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Documents authored by Yakoubov, Sophia


Document
Secure Communication in Dynamic Incomplete Networks

Authors: Ivan Damgård, Divya Ravi, Daniel Tschudi, and Sophia Yakoubov

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 267, 4th Conference on Information-Theoretic Cryptography (ITC 2023)


Abstract
In this paper, we explore the feasibility of reliable and private communication in dynamic networks, where in each round the adversary can choose which direct peer-to-peer links are available in the network graph, under the sole condition that the graph is k-connected at each round (for some k). We show that reliable communication is possible in such a dynamic network if and only if k > 2t. We also show that if k = cn > 2 t for a constant c, we can achieve reliable communication with polynomial round and communication complexity. For unconditionally private communication, we show that for a passive adversary, k > t is sufficient (and clearly necessary). For an active adversary, we show that k > 2t is sufficient for statistical security (and clearly necessary), while k > 3t is sufficient for perfect security. We conjecture that, in contrast to the static case, k > 2t is not enough for perfect security, and we give evidence that the conjecture is true. Once we have reliable and private communication between each pair of parties, we can emulate a complete network with secure channels, and we can use known protocols to do secure computation.

Cite as

Ivan Damgård, Divya Ravi, Daniel Tschudi, and Sophia Yakoubov. Secure Communication in Dynamic Incomplete Networks. In 4th Conference on Information-Theoretic Cryptography (ITC 2023). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 267, pp. 13:1-13:21, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2023)


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@InProceedings{damgard_et_al:LIPIcs.ITC.2023.13,
  author =	{Damg\r{a}rd, Ivan and Ravi, Divya and Tschudi, Daniel and Yakoubov, Sophia},
  title =	{{Secure Communication in Dynamic Incomplete Networks}},
  booktitle =	{4th Conference on Information-Theoretic Cryptography (ITC 2023)},
  pages =	{13:1--13:21},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-271-6},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2023},
  volume =	{267},
  editor =	{Chung, Kai-Min},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITC.2023.13},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-183419},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ITC.2023.13},
  annote =	{Keywords: Secure Communication, Dynamic Incomplete Network, Information-theoretic}
}
Document
Broadcast Secret-Sharing, Bounds and Applications

Authors: Ivan Bjerre Damgård, Kasper Green Larsen, and Sophia Yakoubov

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 199, 2nd Conference on Information-Theoretic Cryptography (ITC 2021)


Abstract
Consider a sender 𝒮 and a group of n recipients. 𝒮 holds a secret message 𝗆 of length l bits and the goal is to allow 𝒮 to create a secret sharing of 𝗆 with privacy threshold t among the recipients, by broadcasting a single message 𝖼 to the recipients. Our goal is to do this with information theoretic security in a model with a simple form of correlated randomness. Namely, for each subset 𝒜 of recipients of size q, 𝒮 may share a random key with all recipients in 𝒜. (The keys shared with different subsets 𝒜 must be independent.) We call this Broadcast Secret-Sharing (BSS) with parameters l, n, t and q. Our main question is: how large must 𝖼 be, as a function of the parameters? We show that (n-t)/q l is a lower bound, and we show an upper bound of ((n(t+1)/(q+t)) -t)l, matching the lower bound whenever t = 0, or when q = 1 or n-t. When q = n-t, the size of 𝖼 is exactly l which is clearly minimal. The protocol demonstrating the upper bound in this case requires 𝒮 to share a key with every subset of size n-t. We show that this overhead cannot be avoided when 𝖼 has minimal size. We also show that if access is additionally given to an idealized PRG, the lower bound on ciphertext size becomes (n-t)/q λ + l - negl(λ) (where λ is the length of the input to the PRG). The upper bound becomes ((n(t+1))/(q+t) -t)λ + l. BSS can be applied directly to secret-key threshold encryption. We can also consider a setting where the correlated randomness is generated using computationally secure and non-interactive key exchange, where we assume that each recipient has an (independently generated) public key for this purpose. In this model, any protocol for non-interactive secret sharing becomes an ad hoc threshold encryption (ATE) scheme, which is a threshold encryption scheme with no trusted setup beyond a PKI. Our upper bounds imply new ATE schemes, and our lower bound becomes a lower bound on the ciphertext size in any ATE scheme that uses a key exchange functionality and no other cryptographic primitives.

Cite as

Ivan Bjerre Damgård, Kasper Green Larsen, and Sophia Yakoubov. Broadcast Secret-Sharing, Bounds and Applications. In 2nd Conference on Information-Theoretic Cryptography (ITC 2021). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 199, pp. 10:1-10:20, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2021)


Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{damgard_et_al:LIPIcs.ITC.2021.10,
  author =	{Damg\r{a}rd, Ivan Bjerre and Larsen, Kasper Green and Yakoubov, Sophia},
  title =	{{Broadcast Secret-Sharing, Bounds and Applications}},
  booktitle =	{2nd Conference on Information-Theoretic Cryptography (ITC 2021)},
  pages =	{10:1--10:20},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-197-9},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2021},
  volume =	{199},
  editor =	{Tessaro, Stefano},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITC.2021.10},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-143299},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ITC.2021.10},
  annote =	{Keywords: Secret-Sharing, Ad-hoc Threshold Encryption}
}
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