4 Search Results for "Aggarwal, Gagan"

Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.86
The Secretary Problem with Predictions and a Chosen Order

Authors: Helia Karisani, Mohammadreza Daneshvaramoli, Hedyeh Beyhaghi, Mohammad Hajiesmaili, and Cameron Musco

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 362, 17th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2026)

Abstract
We study a learning-augmented variant of the secretary problem, recently introduced by Fujii and Yoshida (2023). In this variant, the decision-maker has access to machine-learned predictions of candidate values in advance. The key challenge is to balance consistency and robustness: when the predictions are accurate, the algorithm should hire a near-best secretary; however, if they are inaccurate, the algorithm should still achieve a bounded competitive ratio. We consider both the standard Random Order Secretary Problem (ROSP), where candidates arrive in a uniform random order, and a more natural model in the learning-augmented setting, where the decision-maker can choose the arrival order based on the predicted candidate values. This model, which we call the Chosen Order Secretary Problem (COSP), can capture scenarios such as an interview schedule that is set by the decision-maker. We propose a novel algorithm that applies to both ROSP and COSP. Building on the approach of Fujii and Yoshida, our method switches from fully trusting predictions to a threshold-based rule when a large deviation of a prediction is observed. Importantly, unlike the algorithm of Fujii and Yoshida, our algorithm uses randomization as part of its decision logic. We show that if ε ∈ [0,1] denotes the maximum multiplicative prediction error, then for ROSP our algorithm achieves competitive ratio max {0.221, (1-ε)/(1+ε)}, improving on a previous bound of max {0.215, (1-ε)/(1+ε)} due to Fujii and Yoshida [Fujii and Yoshida, 2023]. For COSP, our algorithm achieves max {0.262, (1-ε)/(1+ε)}. This surpasses a 0.25 upper bound on the worst-case competitive ratio that applies to the approach of Fujii and Yoshida, and gets closer to the classical secretary benchmark of 1/e ≈ 0.368, which is an upper bound for any algorithm. Our result for COSP highlights the benefit of integrating predictions with arrival-order control in online decision-making.
Cite as

Helia Karisani, Mohammadreza Daneshvaramoli, Hedyeh Beyhaghi, Mohammad Hajiesmaili, and Cameron Musco. The Secretary Problem with Predictions and a Chosen Order. In 17th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2026). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 362, pp. 86:1-86:24, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2026)

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@InProceedings{karisani_et_al:LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.86,
  author =	{Karisani, Helia and Daneshvaramoli, Mohammadreza and Beyhaghi, Hedyeh and Hajiesmaili, Mohammad and Musco, Cameron},
  title =	{{The Secretary Problem with Predictions and a Chosen Order}},
  booktitle =	{17th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2026)},
  pages =	{86:1--86:24},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-410-9},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2026},
  volume =	{362},
  editor =	{Saraf, Shubhangi},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.86},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-253734},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.86},
  annote =	{Keywords: Secretary problem, learning-augmented algorithms, online algorithms}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.DNA.31.8
An Axiomatic Study of Leveraging Blockers to Self-Assemble Arbitrary Shapes via Temperature Programming

Authors: Matthew J. Patitz and Trent A. Rogers

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 347, 31st International Conference on DNA Computing and Molecular Programming (DNA 31) (2025)

Abstract
In this paper we present a theoretical design for tile-based self-assembling systems where individual tile sets that are universal for various tasks (e.g. building shapes or encoding arbitrary data for algorithmic systems) can be provided their input solely using sequences of variations in temperatures. Although there is prior theoretical work in so-called "temperature programming," the results presented here are based upon recent experimental work with "blocked tiles" that provides plausible evidence for their practical implementation. We develop and present an abstract mathematical model, the BlockTAM, for such systems that is based upon the experimental work, and provide constructions within it for universal number encoding systems and a universal shape building construction. These results mirror previous results in temperature programming, covering the two ends of the spectrum that seek to balance the scale factors of assemblies with the number of temperature phases required, while leveraging the features of the BlockTAM that we hope provide a pathway for future experimental implementations.
Cite as

Matthew J. Patitz and Trent A. Rogers. An Axiomatic Study of Leveraging Blockers to Self-Assemble Arbitrary Shapes via Temperature Programming. In 31st International Conference on DNA Computing and Molecular Programming (DNA 31). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 347, pp. 8:1-8:20, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{patitz_et_al:LIPIcs.DNA.31.8,
  author =	{Patitz, Matthew J. and Rogers, Trent A.},
  title =	{{An Axiomatic Study of Leveraging Blockers to Self-Assemble Arbitrary Shapes via Temperature Programming}},
  booktitle =	{31st International Conference on DNA Computing and Molecular Programming (DNA 31)},
  pages =	{8:1--8:20},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-399-7},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{347},
  editor =	{Schaeffer, Josie and Zhang, Fei},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.DNA.31.8},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-238574},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.DNA.31.8},
  annote =	{Keywords: DNA tiles, self-assembly, temperature programming}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.DNA.31.9
Synchronous Versus Asynchronous Tile-Based Self-Assembly

