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Documents authored by Völp, Marcus

Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ECRTS.2023.14
Consensual Resilient Control: Stateless Recovery of Stateful Controllers

Authors: Aleksandar Matovic, Rafal Graczyk, Federico Lucchetti, and Marcus Völp

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 262, 35th Euromicro Conference on Real-Time Systems (ECRTS 2023)

Abstract
Safety-critical systems have to absorb accidental and malicious faults to obtain high mean-times-to-failures (MTTFs). Traditionally, this is achieved through re-execution or replication. However, both techniques come with significant overheads, in particular when cold-start effects are considered. Such effects occur after replicas resume from checkpoints or from their initial state. This work aims at improving on the performance of control-task replication by leveraging an inherent stability of many plants to tolerate occasional control-task deadline misses and suggests masking faults just with a detection quorum. To make this possible, we have to eliminate cold-start effects to allow replicas to rejuvenate during each control cycle. We do so, by systematically turning stateful controllers into instants that can be recovered in a stateless manner. We highlight the mechanisms behind this transformation, how it achieves consensual resilient control, and demonstrate on the example of an inverted pendulum how accidental and maliciously-induced faults can be absorbed, even if control tasks run in less predictable environments.
Cite as

Aleksandar Matovic, Rafal Graczyk, Federico Lucchetti, and Marcus Völp. Consensual Resilient Control: Stateless Recovery of Stateful Controllers. In 35th Euromicro Conference on Real-Time Systems (ECRTS 2023). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 262, pp. 14:1-14:27, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2023)

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@InProceedings{matovic_et_al:LIPIcs.ECRTS.2023.14,
  author =	{Matovic, Aleksandar and Graczyk, Rafal and Lucchetti, Federico and V\"{o}lp, Marcus},
  title =	{{Consensual Resilient Control: Stateless Recovery of Stateful Controllers}},
  booktitle =	{35th Euromicro Conference on Real-Time Systems (ECRTS 2023)},
  pages =	{14:1--14:27},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-280-8},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2023},
  volume =	{262},
  editor =	{Papadopoulos, Alessandro V.},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ECRTS.2023.14},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-180430},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ECRTS.2023.14},
  annote =	{Keywords: resilience, control, replication}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LITES.7.1.1
Randomization as Mitigation of Directed Timing Inference Based Attacks on Time-Triggered Real-Time Systems with Task Replication

Authors: Kristin Krüger, Nils Vreman, Richard Pates, Martina Maggio, Marcus Völp, and Gerhard Fohler

Published in: LITES, Volume 7, Issue 1 (2021): Special Issue on Embedded System Security. Leibniz Transactions on Embedded Systems, Volume 7, Issue 1

Abstract
Time-triggered real-time systems achieve deterministic behavior using schedules that are constructed offline, based on scheduling constraints. Their deterministic behavior makes time-triggered systems suitable for usage in safety-critical environments, like avionics. However, this determinism also allows attackers to fine-tune attacks that can be carried out after studying the behavior of the system through side channels, targeting safety-critical victim tasks. Replication -- i.e., the execution of task variants across different cores -- is inherently able to tolerate both accidental and malicious faults (i.e. attacks) as long as these faults are independent of one another. Yet, targeted attacks on the timing behavior of tasks which utilize information gained about the system behavior violate the fault independence assumption fault tolerance is based on. This violation may give attackers the opportunity to compromise all replicas simultaneously, in particular if they can mount the attack from already compromised components. In this paper, we analyze vulnerabilities of time-triggered systems, focusing on safety-certified multicore real-time systems. We introduce two runtime mitigation strategies to withstand directed timing inference based attacks: (i) schedule randomization at slot level, and (ii) randomization within a set of offline constructed schedules. We evaluate these mitigation strategies with synthetic experiments and a real case study to show their effectiveness and practicality.
Cite as

Kristin Krüger, Nils Vreman, Richard Pates, Martina Maggio, Marcus Völp, and Gerhard Fohler. Randomization as Mitigation of Directed Timing Inference Based Attacks on Time-Triggered Real-Time Systems with Task Replication. In LITES, Volume 7, Issue 1 (2021): Special Issue on Embedded System Security. Leibniz Transactions on Embedded Systems, Volume 7, Issue 1, pp. 01:1-01:29, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2021)

