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Amortized Analysis of Asynchronous Price Dynamics

Authors Yun Kuen Cheung , Richard Cole

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Author Details

Yun Kuen Cheung
  • Max Planck Institute for Informatics, Saarland Informatics Campus, Saarbrücken, Germany
Richard Cole
  • Courant Institute, NYU, New York, USA

Funding

  • Cheung, Yun Kuen: Part of the work done while this author was at the Courant Institute, NYU and at the Faculty of Computer Science, University of Vienna. He was supported in part by NSF Grant CCF-1217989, and the Vienna Science and Technology Fund (WWTF) project ICT10-002. Additionally the research leading to these results has received funding from the European Research Council under the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) / ERC Grant Agreement no. 340506.
  • Cole, Richard: This work was supported in part by NSF grant CCF-1527568.

Cite AsGet BibTex

Yun Kuen Cheung and Richard Cole. Amortized Analysis of Asynchronous Price Dynamics. In 26th Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA 2018). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 112, pp. 18:1-18:15, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2018)
https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.ESA.2018.18

Abstract

We extend a recently developed framework for analyzing asynchronous coordinate descent algorithms to show that an asynchronous version of tatonnement, a fundamental price dynamic widely studied in general equilibrium theory, converges toward a market equilibrium for Fisher markets with CES utilities or Leontief utilities, for which tatonnement is equivalent to coordinate descent.

Subject Classification

ACM Subject Classification
  • Theory of computation → Market equilibria
Keywords
  • Asynchronous Tatonnement
  • Fisher Market
  • Market Equilibrium
  • Amortized Analysis

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