6 Search Results for "Kollias, Kostas"

Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.STACS.2026.69
Approximating q → p Norms of Non-Negative Matrices in Nearly-Linear Time

Authors: Etienne Objois and Adrian Vladu

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 364, 43rd International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS 2026)

Abstract
We provide the first nearly-linear time algorithm for approximating 𝓁_{q → p}-norms of non-negative matrices, for q ≥ p ≥ 1. Our algorithm returns a (1-ε)-approximation to the matrix norm in time Õ(1/(q ε) ⋅ nnz(A)), where A is the input matrix, and improves upon the previous state of the art, which either proved convergence only in the limit [Boyd '74], or had very high polynomial running times [Bhaskara-Vijayraghavan, SODA '11]. Our algorithm is extremely simple, and is largely inspired from the coordinate-scaling approach used for positive linear program solvers. Our algorithm can readily be used in the [Englert-Räcke, FOCS '09] to improve the running time of constructing O(log n)-competitive 𝓁_p-oblivious routings.
Cite as

Etienne Objois and Adrian Vladu. Approximating q → p Norms of Non-Negative Matrices in Nearly-Linear Time. In 43rd International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS 2026). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 364, pp. 69:1-69:19, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2026)

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@InProceedings{objois_et_al:LIPIcs.STACS.2026.69,
  author =	{Objois, Etienne and Vladu, Adrian},
  title =	{{Approximating q → p Norms of Non-Negative Matrices in Nearly-Linear Time}},
  booktitle =	{43rd International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS 2026)},
  pages =	{69:1--69:19},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-412-3},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2026},
  volume =	{364},
  editor =	{Mahajan, Meena and Manea, Florin and McIver, Annabelle and Thắng, Nguy\~{ê}n Kim},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.STACS.2026.69},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-255585},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.STACS.2026.69},
  annote =	{Keywords: matrix norm, Perron-Frobenius theory, oblivious routings, input-sparsity time, lp norm}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2025.38
Fairness and Efficiency in Two-Sided Matching Markets

Authors: Pallavi Jain, Palash Jha, and Shubham Solanki

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 360, 45th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2025)

Abstract
We propose a new fairness notion, motivated by the practical challenge of allocating teaching assistants (TAs) to courses in a department. Each course requires a certain number of TAs and each TA has preferences over the courses they want to assist. Similarly, each course instructor has preferences over the TAs who applied for their course. We demand fairness and efficiency for both sides separately, giving rise to the following criteria: (i) every course gets the required number of TAs and the average utility of the assigned TAs meets a threshold; (ii) the allocation of courses to TAs is envy-free, where a TA envies another TA if the former prefers the latter’s course and has a higher or equal grade in that course. Note that the definition of envy-freeness here differs from the one in the literature, and we call it merit-based envy-freeness. We show that the problem of finding a merit-based envy-free and efficient matching is NP-hard even for very restricted settings, such as two courses and uniform valuations; constant degree, constant capacity of TAs for every course, valuations in the range {0,1,2,3}, identical valuations from TAs, and even more. To find tractable results, we consider some restricted instances, such as, strict valuation of TAs for courses, the difference between the number of positively valued TAs for a course and the capacity, the number of positively valued TAs/courses, types of valuation functions, and obtained some polynomial-time solvable cases, showing the contrast with intractable results. We further studied the problem in the paradigm of parameterized algorithms and designed some exact and approximation algorithms.
Cite as

Pallavi Jain, Palash Jha, and Shubham Solanki. Fairness and Efficiency in Two-Sided Matching Markets. In 45th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 360, pp. 38:1-38:17, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{jain_et_al:LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2025.38,
  author =	{Jain, Pallavi and Jha, Palash and Solanki, Shubham},
  title =	{{Fairness and Efficiency in Two-Sided Matching Markets}},
  booktitle =	{45th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2025)},
  pages =	{38:1--38:17},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-406-2},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{360},
  editor =	{Aiswarya, C. and Mehta, Ruta and Roy, Subhajit},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2025.38},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-251186},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2025.38},
  annote =	{Keywords: Fair Matching, Envy-Freeness, Efficiency}
}
Document
Track A: Algorithms, Complexity and Games
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2025.117
Incremental Approximate Single-Source Shortest Paths with Predictions

Authors: Samuel McCauley, Benjamin Moseley, Aidin Niaparast, Helia Niaparast, and Shikha Singh

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 334, 52nd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2025)