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@Article{kruger_et_al:LITES.7.1.1,
  author =	{Kr\"{u}ger, Kristin and Vreman, Nils and Pates, Richard and Maggio, Martina and V\"{o}lp, Marcus and Fohler, Gerhard},
  title =	{{Randomization as Mitigation of Directed Timing Inference Based Attacks on Time-Triggered Real-Time Systems with Task Replication}},
  journal =	{Leibniz Transactions on Embedded Systems},
  pages =	{01:1--01:29},
  ISSN =	{2199-2002},
  year =	{2021},
  volume =	{7},
  number =	{1},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LITES.7.1.1},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-192847},
  doi =		{10.4230/LITES.7.1.1},
  annote =	{Keywords: real-time systems, time-triggered systems, security}
}
Document
Complete Volume
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ECRTS.2020
LIPIcs, Volume 165, ECRTS 2020, Complete Volume

Authors: Marcus Völp

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 165, 32nd Euromicro Conference on Real-Time Systems (ECRTS 2020)

Abstract
LIPIcs, Volume 165, ECRTS 2020, Complete Volume
Cite as

32nd Euromicro Conference on Real-Time Systems (ECRTS 2020). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 165, pp. 1-578, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2020)

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@Proceedings{volp:LIPIcs.ECRTS.2020,
  title =	{{LIPIcs, Volume 165, ECRTS 2020, Complete Volume}},
  booktitle =	{32nd Euromicro Conference on Real-Time Systems (ECRTS 2020)},
  pages =	{1--578},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-152-8},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2020},
  volume =	{165},
  editor =	{V\"{o}lp, Marcus},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ECRTS.2020},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-123626},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ECRTS.2020},
  annote =	{Keywords: LIPIcs, Volume 165, ECRTS 2020, Complete Volume}
}
Document
Front Matter
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ECRTS.2020.0
Front Matter, Table of Contents, Preface, Conference Organization

Authors: Marcus Völp

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 165, 32nd Euromicro Conference on Real-Time Systems (ECRTS 2020)

Abstract
Front Matter, Table of Contents, Preface, Conference Organization
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32nd Euromicro Conference on Real-Time Systems (ECRTS 2020). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 165, pp. 0:i-0:xiv, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2020)

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@InProceedings{volp:LIPIcs.ECRTS.2020.0,
  author =	{V\"{o}lp, Marcus},
  title =	{{Front Matter, Table of Contents, Preface, Conference Organization}},
  booktitle =	{32nd Euromicro Conference on Real-Time Systems (ECRTS 2020)},
  pages =	{0:i--0:xiv},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-152-8},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2020},
  volume =	{165},
  editor =	{V\"{o}lp, Marcus},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ECRTS.2020.0},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-123631},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ECRTS.2020.0},
  annote =	{Keywords: Front Matter, Table of Contents, Preface, Conference Organization}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/OASIcs.CERTS.2019.4
Sustainable Security & Safety: Challenges and Opportunities

Authors: Andrew Paverd, Marcus Völp, Ferdinand Brasser, Matthias Schunter, N. Asokan, Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi, Paulo Esteves-Veríssimo, Andreas Steininger, and Thorsten Holz

Published in: OASIcs, Volume 73, 4th International Workshop on Security and Dependability of Critical Embedded Real-Time Systems (CERTS 2019)

Abstract
A significant proportion of today’s information and communication technology (ICT) systems are entrusted with high value assets, and our modern society has become increasingly dependent on these systems operating safely and securely over their anticipated lifetimes. However, we observe a mismatch between the lifetimes expected from ICT-supported systems (such as autonomous cars) and the duration for which these systems are able to remain safe and secure, given the spectrum of threats they face. Whereas most systems today are constructed within the constraints of foreseeable technology advancements, we argue that long term, i.e., sustainable security & safety, requires anticipating the unforeseeable and preparing systems for threats not known today. In this paper, we set out our vision for sustainable security & safety. We summarize the main challenges in realizing this desideratum in real-world systems, and we identify several design principles that could address these challenges and serve as building blocks for achieving this vision.
Cite as

