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Documents authored by Pigozzi, Gabriella

Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagRep.4.5.27
JA4AI – Judgment Aggregation for Artificial Intelligence (Dagstuhl Seminar 14202)

Authors: Franz Dietrich, Ulle Endriss, Davide Grossi, Gabriella Pigozzi, and Marija Slavkovik

Published in: Dagstuhl Reports, Volume 4, Issue 5 (2014)

Abstract
This report documents the programme and the outcomes of Dagstuhl Seminar 14202 on "Judgment Aggregation for Artificial Intelligence". Judgment aggregation is a new group decision-making theory that lies in the intersection of logic and social choice; it studies how to reach group decisions on several logically interconnected issues by aggregation of individual judgments. Until recently research in judgment aggregation was dominated by its originating context of philosophy, political science and law. Presently, however we are witnessing increasing work in judgment aggregation from researchers in computer science. Since researchers from such diverse disciplinary backgrounds working on judgment aggregation each publish within their own discipline with virtually no cross-discipline cooperation on concrete projects, it is essential that they are given an opportunity to connect to each other and become aware of the workings of the other side. This seminar has provided such an opportunity.
Cite as

Franz Dietrich, Ulle Endriss, Davide Grossi, Gabriella Pigozzi, and Marija Slavkovik. JA4AI – Judgment Aggregation for Artificial Intelligence (Dagstuhl Seminar 14202). In Dagstuhl Reports, Volume 4, Issue 5, pp. 27-39, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2014)

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@Article{dietrich_et_al:DagRep.4.5.27,
  author =	{Dietrich, Franz and Endriss, Ulle and Grossi, Davide and Pigozzi, Gabriella and Slavkovik, Marija},
  title =	{{JA4AI – Judgment Aggregation for Artificial Intelligence (Dagstuhl Seminar 14202)}},
  pages =	{27--39},
  journal =	{Dagstuhl Reports},
  ISSN =	{2192-5283},
  year =	{2014},
  volume =	{4},
  number =	{5},
  editor =	{Dietrich, Franz and Endriss, Ulle and Grossi, Davide and Pigozzi, Gabriella and Slavkovik, Marija},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagRep.4.5.27},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-46791},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagRep.4.5.27},
  annote =	{Keywords: Judgment Aggregation, Artificial Intelligence, Computational Social Choice, Collective Decision-making}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.09121.1
09121 Abstracts Collection – Normative Multi-Agent Systems

Authors: Guido Boella, Pablo Noriega, and Gabriella Pigozzi

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 9121, Normative Multi-Agent Systems (2009)

Abstract
From 15.03. to 20.03.2009, the Dagstuhl Seminar 09121 ``Normative Multi-Agent Systems '' was held in Schloss Dagstuhl~--~Leibniz Center for Informatics. During the seminar, several participants presented their current research, and ongoing work and open problems were discussed. Abstracts of the presentations given during the seminar as well as abstracts of seminar results and ideas are put together in this paper. The first section describes the seminar topics and goals in general.
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Guido Boella, Pablo Noriega, and Gabriella Pigozzi. 09121 Abstracts Collection – Normative Multi-Agent Systems. In Normative Multi-Agent Systems. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 9121, pp. 1-17, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2009)

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@InProceedings{boella_et_al:DagSemProc.09121.1,
  author =	{Boella, Guido and Noriega, Pablo and Pigozzi, Gabriella},
  title =	{{09121 Abstracts Collection – Normative Multi-Agent Systems}},
  booktitle =	{Normative Multi-Agent Systems},
  pages =	{1--17},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2009},
  volume =	{9121},
  editor =	{Guido Boella and Pablo Noriega and Gabriella Pigozzi and Harko Verhagen},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.09121.1},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-19229},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.09121.1},
  annote =	{Keywords: Similarity-based clustering and classification, metric adaptation and kernel design, learning on graphs, spatiotemporal data}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.09121.2
Normative Systems in Computer Science - Ten Guidelines for Normative Multiagent Systems

Authors: Guido Boella, Gabriella Pigozzi, and Leendert van der Torre

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 9121, Normative Multi-Agent Systems (2009)

Abstract
In this paper we introduce and discuss ten guidelines for the use of normative systems in computer science. We adopt a multiagent sys- tems perspective, because norms are used to coordinate, organize, guide, regulate or control interaction among distributed autonomous systems. The first six guidelines are derived from the computer science literature. From the so-called ‘normchange’ definition of the first workshop on nor- mative multiagent systems in 2005 we derive the guidelines to motivate which definition of normative multiagent system is used, to make explicit why norms are a kind of (soft) constraints deserving special analysis, and to explain why and how norms can be changed at runtime. From the so-called ‘mechanism design’ definition of the second workshop on nor- mative multiagent systems in 2007 we derive the guidelines to discuss the use and role of norms as a mechanism in a game-theoretic setting, clarify the role of norms in the multiagent system, and to relate the no- tion of “norm” to the legal, social, or moral literature. The remaining four guidelines follow from the philosophical literature: use norms also to resolve dilemmas, and in general to coordinate, organize, guide, regulate or control interaction among agents, distinguish norms from obligations, prohibitions and permissions, use the deontic paradoxes only to illustrate the normative multiagent system, and consider regulative norms in rela- tion to other kinds of norms and other social-cognitive computer science concepts.
Cite as