Abstract
The algorithms-with-predictions framework has been used extensively to develop online algorithms with improved beyond-worst-case competitive ratios. Recently, there is growing interest in leveraging predictions for designing data structures with improved beyond-worst-case running times. In this paper, we study the fundamental data structure problem of maintaining approximate shortest paths in incremental graphs in the algorithms-with-predictions model. Given a sequence σ of edges that are inserted one at a time, the goal is to maintain approximate shortest paths from the source to each vertex in the graph at each time step. Before any edges arrive, the data structure is given a prediction of the online edge sequence σ̂ which is used to "warm start" its state. As our main result, we design a learned algorithm that maintains (1+ε)-approximate single-source shortest paths, which runs in Õ(m η log W/ε) time, where W is the weight of the heaviest edge and η is the prediction error. We show these techniques immediately extend to the all-pairs shortest-path setting as well. Our algorithms are consistent (performing nearly as fast as the offline algorithm) when predictions are nearly perfect, have a smooth degradation in performance with respect to the prediction error and, in the worst case, match the best offline algorithm up to logarithmic factors. That is, the algorithms are "ideal" in the algorithms-with-predictions model. As a building block, we study the offline incremental approximate single-source shortest-path (SSSP) problem. In the offline incremental SSSP problem, the edge sequence σ is known a priori and the goal is to construct a data structure that can efficiently return the length of the shortest paths in the intermediate graph G_t consisting of the first t edges, for all t. Note that the offline incremental problem is defined in the worst-case setting (without predictions) and is of independent interest.
Cite as

Samuel McCauley, Benjamin Moseley, Aidin Niaparast, Helia Niaparast, and Shikha Singh. Incremental Approximate Single-Source Shortest Paths with Predictions. In 52nd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 334, pp. 117:1-117:20, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{mccauley_et_al:LIPIcs.ICALP.2025.117,
  author =	{McCauley, Samuel and Moseley, Benjamin and Niaparast, Aidin and Niaparast, Helia and Singh, Shikha},
  title =	{{Incremental Approximate Single-Source Shortest Paths with Predictions}},
  booktitle =	{52nd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2025)},
  pages =	{117:1--117:20},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-372-0},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{334},
  editor =	{Censor-Hillel, Keren and Grandoni, Fabrizio and Ouaknine, Jo\"{e}l and Puppis, Gabriele},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2025.117},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-234946},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2025.117},
  annote =	{Keywords: Algorithms with Predictions, Shortest Paths, Approximation Algorithms, Dynamic Graph Algorithms}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2023.16
Online Learning and Bandits with Queried Hints

Authors: Aditya Bhaskara, Sreenivas Gollapudi, Sungjin Im, Kostas Kollias, and Kamesh Munagala

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 251, 14th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2023)

Abstract
We consider the classic online learning and stochastic multi-armed bandit (MAB) problems, when at each step, the online policy can probe and find out which of a small number (k) of choices has better reward (or loss) before making its choice. In this model, we derive algorithms whose regret bounds have exponentially better dependence on the time horizon compared to the classic regret bounds. In particular, we show that probing with k = 2 suffices to achieve time-independent regret bounds for online linear and convex optimization. The same number of probes improve the regret bound of stochastic MAB with independent arms from O(√{nT}) to O(n² log T), where n is the number of arms and T is the horizon length. For stochastic MAB, we also consider a stronger model where a probe reveals the reward values of the probed arms, and show that in this case, k = 3 probes suffice to achieve parameter-independent constant regret, O(n²). Such regret bounds cannot be achieved even with full feedback after the play, showcasing the power of limited "advice" via probing before making the play. We also present extensions to the setting where the hints can be imperfect, and to the case of stochastic MAB where the rewards of the arms can be correlated.
Cite as

Aditya Bhaskara, Sreenivas Gollapudi, Sungjin Im, Kostas Kollias, and Kamesh Munagala. Online Learning and Bandits with Queried Hints. In 14th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2023). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 251, pp. 16:1-16:24, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2023)

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@InProceedings{bhaskara_et_al:LIPIcs.ITCS.2023.16,
  author =	{Bhaskara, Aditya and Gollapudi, Sreenivas and Im, Sungjin and Kollias, Kostas and Munagala, Kamesh},
  title =	{{Online Learning and Bandits with Queried Hints}},
  booktitle =	{14th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2023)},
  pages =	{16:1--16:24},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-263-1},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2023},
  volume =	{251},
  editor =	{Tauman Kalai, Yael},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2023.16},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-175197},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2023.16},
  annote =	{Keywords: Online learning, multi-armed bandits, regret}
}
Document
APPROX
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.APPROX/RANDOM.2021.26
Revenue Maximization in Transportation Networks

