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Documents authored by Schmand, Daniel

Document
Track A: Algorithms, Complexity and Games
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2024.48
Solving Woeginger’s Hiking Problem: Wonderful Partitions in Anonymous Hedonic Games

Authors: Andrei Constantinescu, Pascal Lenzner, Rebecca Reiffenhäuser, Daniel Schmand, and Giovanna Varricchio

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 297, 51st International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2024)

Abstract
A decade ago, Gerhard Woeginger posed an open problem that became well-known as "Woeginger’s Hiking Problem": Consider a group of n people that want to go hiking; everyone expresses preferences over the size of their hiking group in the form of an interval between 1 and n. Is it possible to efficiently assign the n people to a set of hiking subgroups so that every person approves the size of their assigned subgroup? The problem is also known as efficiently deciding if an instance of an anonymous Hedonic Game with interval approval preferences admits a wonderful partition. We resolve the open problem in the affirmative by presenting an O(n⁵) time algorithm for Woeginger’s Hiking Problem. Our solution is based on employing a dynamic programming approach for a specific rectangle stabbing problem from computational geometry. Moreover, we propose natural, more demanding extensions of the problem, e.g., maximizing the number of satisfied participants and variants with single-peaked preferences, and show that they are also efficiently solvable. Last but not least, we employ our solution to efficiently compute a partition that maximizes the egalitarian welfare for anonymous single-peaked Hedonic Games.
Cite as

Andrei Constantinescu, Pascal Lenzner, Rebecca Reiffenhäuser, Daniel Schmand, and Giovanna Varricchio. Solving Woeginger’s Hiking Problem: Wonderful Partitions in Anonymous Hedonic Games. In 51st International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2024). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 297, pp. 48:1-48:18, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2024)

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@InProceedings{constantinescu_et_al:LIPIcs.ICALP.2024.48,
  author =	{Constantinescu, Andrei and Lenzner, Pascal and Reiffenh\"{a}user, Rebecca and Schmand, Daniel and Varricchio, Giovanna},
  title =	{{Solving Woeginger’s Hiking Problem: Wonderful Partitions in Anonymous Hedonic Games}},
  booktitle =	{51st International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2024)},
  pages =	{48:1--48:18},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-322-5},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2024},
  volume =	{297},
  editor =	{Bringmann, Karl and Grohe, Martin and Puppis, Gabriele and Svensson, Ola},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2024.48},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-201910},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2024.48},
  annote =	{Keywords: Algorithmic Game Theory, Dynamic Programming, Anonymous Hedonic Games, Single-Peaked Preferences, Social Optimum, Wonderful Partitions}
}
Document
Track A: Algorithms, Complexity and Games
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2024.76
Solution Discovery via Reconfiguration for Problems in P

Authors: Mario Grobler, Stephanie Maaz, Nicole Megow, Amer E. Mouawad, Vijayaragunathan Ramamoorthi, Daniel Schmand, and Sebastian Siebertz

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 297, 51st International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2024)

Abstract
In the recently introduced framework of solution discovery via reconfiguration [Fellows et al., ECAI 2023], we are given an initial configuration of k tokens on a graph and the question is whether we can transform this configuration into a feasible solution (for some problem) via a bounded number b of small modification steps. In this work, we study solution discovery variants of polynomial-time solvable problems, namely Spanning Tree Discovery, Shortest Path Discovery, Matching Discovery, and Vertex/Edge Cut Discovery in the unrestricted token addition/removal model, the token jumping model, and the token sliding model. In the unrestricted token addition/removal model, we show that all four discovery variants remain in P. For the token jumping model we also prove containment in P, except for Vertex/Edge Cut Discovery, for which we prove NP-completeness. Finally, in the token sliding model, almost all considered problems become NP-complete, the exception being Spanning Tree Discovery, which remains polynomial-time solvable. We then study the parameterized complexity of the NP-complete problems and provide a full classification of tractability with respect to the parameters solution size (number of tokens) k and transformation budget (number of steps) b. Along the way, we observe strong connections between the solution discovery variants of our base problems and their (weighted) rainbow variants as well as their red-blue variants with cardinality constraints.
Cite as

Mario Grobler, Stephanie Maaz, Nicole Megow, Amer E. Mouawad, Vijayaragunathan Ramamoorthi, Daniel Schmand, and Sebastian Siebertz. Solution Discovery via Reconfiguration for Problems in P. In 51st International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2024). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 297, pp. 76:1-76:20, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2024)

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@InProceedings{grobler_et_al:LIPIcs.ICALP.2024.76,
  author =	{Grobler, Mario and Maaz, Stephanie and Megow, Nicole and Mouawad, Amer E. and Ramamoorthi, Vijayaragunathan and Schmand, Daniel and Siebertz, Sebastian},
  title =	{{Solution Discovery via Reconfiguration for Problems in P}},
  booktitle =	{51st International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2024)},
  pages =	{76:1--76:20},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-322-5},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2024},
  volume =	{297},
  editor =	{Bringmann, Karl and Grohe, Martin and Puppis, Gabriele and Svensson, Ola},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2024.76},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-202195},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2024.76},
  annote =	{Keywords: solution discovery, reconfiguration, spanning tree, shortest path, matching, cut}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2020.46
Strategic Payments in Financial Networks

Authors: Nils Bertschinger, Martin Hoefer, and Daniel Schmand

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 151, 11th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2020)

