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Document
Tutorial
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.STACS.2015.19
Computational Social Choice (Tutorial)

Authors: Felix Brandt

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 30, 32nd International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS 2015)

Abstract
Over the past few years there has been a lively exchange of ideas between computer science, in particular theoretical computer science and artificial intelligence, on the one hand and economics, in particular game theory and social choice, on the other. This exchange goes in both directions and has produced active research areas such as algorithmic game theory and computational social choice. Social choice theory concerns the formal analysis and design of methods for aggregating possibly conflicting preferences such as in voting, assignment, or matching problems. Much of the work in classic social choice theory has focused on results concerning the formal possibility and impossibility of aggregation functions that combine desirable properties. This tutorial provided an overview of central results in social choice theory with a special focus on axiomatic characterizations as well as computational aspects. While some aggregation functions can be easily computed, others have been shown to be computationally intractable (e.g., NP-hard or #P-hard). Topics that were covered in this tutorial included (i) rational choice theory, (ii) Arrow's impossibility theorem, (iii) tournament solutions (such as the top cycle, the uncovered set, the Banks set, or the tournament equilibrium set), and (iv) randomized social choice functions. The overarching theme were escape routes from negative results such as Arrow's impossibility theorem.
Cite as

Felix Brandt. Computational Social Choice (Tutorial). In 32nd International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS 2015). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 30, p. 19, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2015)

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@InProceedings{brandt:LIPIcs.STACS.2015.19,
  author =	{Brandt, Felix},
  title =	{{Computational Social Choice}},
  booktitle =	{32nd International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS 2015)},
  pages =	{19--19},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-939897-78-1},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2015},
  volume =	{30},
  editor =	{Mayr, Ernst W. and Ollinger, Nicolas},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.STACS.2015.19},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-49593},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.STACS.2015.19},
  annote =	{Keywords: social choice theory, economics, algorithms, theory}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.10101.1
10101 Abstracts Collection – Computational Foundations of Social Choice

Authors: Felix Brandt, Vincent Conitzer, Lane A. Hemaspaandra, Jean-Francois Laslier, and William S. Zwicker

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 10101, Computational Foundations of Social Choice (2010)

Abstract
From March 7 to March 12, 2010, the Dagstuhl Seminar 10101 ``Computational Foundations of Social Choice '' was held in Schloss Dagstuhl~--~Leibniz Center for Informatics. During the seminar, several participants presented their current research, and ongoing work and open problems were discussed. Abstracts of the presentations given during the seminar as well as abstracts of seminar results and ideas are put together in this paper. The first section describes the seminar topics and goals in general. Links to extended abstracts or full papers are provided, if available.
Cite as

Felix Brandt, Vincent Conitzer, Lane A. Hemaspaandra, Jean-Francois Laslier, and William S. Zwicker. 10101 Abstracts Collection – Computational Foundations of Social Choice. In Computational Foundations of Social Choice. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 10101, pp. 1-18, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2010)

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@InProceedings{brandt_et_al:DagSemProc.10101.1,
  author =	{Brandt, Felix and Conitzer, Vincent and Hemaspaandra, Lane A. and Laslier, Jean-Francois and Zwicker, William S.},
  title =	{{10101 Abstracts Collection – Computational Foundations of Social Choice}},
  booktitle =	{Computational Foundations of Social Choice},
  pages =	{1--18},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2010},
  volume =	{10101},
  editor =	{Felix Brandt and Vincent Conitzer and Lane A. Hemaspaandra and Jean-Francois Laslier and William S. Zwicker},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.10101.1},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-25644},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.10101.1},
  annote =	{Keywords: Social Choice Theory, Voting, Fair Division, Algorithms, Computational Complexity, Multiagent Systems}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.10101.2
10101 Executive Summary – Computational Foundations of Social Choice

Authors: Felix Brandt, Vincent Conitzer, Lane A. Hemaspaandra, Jean-Francois Laslier, and William S. Zwicker

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 10101, Computational Foundations of Social Choice (2010)

Abstract
This seminar addressed some of the key issues in computational social choice, a novel interdisciplinary field of study at the interface of social choice theory and computer science. Computational social choice is concerned with the application of computational techniques to the study of social choice mechanisms, such as voting rules and fair division protocols, as well as with the integration of social choice paradigms into computing. The seminar brought together many of the most active researchers in the field and focussed the research community currently forming around these important and exciting topics.
Cite as