Authors: Kshipra Bhawalkar, Kostas Kollias, and Manish Purohit

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 207, Approximation, Randomization, and Combinatorial Optimization. Algorithms and Techniques (APPROX/RANDOM 2021)

Abstract
We study the joint optimization problem of pricing trips in a transportation network and serving the induced demands by routing a fleet of available service vehicles to maximize revenue. Our framework encompasses applications that include traditional transportation networks (e.g., airplanes, buses) and their more modern counterparts (e.g., ride-sharing systems). We describe a simple combinatorial model, in which each edge in the network is endowed with a curve that gives the demand for traveling between its endpoints at any given price. We are supplied with a number of vehicles and a time budget to serve the demands induced by the prices that we set, seeking to maximize revenue. We first focus on a (preliminary) special case of our model with unit distances and unit time horizon. We show that this version of the problem can be solved optimally in polynomial time. Switching to the general case of our model, we first present a two-stage approach that separately optimizes for prices and routes, achieving a logarithmic approximation to revenue in the process. Next, using the insights gathered in the first two results, we present a constant factor approximation algorithm that jointly optimizes for prices and routes for the supply vehicles. Finally, we discuss how our algorithms can handle capacitated vehicles, impatient demands, and selfish (wage-maximizing) drivers.
Cite as

Kshipra Bhawalkar, Kostas Kollias, and Manish Purohit. Revenue Maximization in Transportation Networks. In Approximation, Randomization, and Combinatorial Optimization. Algorithms and Techniques (APPROX/RANDOM 2021). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 207, pp. 26:1-26:16, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2021)

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@InProceedings{bhawalkar_et_al:LIPIcs.APPROX/RANDOM.2021.26,
  author =	{Bhawalkar, Kshipra and Kollias, Kostas and Purohit, Manish},
  title =	{{Revenue Maximization in Transportation Networks}},
  booktitle =	{Approximation, Randomization, and Combinatorial Optimization. Algorithms and Techniques (APPROX/RANDOM 2021)},
  pages =	{26:1--26:16},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-207-5},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2021},
  volume =	{207},
  editor =	{Wootters, Mary and Sanit\`{a}, Laura},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.APPROX/RANDOM.2021.26},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-147197},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.APPROX/RANDOM.2021.26},
  annote =	{Keywords: Pricing, networks, approximation algorithms}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ESA.2017.43
Profit Sharing and Efficiency in Utility Games

Authors: Sreenivas Gollapudi, Kostas Kollias, Debmalya Panigrahi, and Venetia Pliatsika

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 87, 25th Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA 2017)

Abstract
We study utility games (Vetta, FOCS 2002) where a set of players join teams to produce social utility, and receive individual utility in the form of payments in return. These games have many natural applications in competitive settings such as labor markets, crowdsourcing, etc. The efficiency of such a game depends on the profit sharing mechanism - the rule that maps utility produced by the players to their individual payments. We study three natural and widely used profit sharing mechanisms - egalitarian or equal sharing, marginal gain or value addition when a player joins, and marginal loss or value depletion when a player leaves. For these settings, we give tight bounds on the price of anarchy, thereby allowing comparison between these popular mechanisms from a (worst case) social welfare perspective.
Cite as

Sreenivas Gollapudi, Kostas Kollias, Debmalya Panigrahi, and Venetia Pliatsika. Profit Sharing and Efficiency in Utility Games. In 25th Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA 2017). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 87, pp. 43:1-43:14, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2017)

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@InProceedings{gollapudi_et_al:LIPIcs.ESA.2017.43,
  author =	{Gollapudi, Sreenivas and Kollias, Kostas and Panigrahi, Debmalya and Pliatsika, Venetia},
  title =	{{Profit Sharing and Efficiency in Utility Games}},
  booktitle =	{25th Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA 2017)},
  pages =	{43:1--43:14},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-049-1},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2017},
  volume =	{87},
  editor =	{Pruhs, Kirk and Sohler, Christian},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ESA.2017.43},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-78329},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ESA.2017.43},
  annote =	{Keywords: Price of anarchy, submodular maximization, coverage functions}
}
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