Abstract
In their seminal work on systemic risk in financial markets, Eisenberg and Noe [Larry Eisenberg and Thomas Noe, 2001] proposed and studied a model with n firms embedded into a network of debt relations. We analyze this model from a game-theoretic point of view. Every firm is a rational agent in a directed graph that has an incentive to allocate payments in order to clear as much of its debt as possible. Each edge is weighted and describes a liability between the firms. We consider several variants of the game that differ in the permissible payment strategies. We study the existence and computational complexity of pure Nash and strong equilibria, and we provide bounds on the (strong) prices of anarchy and stability for a natural notion of social welfare. Our results highlight the power of financial regulation - if payments of insolvent firms can be centrally assigned, a socially optimal strong equilibrium can be found in polynomial time. In contrast, worst-case strong equilibria can be a factor of Ω(n) away from optimal, and, in general, computing a best response is an NP-hard problem. For less permissible sets of strategies, we show that pure equilibria might not exist, and deciding their existence as well as computing them if they exist constitute NP-hard problems.
Cite as

Nils Bertschinger, Martin Hoefer, and Daniel Schmand. Strategic Payments in Financial Networks. In 11th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2020). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 151, pp. 46:1-46:16, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2020)

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@InProceedings{bertschinger_et_al:LIPIcs.ITCS.2020.46,
  author =	{Bertschinger, Nils and Hoefer, Martin and Schmand, Daniel},
  title =	{{Strategic Payments in Financial Networks}},
  booktitle =	{11th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2020)},
  pages =	{46:1--46:16},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-134-4},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2020},
  volume =	{151},
  editor =	{Vidick, Thomas},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2020.46},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-117316},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2020.46},
  annote =	{Keywords: Nash Equilibrium, Financial Network, Systemic Risk, Price of Anarchy, Equilibrium Computation}
}
Document
Track C: Foundations of Networks and Multi-Agent Systems: Models, Algorithms and Information Management
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2019.151
Network Investment Games with Wardrop Followers

Authors: Daniel Schmand, Marc Schröder, and Alexander Skopalik

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 132, 46th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2019)

Abstract
We study a two-sided network investment game consisting of two sets of players, called providers and users. The game is set in two stages. In the first stage, providers aim to maximize their profit by investing in bandwidth of cloud computing services. The investments of the providers yield a set of usable services for the users. In the second stage, each user wants to process a task and therefore selects a bundle of services so as to minimize the total processing time. We assume the total processing time to be separable over the chosen services and the processing time of each service to depend on the utilization of the service and the installed bandwidth. We provide insights on how competition between providers affects the total costs of the users and show that every game on a series-parallel graph can be reduced to an equivalent single edge game when analyzing the set of subgame perfect Nash equilibria.
Cite as

Daniel Schmand, Marc Schröder, and Alexander Skopalik. Network Investment Games with Wardrop Followers. In 46th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2019). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 132, pp. 151:1-151:14, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2019)

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@InProceedings{schmand_et_al:LIPIcs.ICALP.2019.151,
  author =	{Schmand, Daniel and Schr\"{o}der, Marc and Skopalik, Alexander},
  title =	{{Network Investment Games with Wardrop Followers}},
  booktitle =	{46th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2019)},
  pages =	{151:1--151:14},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-109-2},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2019},
  volume =	{132},
  editor =	{Baier, Christel and Chatzigiannakis, Ioannis and Flocchini, Paola and Leonardi, Stefano},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2019.151},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-107272},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2019.151},
  annote =	{Keywords: Network Investment Game, Wardrop Equilibrium, Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.MFCS.2016.49
Competitive Packet Routing with Priority Lists

Authors: Tobias Harks, Britta Peis, Daniel Schmand, and Laura Vargas Koch

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 58, 41st International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS 2016)

Abstract
In competitive packet routing games, packets are routed selfishly through a network and scheduling policies at edges determine which packages are forwarded first if there is not enough capacity on an edge to forward all packages at once. We analyze the impact of priority lists on the worst-case quality of pure Nash equilibria. A priority list is an ordered list of players that may or may not depend on the edge. Whenever the number of packets entering an edge exceeds the inflow capacity, packets are processed in list order. We derive several new bounds on the price of anarchy and stability for global and local priority policies. We also consider the question of the complexity of computing an optimal priority list. It turns out that even for very restricted cases, i.e., for routing on a tree, the computation of an optimal priority list is APX-hard.
Cite as

Tobias Harks, Britta Peis, Daniel Schmand, and Laura Vargas Koch. Competitive Packet Routing with Priority Lists. In 41st International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS 2016). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 58, pp. 49:1-49:14, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2016)

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@InProceedings{harks_et_al:LIPIcs.MFCS.2016.49,
  author =	{Harks, Tobias and Peis, Britta and Schmand, Daniel and Vargas Koch, Laura},
  title =	{{Competitive Packet Routing with Priority Lists}},
  booktitle =	{41st International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS 2016)},
  pages =	{49:1--49:14},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-016-3},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2016},
  volume =	{58},
  editor =	{Faliszewski, Piotr and Muscholl, Anca and Niedermeier, Rolf},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.MFCS.2016.49},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-64622},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.MFCS.2016.49},
  annote =	{Keywords: packet routing, Nash equilibrium, price of anarchy, priority policy, complexity}
}
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