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Documents authored by Protzenko, Jonathan

Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagRep.13.3.1
Foundations of WebAssembly (Dagstuhl Seminar 23101)

Authors: Karthikeyan Bhargavan, Jonathan Protzenko, Andreas Rossberg, and Deian Stefan

Published in: Dagstuhl Reports, Volume 13, Issue 3 (2023)

Abstract
WebAssembly (Wasm) is a new portable code format with a formal semantics whose popularity has been growing fast, as a platform for new application domains, as a target for compilers and languages, and as a subject of research into its semantics, its performance, and its use in building verified and secure systems. This Dagstuhl Seminar brought together leading academics and industry representatives currently involved in the design, implementation and formal study of Wasm, to exchange ideas around topics such as formal methods for, verified compilation to, and verified implementation of Wasm.
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Karthikeyan Bhargavan, Jonathan Protzenko, Andreas Rossberg, and Deian Stefan. Foundations of WebAssembly (Dagstuhl Seminar 23101). In Dagstuhl Reports, Volume 13, Issue 3, pp. 1-16, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2023)

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@Article{bhargavan_et_al:DagRep.13.3.1,
  author =	{Bhargavan, Karthikeyan and Protzenko, Jonathan and Rossberg, Andreas and Stefan, Deian},
  title =	{{Foundations of WebAssembly (Dagstuhl Seminar 23101)}},
  pages =	{1--16},
  journal =	{Dagstuhl Reports},
  ISSN =	{2192-5283},
  year =	{2023},
  volume =	{13},
  number =	{3},
  editor =	{Bhargavan, Karthikeyan and Protzenko, Jonathan and Rossberg, Andreas and Stefan, Deian},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagRep.13.3.1},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-192255},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagRep.13.3.1},
  annote =	{Keywords: Compilation, Formal methods, Programming languages, Verification, Virtual machines, WebAssembly}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.SNAPL.2017.1
Everest: Towards a Verified, Drop-in Replacement of HTTPS

Authors: Karthikeyan Bhargavan, Barry Bond, Antoine Delignat-Lavaud, Cédric Fournet, Chris Hawblitzel, Catalin Hritcu, Samin Ishtiaq, Markulf Kohlweiss, Rustan Leino, Jay Lorch, Kenji Maillard, Jianyang Pan, Bryan Parno, Jonathan Protzenko, Tahina Ramananandro, Ashay Rane, Aseem Rastogi, Nikhil Swamy, Laure Thompson, Peng Wang, Santiago Zanella-Béguelin, and Jean-Karim Zinzindohoué

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 71, 2nd Summit on Advances in Programming Languages (SNAPL 2017)

Abstract
The HTTPS ecosystem is the foundation on which Internet security is built. At the heart of this ecosystem is the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol, which in turn uses the X.509 public-key infrastructure and numerous cryptographic constructions and algorithms. Unfortunately, this ecosystem is extremely brittle, with headline-grabbing attacks and emergency patches many times a year. We describe our ongoing efforts in Everest (The Everest VERified End-to-end Secure Transport) a project that aims to build and deploy a verified version of TLS and other components of HTTPS, replacing the current infrastructure with proven, secure software. Aiming both at full verification and usability, we conduct high-level code-based, game-playing proofs of security on cryptographic implementations that yield efficient, deployable code, at the level of C and assembly. Concretely, we use F*, a dependently typed language for programming, meta-programming, and proving at a high level, while relying on low-level DSLs embedded within F* for programming low-level components when necessary for performance and, sometimes, side-channel resistance. To compose the pieces, we compile all our code to source-like C and assembly, suitable for deployment and integration with existing code bases, as well as audit by independent security experts. Our main results so far include (1) the design of Low*, a subset of F* designed for C-like imperative programming but with high-level verification support, and KreMLin, a compiler that extracts Low* programs to C; (2) an implementation of the TLS-1.3 record layer in Low*, together with a proof of its concrete cryptographic security; (3) Vale, a new DSL for verified assembly language, and several optimized cryptographic primitives proven functionally correct and side-channel resistant. In an early deployment, all our verified software is integrated and deployed within libcurl, a widely used library of networking protocols.
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Karthikeyan Bhargavan, Barry Bond, Antoine Delignat-Lavaud, Cédric Fournet, Chris Hawblitzel, Catalin Hritcu, Samin Ishtiaq, Markulf Kohlweiss, Rustan Leino, Jay Lorch, Kenji Maillard, Jianyang Pan, Bryan Parno, Jonathan Protzenko, Tahina Ramananandro, Ashay Rane, Aseem Rastogi, Nikhil Swamy, Laure Thompson, Peng Wang, Santiago Zanella-Béguelin, and Jean-Karim Zinzindohoué. Everest: Towards a Verified, Drop-in Replacement of HTTPS. In 2nd Summit on Advances in Programming Languages (SNAPL 2017). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 71, pp. 1:1-1:12, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2017)

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@InProceedings{bhargavan_et_al:LIPIcs.SNAPL.2017.1,
  author =	{Bhargavan, Karthikeyan and Bond, Barry and Delignat-Lavaud, Antoine and Fournet, C\'{e}dric and Hawblitzel, Chris and Hritcu, Catalin and Ishtiaq, Samin and Kohlweiss, Markulf and Leino, Rustan and Lorch, Jay and Maillard, Kenji and Pan, Jianyang and Parno, Bryan and Protzenko, Jonathan and Ramananandro, Tahina and Rane, Ashay and Rastogi, Aseem and Swamy, Nikhil and Thompson, Laure and Wang, Peng and Zanella-B\'{e}guelin, Santiago and Zinzindohou\'{e}, Jean-Karim},
  title =	{{Everest: Towards a Verified, Drop-in Replacement of HTTPS}},
  booktitle =	{2nd Summit on Advances in Programming Languages (SNAPL 2017)},
  pages =	{1:1--1:12},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-032-3},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2017},
  volume =	{71},
  editor =	{Lerner, Benjamin S. and Bod{\'\i}k, Rastislav and Krishnamurthi, Shriram},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.SNAPL.2017.1},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-71196},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.SNAPL.2017.1},
  annote =	{Keywords: Security, Cryptography, Verification, TLS}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ECOOP.2015.568
Global Sequence Protocol: A Robust Abstraction for Replicated Shared State

