; these differences are hard to detect in the first round of play, but grow over time. When significant, the differences we find are in the direction predicted by certain- and possible-loss avoidance. Our results carry implications for games with multiple equilibria, and for theories that attempt to select equilibria in such games.

Cite as

Nicholas Feltovich, Atsushi Iwasaki, and Sobei H. Oda. Payoff levels, loss avoidance, and equilibrium selection in the Stag Hunt: an experimental study. In Negotiation and Market Engineering. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 6461, pp. 1-6, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)

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@InProceedings{feltovich_et_al:DagSemProc.06461.19,
  author =	{Feltovich, Nicholas and Iwasaki, Atsushi and Oda, Sobei H.},
  title =	{{Payoff levels, loss avoidance, and equilibrium selection in the Stag Hunt: an experimental study}},
  booktitle =	{Negotiation and Market Engineering},
  pages =	{1--6},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{6461},
  editor =	{Nick Jennings and Gregory Kersten and Axel Ockenfels and Christof Weinhardt},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.19},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-9960},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.19},
  annote =	{Keywords: Experiment, game theory, behavioral economics, stag hunt, learning}
}

Document

DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.20

Prediction Markets: How Do Incentive Schemes Affect Prediction Accuracy?

Authors: Stefan Luckner

Abstract

Prediction markets are a promising approach for forecasting future events. The basic idea of a prediction market is to trade virtual stocks whose final value is tied to the outcome of uncertain future events. Market prices can then be interpreted as predictions of the likelihood of those future events. In information efficient markets, prices represent all available information about the participants’ valuations at any time. The results of recent studies on prediction markets are encouraging. Prior experience in this field demonstrates that real money as well as play money markets predicted future events at a remarkable accuracy. Experimental economists most probably would insist that performance-related payment is required in order to obtain valid conclusions about economic behavior. Payments based on the participants' performance are usually intended to provide incentives for rational – or at least well considered – decision making. On the other hand, there is evidence that monetary incentives do not necessarily increase performance. We study the impact of different monetary incentives on prediction markets in a field experiment. In order to do so, we compare three groups of users, corresponding to three treatments with different incentive schemes, in a prediction market for the FIFA World Cup 2006. The subjects of the first group are paid a fixed amount. To subjects in the second group we promise a payment which linearly depends on their deposit value in the prediction market. In the third group, individuals are paid according to their ordinal rank. We study the predictive power of markets depending on the incentive scheme. The goal of our work thus is to analyze the impact of different incentive schemes on the market quality and the predictive power of markets. Based on these results we want to give advice on engineering incentive schemes for future prediction markets.

Cite as

Stefan Luckner. Prediction Markets: How Do Incentive Schemes Affect Prediction Accuracy?. In Negotiation and Market Engineering. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 6461, pp. 1-10, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)

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@InProceedings{luckner:DagSemProc.06461.20,
  author =	{Luckner, Stefan},
  title =	{{Prediction Markets: How Do Incentive Schemes Affect Prediction Accuracy?}},
  booktitle =	{Negotiation and Market Engineering},
  pages =	{1--10},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{6461},
  editor =	{Nick Jennings and Gregory Kersten and Axel Ockenfels and Christof Weinhardt},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.20},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-10022},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.20},
  annote =	{Keywords: Prediction Markets, Incentive Engineering}
}

Document

DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.21

Sellers Competing for Buyers in Online Markets

Authors: Enrico H. Gerding, Alex Rogers, Rajdeep K. Dash, and Nicholas R. Jennings

Abstract

We consider competition between sellers offering similar items in concurrent online auctions, where each seller must set its individual auction parameters (such as the reserve price) in such a way as to attract buyers. We show that there exists a pure Nash equilibrium in the case of two sellers with asymmetric production costs. In addition, we show that, rather than setting a reserve price, a seller can further improve its utility by shill bidding (i.e., pretending to be a buyer in order to bid in its own auction). But, using an evolutionary simulation, we show that this shill bidding introduces inefficiences within the market. However, we then go on to show that these inefficiences can be reduced when the mediating auction institution uses appropriate auction fees that deter sellers from submitting shill bids.

Cite as

Enrico H. Gerding, Alex Rogers, Rajdeep K. Dash, and Nicholas R. Jennings. Sellers Competing for Buyers in Online Markets. In Negotiation and Market Engineering. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 6461, pp. 1-7, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)

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@InProceedings{gerding_et_al:DagSemProc.06461.21,
  author =	{Gerding, Enrico H. and Rogers, Alex and Dash, Rajdeep K. and Jennings, Nicholas R.},
  title =	{{Sellers Competing for Buyers in Online Markets}},
  booktitle =	{Negotiation and Market Engineering},
  pages =	{1--7},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{6461},
  editor =	{Nick Jennings and Gregory Kersten and Axel Ockenfels and Christof Weinhardt},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.21},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-9979},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.21},
  annote =	{Keywords: Auctions, Competing Sellers, Shill Bidding, Auction Fees, Reserve Price}
}

Document

DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.22

Three Decision-making Mechanisms to facilitate Negotiation of Service Level Agreements for Web Service Compositions

Authors: Jakub Brzostowski, Mohan Baruwal Chhetri, and Ryszard Kowalczyk

Abstract

The negotiation of Service Level Agreements for composite web services is a very complex process. It involves the coordination of the negotiation process so that the end-to-end QoS requirements of the user request are satisfied while ensuring that the atomic QoS requirements are also simultaneously satisfied. This paper summarizes three decision-making mechanisms which support the process of Service Level Agreement negotiation for composite web services. The mechanisms include: the decomposition of the overall user preferences into the preferences of individual negotiation agents representing each atomic services within the composition; the selection of the prospective negotiation partners for the actual interaction from a list of potential service providers and finally the negotiation of Service Level Agreement with the selected provider agents while ensuring that the end-to-end QoS is satisfied.

Cite as

Jakub Brzostowski, Mohan Baruwal Chhetri, and Ryszard Kowalczyk. Three Decision-making Mechanisms to facilitate Negotiation of Service Level Agreements for Web Service Compositions. In Negotiation and Market Engineering. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 6461, pp. 1-8, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)

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@InProceedings{brzostowski_et_al:DagSemProc.06461.22,
  author =	{Brzostowski, Jakub and Chhetri, Mohan Baruwal and Kowalczyk, Ryszard},
  title =	{{Three Decision-making Mechanisms to facilitate Negotiation of Service Level Agreements for Web Service Compositions}},
  booktitle =	{Negotiation and Market Engineering},
  pages =	{1--8},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{6461},
  editor =	{Nick Jennings and Gregory Kersten and Axel Ockenfels and Christof Weinhardt},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.22},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-10016},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.22},
  annote =	{Keywords: Egotiation, end-to-end QoS, composite web services}
}

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