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Documents authored by Avarikioti, Zeta

Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2024.11
Bribe & Fork: Cheap PCN Bribing Attacks via Forking Threat

Authors: Zeta Avarikioti, Paweł Kędzior, Tomasz Lizurej, and Tomasz Michalak

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 316, 6th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2024)

Abstract
In this work, we reexamine the vulnerability of Payment Channel Networks (PCNs) to bribing attacks, where an adversary incentivizes blockchain miners to deliberately ignore a specific transaction to undermine the punishment mechanism of PCNs. While previous studies have posited a prohibitive cost for such attacks, we show that this cost can be dramatically reduced (to approximately $125), thereby increasing the likelihood of these attacks. To this end, we introduce Bribe & Fork, a modified bribing attack that leverages the threat of a so-called feather fork which we analyze with a novel formal model for the mining game with forking. We empirically analyze historical data of some real-world blockchain implementations to evaluate the scale of this cost reduction. Our findings shed more light on the potential vulnerability of PCNs and highlight the need for robust solutions.
Cite as

Zeta Avarikioti, Paweł Kędzior, Tomasz Lizurej, and Tomasz Michalak. Bribe & Fork: Cheap PCN Bribing Attacks via Forking Threat. In 6th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2024). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 316, pp. 11:1-11:22, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2024)

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@InProceedings{avarikioti_et_al:LIPIcs.AFT.2024.11,
  author =	{Avarikioti, Zeta and K\k{e}dzior, Pawe{\l} and Lizurej, Tomasz and Michalak, Tomasz},
  title =	{{Bribe \& Fork: Cheap PCN Bribing Attacks via Forking Threat}},
  booktitle =	{6th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2024)},
  pages =	{11:1--11:22},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-345-4},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2024},
  volume =	{316},
  editor =	{B\"{o}hme, Rainer and Kiffer, Lucianna},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2024.11},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-209473},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2024.11},
  annote =	{Keywords: Blockchain, Payment Channels Networks, Timelock Bribing, Feather Forking}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2024.13
Musketeer: Incentive-Compatible Rebalancing for Payment Channel Networks

Authors: Zeta Avarikioti, Stefan Schmid, and Samarth Tiwari

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 316, 6th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2024)

Abstract
In this work, we revisit the severely limited throughput problem of cryptocurrencies and propose a novel rebalancing approach for Payment Channel Networks (PCNs). PCNs are a popular solution for increasing the blockchain throughput, however, their benefit depends on the overall users' liquidity. Rebalancing mechanisms are the state-of-the-art approach to maintaining high liquidity in PCNs. However, existing opt-in rebalancing mechanisms exclude users that may assist in rebalancing for small service fees, leading to suboptimal solutions and under-utilization of the PCNs' bounded liquidity. We introduce the first rebalancing approach for PCNs that includes all users, following a "all for one and one for all" design philosophy that yields optimal throughput. The proposed approach introduces a double-auction rebalancing problem, which we term Musketeer, where users can participate as buyers (paying fees to rebalance) or sellers (charging fees to route transactions). The desired properties tailored to the unique characteristics of PCNs are formally defined, including the novel game-theoretic property of cyclic budget balance that is a stronger variation of strong budget balance. Basic results derived from auction theory, including an impossibility and multiple mechanisms that either achieve all desiderata under a relaxed model or sacrifice one of the properties, are presented. We also propose a novel mechanism that leverages time delays as an additional cost to users. This mechanism is provably truthful, cyclic budget balanced, individually rational and economic efficient but only with respect to liquidity.
Cite as

Zeta Avarikioti, Stefan Schmid, and Samarth Tiwari. Musketeer: Incentive-Compatible Rebalancing for Payment Channel Networks. In 6th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2024). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 316, pp. 13:1-13:22, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2024)

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@InProceedings{avarikioti_et_al:LIPIcs.AFT.2024.13,
  author =	{Avarikioti, Zeta and Schmid, Stefan and Tiwari, Samarth},
  title =	{{Musketeer: Incentive-Compatible Rebalancing for Payment Channel Networks}},
  booktitle =	{6th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2024)},
  pages =	{13:1--13:22},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-345-4},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2024},
  volume =	{316},
  editor =	{B\"{o}hme, Rainer and Kiffer, Lucianna},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2024.13},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-209494},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2024.13},
  annote =	{Keywords: Blockchains, Payment Channel Networks, Rebalancing, Game Theory}
}
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