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Documents authored by Altman, Alon

Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.10101.5
Nonmanipulable Selections from a Tournament

Authors: Alon Altman, Ariel D. Procaccia, and Moshe Tennenholtz

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 10101, Computational Foundations of Social Choice (2010)

Abstract
A tournament is a binary dominance relation on a set of alternatives. Tournaments arise in many contexts that are relevant to AI, most notably in voting (as a method to aggregate the preferences of agents). There are many works that deal with choice rules that select a desirable alternative from a tournament, but very few of them deal directly with incentive issues, despite the fact that game-theoretic considerations are crucial with respect to systems populated by selfish agents. We deal with the problem of the manipulation of choice rules by considering two types of manipulation. We say that a choice rule is emph{monotonic} if an alternative cannot get itself selected by losing on purpose, and emph{pairwise nonmanipulable} if a pair of alternatives cannot make one of them the winner by reversing the outcome of the match between them. Our main result is a combinatorial construction of a choice rule that is monotonic, pairwise nonmanipulable, and onto the set of alternatives, for any number of alternatives besides three.
Cite as

Alon Altman, Ariel D. Procaccia, and Moshe Tennenholtz. Nonmanipulable Selections from a Tournament. In Computational Foundations of Social Choice. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 10101, pp. 1-6, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2010)

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@InProceedings{altman_et_al:DagSemProc.10101.5,
  author =	{Altman, Alon and Procaccia, Ariel D. and Tennenholtz, Moshe},
  title =	{{Nonmanipulable Selections from a Tournament}},
  booktitle =	{Computational Foundations of Social Choice},
  pages =	{1--6},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2010},
  volume =	{10101},
  editor =	{Felix Brandt and Vincent Conitzer and Lane A. Hemaspaandra and Jean-Francois Laslier and William S. Zwicker},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.10101.5},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-25607},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.10101.5},
  annote =	{Keywords: Tournament, manipulation}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.3
An Axiomatic Approach to Personalized Ranking Systems

Authors: Alon Altman and Moshe Tennenholtz

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7271, Computational Social Systems and the Internet (2007)

Abstract
Personalized ranking systems and trust systems are an essential tool for collaboration in a multi-agent environment. In these systems, trust relations between many agents are aggregated to produce a personalized trust rating of the agents. In this paper we introduce the first extensive axiomatic study of this setting, and explore a wide array of well-known and new personalized ranking systems. We adapt several axioms (basic criteria) from the literature on global ranking systems to the context of personalized ranking systems, and fully classify the set of systems that satisfy all of these axioms. We further show that all these axioms are necessary for this result.
Cite as

Alon Altman and Moshe Tennenholtz. An Axiomatic Approach to Personalized Ranking Systems. In Computational Social Systems and the Internet. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7271, pp. 1-25, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)

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@InProceedings{altman_et_al:DagSemProc.07271.3,
  author =	{Altman, Alon and Tennenholtz, Moshe},
  title =	{{An Axiomatic Approach to Personalized Ranking Systems}},
  booktitle =	{Computational Social Systems and the Internet},
  pages =	{1--25},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{7271},
  editor =	{Peter Cramton and Rudolf M\"{u}ller and Eva Tardos and Moshe Tennenholtz},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.3},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-11527},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.3},
  annote =	{Keywords: Ranking systems, trust, axiomatization, incentives, mechanism design, game theory}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.05011.18
The PageRank Axioms

Authors: Alon Altman

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 5011, Computing and Markets (2005)

Abstract
This talk introduces the first graph-theoretic, ordinal representation theorem for the PageRank algorithm, bridging the gap between page ranking algorithms and the formal theory of social choice.
Cite as

Alon Altman. The PageRank Axioms. In Computing and Markets. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 5011, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2005)

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@InProceedings{altman:DagSemProc.05011.18,
  author =	{Altman, Alon},
  title =	{{The PageRank Axioms}},
  booktitle =	{Computing and Markets},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2005},
  volume =	{5011},
  editor =	{Daniel Lehmann and Rudolf M\"{u}ller and Tuomas Sandholm},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.05011.18},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-1972},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.05011.18},
  annote =	{Keywords: pagerank , social choice , ranking system}
}
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