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Documents authored by Garay, Juan A.

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Garay, Juan A.

Document
Keynote
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2015.5
Blockchain-Based Consensus (Keynote)

Authors: Juan A. Garay

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 46, 19th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2015)

Abstract
Distributed consensus (aka Byzantine agreement [Pease, Shostak & Lamport, 1980]) is one of the fundamental problems in fault-tolerant distributed computing and cryptographic protocols. It requires correct participants (parties) to reach agreement on initially held values despite the arbitrary behavior of some of them, with the additional requirement (known as Validity) that if all the correct participants start off with the same value, then that must be the decision value. The problem has been studied extensively in both the unconditional setting (where no assumptions are made about the computational power of the adversary) and the cryptographic setting, and efficient (i.e., polynomial-time) solutions exist tolerating the optimal number of misbehaving parties and running in the optimal number of rounds, on networks with pairwise authenticated channels. In many interesting scenarios, however, such as "peer-to-peer" networks, where parties come and go as they please and there are no prior relations among them, such infrastructure (pairwise authenticated channels, public-key infrastructure) is unavailable, thus raising the question whether anything "interesting" can be achieved. In this talk we answer this question in the affirmative, presenting two new probabilistic consensus protocols based on "proofs of work" (POWs, aka "moderately hard functions," "cryptographic puzzles" [Dwork & Naor, 1992]), the technology underlying Bitcoin, the first and most popular decentralized cryptocurrency to date. (In Bitcoin, POWs are implemented using the SHA-256 cryptographic hash function, by finding preimages that produce values in a given smaller domain.) In more detail, we first extract and analyze the core of the Bitcoin protocol, which we term the Bitcoin backbone, and prove two fundamental properties of its "blockchain" approach which we call "common prefix" and "chain quality." The consensus protocols can then be built as applications on top of the backbone protocol, with the Agreement and Validity properties following from common prefix and chain quality, respectively. The first protocol works assuming the adversary's hashing power is bounded by 1/3 of the network's total hashing power. The second consensus protocol is more elaborate, relies on the notion of robust transaction ledgers, which capture the essence of Bitcoin's operation as a cryptocurrency, and works assuming the adversary's hashing power is strictly less than 1/2.
Cite as

Juan A. Garay. Blockchain-Based Consensus (Keynote). In 19th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2015). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 46, p. 5:1, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2016)

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@InProceedings{garay:LIPIcs.OPODIS.2015.5,
  author =	{Garay, Juan A.},
  title =	{{Blockchain-Based Consensus}},
  booktitle =	{19th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2015)},
  pages =	{5:1--5:1},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-939897-98-9},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2016},
  volume =	{46},
  editor =	{Anceaume, Emmanuelle and Cachin, Christian and Potop-Butucaru, Maria},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2015.5},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-65968},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2015.5},
  annote =	{Keywords: Distributed consensus, cryptocurrencies, cryptographic protocols}
}

Garay, Juan

Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ITC.2022.14
Universally Composable Almost-Everywhere Secure Computation

Authors: Nishanth Chandran, Pouyan Forghani, Juan Garay, Rafail Ostrovsky, Rutvik Patel, and Vassilis Zikas

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 230, 3rd Conference on Information-Theoretic Cryptography (ITC 2022)

Abstract
Most existing work on secure multi-party computation (MPC) ignores a key idiosyncrasy of modern communication networks, that there are a limited number of communication paths between any two nodes, many of which might even be corrupted. The problem becomes particularly acute in the information-theoretic setting, where the lack of trusted setups (and the cryptographic primitives they enable) makes communication over sparse networks more challenging. The work by Garay and Ostrovsky [EUROCRYPT'08] on almost-everywhere MPC (AE-MPC), introduced "best-possible security" properties for MPC over such incomplete networks, where necessarily some of the honest parties may be excluded from the computation. In this work, we provide a universally composable definition of almost-everywhere security, which allows us to automatically and accurately capture the guarantees of AE-MPC (as well as AE-communication, the analogous "best-possible security" version of secure communication) in the Universal Composability (UC) framework of Canetti. Our results offer the first simulation-based treatment of this important but under-investigated problem, along with the first simulation-based proof of AE-MPC. To achieve that goal, we state and prove a general composition theorem, which makes precise the level or "quality" of AE-security that is obtained when a protocol’s hybrids are replaced with almost-everywhere components.
Cite as

Nishanth Chandran, Pouyan Forghani, Juan Garay, Rafail Ostrovsky, Rutvik Patel, and Vassilis Zikas. Universally Composable Almost-Everywhere Secure Computation. In 3rd Conference on Information-Theoretic Cryptography (ITC 2022). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 230, pp. 14:1-14:25, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2022)

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@InProceedings{chandran_et_al:LIPIcs.ITC.2022.14,
  author =	{Chandran, Nishanth and Forghani, Pouyan and Garay, Juan and Ostrovsky, Rafail and Patel, Rutvik and Zikas, Vassilis},
  title =	{{Universally Composable Almost-Everywhere Secure Computation}},
  booktitle =	{3rd Conference on Information-Theoretic Cryptography (ITC 2022)},
  pages =	{14:1--14:25},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-238-9},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2022},
  volume =	{230},
  editor =	{Dachman-Soled, Dana},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITC.2022.14},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-164929},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ITC.2022.14},
  annote =	{Keywords: Secure multi-party computation, universal composability, almost-everywhere secure computation, sparse graphs, secure message transmission}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2017.37
Round-Preserving Parallel Composition of Probabilistic-Termination Cryptographic Protocols

Authors: Ran Cohen, Sandro Coretti, Juan Garay, and Vassilis Zikas

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 80, 44th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2017)