Felix Brandt, Vincent Conitzer, Lane A. Hemaspaandra, Jean-Francois Laslier, and William S. Zwicker. 10101 Executive Summary – Computational Foundations of Social Choice. In Computational Foundations of Social Choice. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 10101, pp. 1-2, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2010)

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@InProceedings{brandt_et_al:DagSemProc.10101.2,
  author =	{Brandt, Felix and Conitzer, Vincent and Hemaspaandra, Lane A. and Laslier, Jean-Francois and Zwicker, William S.},
  title =	{{10101 Executive Summary – Computational Foundations of Social Choice}},
  booktitle =	{Computational Foundations of Social Choice},
  pages =	{1--2},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2010},
  volume =	{10101},
  editor =	{Felix Brandt and Vincent Conitzer and Lane A. Hemaspaandra and Jean-Francois Laslier and William S. Zwicker},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.10101.2},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-25637},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.10101.2},
  annote =	{Keywords: Social Choice Theory, Voting, Fair Division, Algorithms, Computational Complexity, Multiagent Systems}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.STACS.2010.2448
On Iterated Dominance, Matrix Elimination, and Matched Paths

Authors: Felix Brandt, Felix Fischer, and Markus Holzer

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 5, 27th International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (2010)

Abstract
We study computational problems arising from the iterated removal of weakly dominated actions in anonymous games. Our main result shows that it is NP-complete to decide whether an anonymous game with three actions can be solved via iterated weak dominance. The two-action case can be reformulated as a natural elimination problem on a matrix, the complexity of which turns out to be surprisingly difficult to characterize and ultimately remains open. We however establish connections to a matching problem along paths in a directed graph, which is computationally hard in general but can also be used to identify tractable cases of matrix elimination. We finally identify different classes of anonymous games where iterated dominance is in P and NP-complete, respectively.
Cite as

Felix Brandt, Felix Fischer, and Markus Holzer. On Iterated Dominance, Matrix Elimination, and Matched Paths. In 27th International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science. Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 5, pp. 107-118, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2010)

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@InProceedings{brandt_et_al:LIPIcs.STACS.2010.2448,
  author =	{Brandt, Felix and Fischer, Felix and Holzer, Markus},
  title =	{{On Iterated Dominance, Matrix Elimination, and Matched Paths}},
  booktitle =	{27th International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science},
  pages =	{107--118},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-939897-16-3},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2010},
  volume =	{5},
  editor =	{Marion, Jean-Yves and Schwentick, Thomas},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.STACS.2010.2448},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-24485},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.STACS.2010.2448},
  annote =	{Keywords: Algorithmic Game Theory, Computational Complexity, Iterated Dominance, Matching}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.05011.17
Spiteful Bidding in Sealed-Bid Auctions

Authors: Felix Brandt, Tuomas Sandholm, and Yoav Shoham

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 5011, Computing and Markets (2005)

Abstract
We study the bidding behavior of spiteful agents who, contrary to the common assumption of self-interest, maximize the weighted difference of their own profit and their competitors' profit. This assumption is motivated by inherent spitefulness, or, for example, by competitive scenarios such as in closed markets where the loss of a competitor will likely result in future gains for oneself. We derive symmetric Bayes Nash equilibria for spiteful agents in first-price and second-price sealed-bid auctions. In first-price auctions, bidders become "more truthful" the more spiteful they are. Surprisingly, the equilibrium strategy in second-price auctions does not depend on the number of bidders. Based on these equilibria, we compare revenue in both auction types. It turns out that expected revenue in second-price auctions is higher than expected revenue in first-price auctions whenever agents have the slightest interest in reducing others' profit as long as they still care for their own profit. In other words, revenue equivalence only holds for auctions in which all agents are either self-interested or completely malicious.
Cite as

Felix Brandt, Tuomas Sandholm, and Yoav Shoham. Spiteful Bidding in Sealed-Bid Auctions. In Computing and Markets. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 5011, pp. 1-16, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2005)

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@InProceedings{brandt_et_al:DagSemProc.05011.17,
  author =	{Brandt, Felix and Sandholm, Tuomas and Shoham, Yoav},
  title =	{{Spiteful Bidding in Sealed-Bid Auctions}},
  booktitle =	{Computing and Markets},
  pages =	{1--16},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2005},
  volume =	{5011},
  editor =	{Daniel Lehmann and Rudolf M\"{u}ller and Tuomas Sandholm},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.05011.17},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-1987},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.05011.17},
  annote =	{Keywords: Auctions , Externalities , Spite , Revenue}
}
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