Guido Boella, Gabriella Pigozzi, and Leendert van der Torre. Normative Systems in Computer Science - Ten Guidelines for Normative Multiagent Systems. In Normative Multi-Agent Systems. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 9121, pp. 1-21, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2009)

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@InProceedings{boella_et_al:DagSemProc.09121.2,
  author =	{Boella, Guido and Pigozzi, Gabriella and van der Torre, Leendert},
  title =	{{Normative Systems in Computer Science - Ten Guidelines for Normative Multiagent Systems}},
  booktitle =	{Normative Multi-Agent Systems},
  pages =	{1--21},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2009},
  volume =	{9121},
  editor =	{Guido Boella and Pablo Noriega and Gabriella Pigozzi and Harko Verhagen},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.09121.2},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-19029},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.09121.2},
  annote =	{Keywords: Normative systems - Guidelines - Norms - Multiagent systems - Deontic logic}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.07351.8
Common Foundations for belief revision, belief merging and voting

Authors: Dov Gabbay, Gabriella Pigozzi, and Odinaldo Rodrigues

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7351, Formal Models of Belief Change in Rational Agents (2007)

Abstract
In this paper, we consider a number of different ways of reasoning about voting as a problem of conciliating contradictory interests. The mechanisms that do the reconciliation are belief revision and belief merging. By investigating the relationship between different voting strategies and their associated counterparts in revision theory, we find that whereas the counting mechanism of the voting process is more easily done at the meta-level in belief merging, it can be brought to the object level in base revision. In the former case, the counting can be tweaked according to the aggregation procedure used, whereas in base revision, we can only rely on the notion of minimal change and hence the syntactical representation of the voters' preferences plays a crucial part in the process. This highlights the similarities between the revision approaches on the one hand and voting on the other, but also opens up a number of interesting questions.
Cite as

Dov Gabbay, Gabriella Pigozzi, and Odinaldo Rodrigues. Common Foundations for belief revision, belief merging and voting. In Formal Models of Belief Change in Rational Agents. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7351, pp. 1-16, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)

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@InProceedings{gabbay_et_al:DagSemProc.07351.8,
  author =	{Gabbay, Dov and Pigozzi, Gabriella and Rodrigues, Odinaldo},
  title =	{{Common Foundations for belief revision, belief merging and voting}},
  booktitle =	{Formal Models of Belief Change in Rational Agents},
  pages =	{1--16},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{7351},
  editor =	{Giacomo Bonanno and James Delgrande and J\'{e}r\^{o}me Lang and Hans Rott},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.07351.8},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-12172},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.07351.8},
  annote =	{Keywords: Belief revision, belief merging, voting, social choice theory}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.07351.16
Premise Independence in Judgment Aggregation

Authors: Gabriella Pigozzi and Leendert van der Torre

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7351, Formal Models of Belief Change in Rational Agents (2007)

Abstract
Judgment aggregation studies how agent opinions on logically interconnected propositions can be mapped into a collective judgment on the same propositions, and is plagued by impossibility results. In this paper we study the central notion of independence in these impossibility results. First, we argue that the distinction between the premises and conclusions play an important role in the benchmark examples of judgment aggregation. Second, we consider the notion of independence in judgment aggregation frameworks, and we observe that the distinction between premises and conclusion is not taken into account. Third, based on our analysis, we introduce independence assumptions that distinguish premises from conclusion. We show that, by introducing new operators that satisfy our independence assumptions, the problematic impossibility results no longer hold.
Cite as

Gabriella Pigozzi and Leendert van der Torre. Premise Independence in Judgment Aggregation. In Formal Models of Belief Change in Rational Agents. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7351, pp. 1-8, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)

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@InProceedings{pigozzi_et_al:DagSemProc.07351.16,
  author =	{Pigozzi, Gabriella and van der Torre, Leendert},
  title =	{{Premise Independence in Judgment Aggregation}},
  booktitle =	{Formal Models of Belief Change in Rational Agents},
  pages =	{1--8},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{7351},
  editor =	{Giacomo Bonanno and James Delgrande and J\'{e}r\^{o}me Lang and Hans Rott},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.07351.16},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-12161},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.07351.16},
  annote =	{Keywords: Judgment aggregation, social choice theory}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.07122.9
Choosing Your Beliefs

Authors: Guido Boella, Célia da Costa Pereira, Gabriella Pigozzi, Andrea Tettamanzi, and Leendert van der Torre