Abstract
An important benchmark for multi-party computation protocols (MPC) is their round complexity. For several important MPC tasks, (tight) lower bounds on the round complexity are known. However, for some of these tasks, such as broadcast, the lower bounds can be circumvented when the termination round of every party is not a priori known, and simultaneous termination is not guaranteed. Protocols with this property are called probabilistic-termination (PT) protocols. Running PT protocols in parallel affects the round complexity of the resulting protocol in somewhat unexpected ways. For instance, an execution of m protocols with constant expected round complexity might take O(log m) rounds to complete. In a seminal work, Ben-Or and El-Yaniv (Distributed Computing '03) developed a technique for parallel execution of arbitrarily many broadcast protocols, while preserving expected round complexity. More recently, Cohen et al. (CRYPTO '16) devised a framework for universal composition of PT protocols, and provided the first composable parallel-broadcast protocol with a simulation-based proof. These constructions crucially rely on the fact that broadcast is ``privacy free,'' and do not generalize to arbitrary protocols in a straightforward way. This raises the question of whether it is possible to execute arbitrary PT protocols in parallel, without increasing the round complexity. In this paper we tackle this question and provide both feasibility and infeasibility results. We construct a round-preserving protocol compiler, secure against a dishonest minority of actively corrupted parties, that compiles arbitrary protocols into a protocol realizing their parallel composition, while having a black-box access to the underlying protocols. Furthermore, we prove that the same cannot be achieved, using known techniques, given only black-box access to the functionalities realized by the protocols, unless merely security against semi-honest corruptions is required, for which case we provide a protocol.
Cite as

Ran Cohen, Sandro Coretti, Juan Garay, and Vassilis Zikas. Round-Preserving Parallel Composition of Probabilistic-Termination Cryptographic Protocols. In 44th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2017). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 80, pp. 37:1-37:15, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2017)

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@InProceedings{cohen_et_al:LIPIcs.ICALP.2017.37,
  author =	{Cohen, Ran and Coretti, Sandro and Garay, Juan and Zikas, Vassilis},
  title =	{{Round-Preserving Parallel Composition of Probabilistic-Termination Cryptographic Protocols}},
  booktitle =	{44th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2017)},
  pages =	{37:1--37:15},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-041-5},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2017},
  volume =	{80},
  editor =	{Chatzigiannakis, Ioannis and Indyk, Piotr and Kuhn, Fabian and Muscholl, Anca},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2017.37},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-74124},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2017.37},
  annote =	{Keywords: Cryptographic protocols, secure multi-party computation, broadcast.}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.08491.5
Sound and Fine-grain Specification of Ideal Functionalities

Authors: Juan Garay, Aggelos Kiayias, and Hong-Sheng Zhou

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 8491, Theoretical Foundations of Practical Information Security (2009)

Abstract
Nowadays it is widely accepted to formulate the security of a protocol carrying out a given task via the "trusted-party paradigm," where the protocol execution is compared with an ideal process where the outputs are computed by a trusted party that sees all the inputs. A protocol is said to securely carry out a given task if running the protocol with a realistic adversary amounts to "emulating" the ideal process with the appropriate trusted party. In the Universal Composability (UC) framework the program run by the trusted party is called an ideal functionality. While this simulation-based security formulation provides strong security guarantees, its usefulness is contingent on the properties and correct specification of the ideal functionality, which, as demonstrated in recent years by the coexistence of complex, multiple functionalities for the same task as well as by their "unstable" nature, does not seem to be an easy task. In this paper we address this problem, by introducing a general methodology for the sound specification of ideal functionalities. First, we introduce the class of canonical ideal functionalities for a cryptographic task, which unifies the syntactic specification of a large class of cryptographic tasks under the same basic template functionality. Furthermore, this representation enables the isolation of the individual properties of a cryptographic task as separate members of the corresponding class. By endowing the class of canonical functionalities with an algebraic structure we are able to combine basic functionalities to a single final canonical functionality for a given task. Effectively, this puts forth a bottom-up approach for the specification of ideal functionalities: first one defines a set of basic constituent functionalities for the task at hand, and then combines them into a single ideal functionality taking advantage of the algebraic structure. In our framework, the constituent functionalities of a task can be derived either directly or, following a translation strategy we introduce, from existing game-based definitions; such definitions have in many cases captured desired individual properties of cryptographic tasks, albeit in less adversarial settings than universal composition. Our translation methodology entails a sequence of steps that derive a corresponding canonical functionality given a game-based definition. In this way, we obtain a well-defined mapping of game-based security properties to their corresponding UC counterparts. Finally, we demonstrate the power of our approach by applying our methodology to a variety of basic cryptographic tasks, including commitments, digital signatures, zero-knowledge proofs, and oblivious transfer. While in some cases our derived canonical functionalities are equivalent to existing formulations, thus attesting to the validity of our approach, in others they differ, enabling us to "debug" previous definitions and pinpoint their shortcomings.
Cite as

Juan Garay, Aggelos Kiayias, and Hong-Sheng Zhou. Sound and Fine-grain Specification of Ideal Functionalities. In Theoretical Foundations of Practical Information Security. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 8491, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2009)

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@InProceedings{garay_et_al:DagSemProc.08491.5,
  author =	{Garay, Juan and Kiayias, Aggelos and Zhou, Hong-Sheng},
  title =	{{Sound and Fine-grain Specification of Ideal Functionalities}},
  booktitle =	{Theoretical Foundations of Practical Information Security},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2009},
  volume =	{8491},
  editor =	{Ran Canetti and Shafi Goldwasser and G\"{u}nter M\"{u}ller and Rainer Steinwandt},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.08491.5},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-18911},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.08491.5},
  annote =	{Keywords: Security definitions, universal composability, cryptographic protocols, lattices and partial orders.}
}
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