Andrew Paverd, Marcus Völp, Ferdinand Brasser, Matthias Schunter, N. Asokan, Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi, Paulo Esteves-Veríssimo, Andreas Steininger, and Thorsten Holz. Sustainable Security & Safety: Challenges and Opportunities. In 4th International Workshop on Security and Dependability of Critical Embedded Real-Time Systems (CERTS 2019). Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs), Volume 73, pp. 4:1-4:13, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2019)

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@InProceedings{paverd_et_al:OASIcs.CERTS.2019.4,
  author =	{Paverd, Andrew and V\"{o}lp, Marcus and Brasser, Ferdinand and Schunter, Matthias and Asokan, N. and Sadeghi, Ahmad-Reza and Esteves-Ver{\'\i}ssimo, Paulo and Steininger, Andreas and Holz, Thorsten},
  title =	{{Sustainable Security \& Safety: Challenges and Opportunities}},
  booktitle =	{4th International Workshop on Security and Dependability of Critical Embedded Real-Time Systems (CERTS 2019)},
  pages =	{4:1--4:13},
  series =	{Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-119-1},
  ISSN =	{2190-6807},
  year =	{2019},
  volume =	{73},
  editor =	{Asplund, Mikael and Paulitsch, Michael},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/OASIcs.CERTS.2019.4},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-108954},
  doi =		{10.4230/OASIcs.CERTS.2019.4},
  annote =	{Keywords: sustainability, security, safety}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ECRTS.2018.22
Vulnerability Analysis and Mitigation of Directed Timing Inference Based Attacks on Time-Triggered Systems

Authors: Kristin Krüger, Marcus Völp, and Gerhard Fohler

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 106, 30th Euromicro Conference on Real-Time Systems (ECRTS 2018)

Abstract
Much effort has been put into improving the predictability of real-time systems, especially in safety-critical environments, which provides designers with a rich set of methods and tools to attest safety in situations with no or a limited number of accidental faults. However, with increasing connectivity of real-time systems and a wide availability of increasingly sophisticated exploits, security and, in particular, the consequences of predictability on security become concerns of equal importance. Time-triggered scheduling with offline constructed tables provides determinism and simplifies timing inference, however, at the same time, time-triggered scheduling creates vulnerabilities by allowing attackers to target their attacks to specific, deterministically scheduled and possibly safety-critical tasks. In this paper, we analyze the severity of these vulnerabilities by assuming successful compromise of a subset of the tasks running in a real-time system and by investigating the attack potential that attackers gain from them. Moreover, we discuss two ways to mitigate direct attacks: slot-level online randomization of schedules, and offline schedule-diversification. We evaluate these mitigation strategies with a real-world case study to show their practicability for mitigating not only accidentally malicious behavior, but also malicious behavior triggered by attackers on purpose.
Cite as

Kristin Krüger, Marcus Völp, and Gerhard Fohler. Vulnerability Analysis and Mitigation of Directed Timing Inference Based Attacks on Time-Triggered Systems. In 30th Euromicro Conference on Real-Time Systems (ECRTS 2018). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 106, pp. 22:1-22:17, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2018)

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@InProceedings{kruger_et_al:LIPIcs.ECRTS.2018.22,
  author =	{Kr\"{u}ger, Kristin and V\"{o}lp, Marcus and Fohler, Gerhard},
  title =	{{Vulnerability Analysis and Mitigation of Directed Timing Inference Based Attacks on Time-Triggered Systems}},
  booktitle =	{30th Euromicro Conference on Real-Time Systems (ECRTS 2018)},
  pages =	{22:1--22:17},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-075-0},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2018},
  volume =	{106},
  editor =	{Altmeyer, Sebastian},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ECRTS.2018.22},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-89811},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ECRTS.2018.22},
  annote =	{Keywords: real-time systems, time-triggered systems, security, vulnerability}
}
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