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7122, Normative Multi-agent Systems (2007)

Abstract
This paper presents and discusses a novel approach to indeterministic belief revision. An indeterministic belief revision operator assumes that, when an agent is confronted with a new piece of information, it can revise its belief sets in more than one way. We define a rational agent not only in terms of what it believes but also of what it desires and wants to achieve. Hence, we propose that the agent's goals play a role in the choice of (possibly) one of the several available revision options. Properties of the new belief revision mechanism are also investigated.
Cite as

Guido Boella, Célia da Costa Pereira, Gabriella Pigozzi, Andrea Tettamanzi, and Leendert van der Torre. Choosing Your Beliefs. In Normative Multi-agent Systems. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7122, pp. 1-18, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)

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@InProceedings{boella_et_al:DagSemProc.07122.9,
  author =	{Boella, Guido and da Costa Pereira, C\'{e}lia and Pigozzi, Gabriella and Tettamanzi, Andrea and van der Torre, Leendert},
  title =	{{Choosing Your Beliefs}},
  booktitle =	{Normative Multi-agent Systems},
  pages =	{1--18},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{7122},
  editor =	{Guido Boella and Leon van der Torre and Harko Verhagen},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.07122.9},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-9386},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.07122.9},
  annote =	{Keywords: Rational agents, indeterministic belief revision, qualitative decision theory}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.07122.28
Ten Philosophical Problems in Deontic Logic

Authors: Jörg Hansen, Gabriella Pigozzi, and Leendert van der Torre

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7122, Normative Multi-agent Systems (2007)

Abstract
The paper discusses ten philosophical problems in deontic logic: how to formally represent norms, when a set of norms may be termed `coherent', how to deal with normative conflicts, how contrary-to-duty obligations can be appropriately modeled, how dyadic deontic operators may be redefined to relate to sets of norms instead of preference relations between possible worlds, how various concepts of permission can be accommodated, how meaning postulates and counts-as conditionals can be taken into account, and how sets of norms may be revised and merged. The problems are discussed from the viewpoint of input/output logic as developed by van der Torre Makinson. We argue that norms, not ideality, should take the central position in deontic semantics, and that a semantics that represents norms, as input/output logic does, provides helpful tools for analyzing, clarifying and solving the problems of deontic logic.
Cite as

Jörg Hansen, Gabriella Pigozzi, and Leendert van der Torre. Ten Philosophical Problems in Deontic Logic. In Normative Multi-agent Systems. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7122, pp. 1-26, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)

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@InProceedings{hansen_et_al:DagSemProc.07122.28,
  author =	{Hansen, J\"{o}rg and Pigozzi, Gabriella and van der Torre, Leendert},
  title =	{{Ten Philosophical Problems in Deontic Logic}},
  booktitle =	{Normative Multi-agent Systems},
  pages =	{1--26},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{7122},
  editor =	{Guido Boella and Leon van der Torre and Harko Verhagen},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.07122.28},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-9413},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.07122.28},
  annote =	{Keywords: Deontic logic, normative systems, input/output logic}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.05321.8
Belief merging, judgment aggregation and some links with social choice theory

Authors: Daniel Eckert and Gabriella Pigozzi

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 5321, Belief Change in Rational Agents: Perspectives from Artificial Intelligence, Philosophy, and Economics (2005)

Abstract
In this paper we explore the relation between three areas: judgment aggregation, belief merging and social choice theory. Judgment aggregation studies how to aggregate individual judgments on logically interconnected propositions into a collective decision on the same propositions. When majority voting is applied to some propositions (the premises) it may however give a different outcome than majority voting applied to another set of propositions (the conclusion). Starting from this so-called doctrinal paradox, the paper surveys the literature on judgment aggregation (and its relation to preference aggregation), and shows that the application of a well known belief merging operator can dissolve the paradox. Finally, the use of distances is shown to establish a link between belief merging and preference aggregation in social choice theory.
Cite as

Daniel Eckert and Gabriella Pigozzi. Belief merging, judgment aggregation and some links with social choice theory. In Belief Change in Rational Agents: Perspectives from Artificial Intelligence, Philosophy, and Economics. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 5321, pp. 1-14, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2005)

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@InProceedings{eckert_et_al:DagSemProc.05321.8,
  author =	{Eckert, Daniel and Pigozzi, Gabriella},
  title =	{{Belief merging, judgment aggregation and some links with social choice theory}},
  booktitle =	{Belief Change in Rational Agents: Perspectives from Artificial Intelligence, Philosophy, and Economics},
  pages =	{1--14},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2005},
  volume =	{5321},
  editor =	{James Delgrande and Jerome Lang and Hans Rott and Jean-Marc Tallon},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.05321.8},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-3330},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.05321.8},
  annote =	{Keywords: Judgment aggregation, belief merging, preference aggregation, social choice theory}
}
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