Authors: Florent Becker, Phillip Drake, Matthew J. Patitz, and Trent A. Rogers

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 347, 31st International Conference on DNA Computing and Molecular Programming (DNA 31) (2025)

Abstract
In this paper we study the relationship between mathematical models of tile-based self-assembly which differ in terms of the synchronicity of tile additions. In the standard abstract Tile Assembly Model (aTAM), each step of assembly consists of a single tile being added to an assembly. At any given time, each location on the perimeter of an assembly to which a tile can legally bind is called a frontier location, and for each step of assembly one frontier location is randomly selected and a tile is added. In the Synchronous Tile Assembly Model (syncTAM), at each step of assembly every frontier location simultaneously receives a tile. Our results show that while directed, non-cooperative syncTAM systems are capable of universal computation (while directed, non-cooperative aTAM systems are known not to be), and they are capable of building shapes that can't be built within the aTAM, the non-cooperative aTAM is also capable of building shapes that can't be built within the syncTAM even cooperatively. We show a variety of results that demonstrate the similarities and differences between these two models.
Cite as

Florent Becker, Phillip Drake, Matthew J. Patitz, and Trent A. Rogers. Synchronous Versus Asynchronous Tile-Based Self-Assembly. In 31st International Conference on DNA Computing and Molecular Programming (DNA 31). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 347, pp. 9:1-9:21, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{becker_et_al:LIPIcs.DNA.31.9,
  author =	{Becker, Florent and Drake, Phillip and Patitz, Matthew J. and Rogers, Trent A.},
  title =	{{Synchronous Versus Asynchronous Tile-Based Self-Assembly}},
  booktitle =	{31st International Conference on DNA Computing and Molecular Programming (DNA 31)},
  pages =	{9:1--9:21},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-399-7},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{347},
  editor =	{Schaeffer, Josie and Zhang, Fei},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.DNA.31.9},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-238580},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.DNA.31.9},
  annote =	{Keywords: self-assembly, noncooperative self-assembly, models of computation, tile assembly systems}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2022.1
Maximizing Revenue in the Presence of Intermediaries

Authors: Gagan Aggarwal, Kshipra Bhawalkar, Guru Guruganesh, and Andres Perlroth

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 215, 13th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2022)

Abstract
We study the mechanism design problem of selling k items to unit-demand buyers with private valuations for the items. A buyer either participates directly in the auction or is represented by an intermediary, who represents a subset of buyers. Our goal is to design robust mechanisms that are independent of the demand structure (i.e. how the buyers are partitioned across intermediaries), and perform well under a wide variety of possible contracts between intermediaries and buyers. We first consider the case of k identical items where each buyer draws its private valuation for an item i.i.d. from a known λ-regular distribution. We construct a robust mechanism that, independent of the demand structure and under certain conditions on the contracts between intermediaries and buyers, obtains a constant factor of the revenue that the mechanism designer could obtain had she known the buyers' valuations. In other words, our mechanism’s expected revenue achieves a constant factor of the optimal welfare, regardless of the demand structure. Our mechanism is a simple posted-price mechanism that sets a take-it-or-leave-it per-item price that depends on k and the total number of buyers, but does not depend on the demand structure or the downstream contracts. Next we generalize our result to the case when the items are not identical. We assume that the item valuations are separable, i.e. v_{i j} = η_j v_i for buyer i and item j, with each private v_i drawn i.i.d. from a known λ-regular distribution. For this case, we design a mechanism that obtains at least a constant fraction of the optimal welfare, by using a menu of posted prices. This mechanism is also independent of the demand structure, but makes a relatively stronger assumption on the contracts between intermediaries and buyers, namely that each intermediary prefers outcomes with a higher sum of utilities of the subset of buyers represented by it.
Cite as

Gagan Aggarwal, Kshipra Bhawalkar, Guru Guruganesh, and Andres Perlroth. Maximizing Revenue in the Presence of Intermediaries. In 13th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2022). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 215, pp. 1:1-1:22, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2022)

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@InProceedings{aggarwal_et_al:LIPIcs.ITCS.2022.1,
  author =	{Aggarwal, Gagan and Bhawalkar, Kshipra and Guruganesh, Guru and Perlroth, Andres},
  title =	{{Maximizing Revenue in the Presence of Intermediaries}},
  booktitle =	{13th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2022)},
  pages =	{1:1--1:22},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-217-4},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2022},
  volume =	{215},
  editor =	{Braverman, Mark},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2022.1},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-155979},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2022.1},
  annote =	{Keywords: Mechanism Design, Revenue Maximization, Posted Price Mechanisms}
}
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