Authors: Sebastian Burckhardt, Daan Leijen, Jonathan Protzenko, and Manuel Fähndrich

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 37, 29th European Conference on Object-Oriented Programming (ECOOP 2015)

Abstract
In the age of cloud-connected mobile devices, users want responsive apps that read and write shared data everywhere, at all times, even if network connections are slow or unavailable. The solution is to replicate data and propagate updates asynchronously. Unfortunately, such mechanisms are notoriously difficult to understand, explain, and implement. To address these challenges, we present GSP (global sequence protocol), an operational model for replicated shared data. GSP is simple and abstract enough to serve as a mental reference model, and offers fine control over the asynchronous update propagation (update transactions, strong synchronization). It abstracts the data model and thus applies both to simple key-value stores, and complex structured data. We then show how to implement GSP robustly on a client-server architecture (masking silent client crashes, server crash-recovery failures, and arbitrary network failures) and efficiently (transmitting and storing minimal information by reducing update sequences).
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Sebastian Burckhardt, Daan Leijen, Jonathan Protzenko, and Manuel Fähndrich. Global Sequence Protocol: A Robust Abstraction for Replicated Shared State. In 29th European Conference on Object-Oriented Programming (ECOOP 2015). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 37, pp. 568-590, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2015)

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@InProceedings{burckhardt_et_al:LIPIcs.ECOOP.2015.568,
  author =	{Burckhardt, Sebastian and Leijen, Daan and Protzenko, Jonathan and F\"{a}hndrich, Manuel},
  title =	{{Global Sequence Protocol: A Robust Abstraction for Replicated Shared State}},
  booktitle =	{29th European Conference on Object-Oriented Programming (ECOOP 2015)},
  pages =	{568--590},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-939897-86-6},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2015},
  volume =	{37},
  editor =	{Boyland, John Tang},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ECOOP.2015.568},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-52385},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ECOOP.2015.568},
  annote =	{Keywords: distributed computing, eventual consistency, GSP protocol}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.SNAPL.2015.221
A Few Lessons from the Mezzo Project

Authors: Francois Pottier and Jonathan Protzenko

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 32, 1st Summit on Advances in Programming Languages (SNAPL 2015)

Abstract
With Mezzo, we set out to design a new, better programming language. In this modest document, we recount our adventure: what worked, and what did not; the decisions that appear in hindsight to have been good, and the design mistakes that cost us; the things that we are happy with in the end, and the frustrating aspects we wish we had handled better.
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Francois Pottier and Jonathan Protzenko. A Few Lessons from the Mezzo Project. In 1st Summit on Advances in Programming Languages (SNAPL 2015). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 32, pp. 221-237, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2015)

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@InProceedings{pottier_et_al:LIPIcs.SNAPL.2015.221,
  author =	{Pottier, Francois and Protzenko, Jonathan},
  title =	{{A Few Lessons from the Mezzo Project}},
  booktitle =	{1st Summit on Advances in Programming Languages (SNAPL 2015)},
  pages =	{221--237},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-939897-80-4},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2015},
  volume =	{32},
  editor =	{Ball, Thomas and Bodík, Rastislav and Krishnamurthi, Shriram and Lerner, Benjamin S. and Morriset, Greg},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.SNAPL.2015.221},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-50281},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.SNAPL.2015.221},
  annote =	{Keywords: static type systems, side effects, aliasing, ownership}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/OASIcs.FSFMA.2013.68
Illustrating the Mezzo programming language

Authors: Jonathan Protzenko

Published in: OASIcs, Volume 31, 1st French Singaporean Workshop on Formal Methods and Applications (FSFMA 2013)

Abstract
When programmers want to prove strong program invariants, they are usually faced with a choice between using theorem provers and using traditional programming languages. The former requires them to provide program proofs, which, for many applications, is considered a heavy burden. The latter provides less guarantees and the programmer usually has to write run-time assertions to compensate for the lack of suitable invariants expressible in the type system. We introduce Mezzo, a programming language in the tradition of ML, in which the usual concept of a type is replaced by a more precise notion of a permission. Programs written in Mezzo usually enjoy stronger guarantees than programs written in pure ML. However, because Mezzo is based on a type system, the reasoning requires no user input. In this paper, we illustrate the key concepts of Mezzo, highlighting the static guarantees our language provides.
Cite as

Jonathan Protzenko. Illustrating the Mezzo programming language. In 1st French Singaporean Workshop on Formal Methods and Applications (FSFMA 2013). Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs), Volume 31, pp. 68-73, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2013)

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@InProceedings{protzenko:OASIcs.FSFMA.2013.68,
  author =	{Protzenko, Jonathan},
  title =	{{Illustrating the Mezzo programming language}},
  booktitle =	{1st French Singaporean Workshop on Formal Methods and Applications (FSFMA 2013)},
  pages =	{68--73},
  series =	{Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-939897-56-9},
  ISSN =	{2190-6807},
  year =	{2013},
  volume =	{31},
  editor =	{Choppy, Christine and Sun, Jun},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/OASIcs.FSFMA.2013.68},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-40905},
  doi =		{10.4230/OASIcs.FSFMA.2013.68},
  annote =	{Keywords: Type system, Language design, ML, Permissions}
}
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