3 Search Results for "Ben Dov, Yoav"

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DOI: 10.4230/TGDK.4.1.2
Temporal Modelling in Cultural Heritage Knowledge Graphs: Use Cases, Requirements, Evaluation, and Decision Support

Authors: Oleksandra Bruns, Jörg Waitelonis, Jeff Z. Pan, and Harald Sack

Published in: TGDK, Volume 4, Issue 1 (2026). Transactions on Graph Data and Knowledge, Volume 4, Issue 1

Abstract
Our culture, history and world are in constant motion, continuously shaped by the flow of time, evolving narratives, and shifting relationships. Capturing this temporal complexity within cultural heritage (CH) knowledge graphs is essential for preserving the dynamic nature of human heritage. However, standard RDF predicates fail to effectively model the temporal aspects of cultural data, such as changing facts, evolving relationships, and temporal concepts. Over the past two decades, a variety of RDF-based approaches have been proposed to address this limitation, yet guidance is missing on which method best suits specific CH contexts. This paper presents a systematic evaluation of temporal RDF modelling approaches from a CH perspective. Based on an analysis of real-world CH use cases, core temporal requirements are identified that reflect both modelling expressivity and practical concerns. Six prominent approaches - RDF*, tRDF, Named Graphs, Singleton Property, N-ary Relations, and 4D Fluents - are assessed across these requirements. Our findings reveal that no single solution fits all scenarios, but suitable approaches can be selected based on project-specific priorities. To support practitioners, a decision-support tool is introduced to guide them in selecting the most suitable extension for their specific needs. This work provides practical guidance for CH modelling and contributes to the broader development of temporally aware Linked Data.
Cite as

Oleksandra Bruns, Jörg Waitelonis, Jeff Z. Pan, and Harald Sack. Temporal Modelling in Cultural Heritage Knowledge Graphs: Use Cases, Requirements, Evaluation, and Decision Support. In Transactions on Graph Data and Knowledge (TGDK), Volume 4, Issue 1, pp. 2:1-2:46, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2026)

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@Article{bruns_et_al:TGDK.4.1.2,
  author =	{Bruns, Oleksandra and Waitelonis, J\"{o}rg and Pan, Jeff Z. and Sack, Harald},
  title =	{{Temporal Modelling in Cultural Heritage Knowledge Graphs: Use Cases, Requirements, Evaluation, and Decision Support}},
  journal =	{Transactions on Graph Data and Knowledge},
  pages =	{2:1--2:46},
  ISSN =	{2942-7517},
  year =	{2026},
  volume =	{4},
  number =	{1},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/TGDK.4.1.2},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-256871},
  doi =		{10.4230/TGDK.4.1.2},
  annote =	{Keywords: Temporal Data Representation, RDF Extensions, Cultural Heritage, Knowledge Graphs}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ITC.2024.3
Are Your Keys Protected? Time Will Tell

Authors: Yoav Ben Dov, Liron David, Moni Naor, and Elad Tzalik

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 304, 5th Conference on Information-Theoretic Cryptography (ITC 2024)

Abstract
Side channel attacks, and in particular timing attacks, are a fundamental obstacle to obtaining secure implementation of algorithms and cryptographic protocols, and have been widely researched for decades. While cryptographic definitions for the security of cryptographic systems have been well established for decades, none of these accepted definitions take into account the running time information leaked from executing the system. In this work, we give the foundation of new cryptographic definitions for cryptographic systems that take into account information about their leaked running time, focusing mainly on keyed functions such as signature and encryption schemes. Specifically, [(1)] 1) We define several cryptographic properties to express the claim that the timing information does not help an adversary to extract sensitive information, e.g. the key or the queries made. We highlight the definition of key-obliviousness, which means that an adversary cannot tell whether it received the timing of the queries with the actual key or the timing of the same queries with a random key. 2) We present a construction of key-oblivious pseudorandom permutations on a small or medium-sized domain. This construction is not "fixed-time," and at the same time is secure against any number of queries even in case the adversary knows the running time exactly. Our construction, which we call Janus Sometimes Recurse, is a variant of the "Sometimes Recurse" shuffle by Morris and Rogaway. 3) We suggest a new security notion for keyed functions, called noticeable security, and prove that cryptographic schemes that have noticeable security remain secure even when the exact timings are leaked, provided the implementation is key-oblivious. We show that our notion applies to cryptographic signatures, private key encryption and PRPs.
Cite as

Yoav Ben Dov, Liron David, Moni Naor, and Elad Tzalik. Are Your Keys Protected? Time Will Tell. In 5th Conference on Information-Theoretic Cryptography (ITC 2024). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 304, pp. 3:1-3:28, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2024)

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@InProceedings{bendov_et_al:LIPIcs.ITC.2024.3,
  author =	{Ben Dov, Yoav and David, Liron and Naor, Moni and Tzalik, Elad},
  title =	{{Are Your Keys Protected? Time Will Tell}},
  booktitle =	{5th Conference on Information-Theoretic Cryptography (ITC 2024)},
  pages =	{3:1--3:28},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-333-1},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2024},
  volume =	{304},
  editor =	{Aggarwal, Divesh},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITC.2024.3},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-205119},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ITC.2024.3},
  annote =	{Keywords: Side channel attacks, Timing attacks, Keyed functions, Key oblivious, Noticeable security}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.FORC.2023.11
Resistance to Timing Attacks for Sampling and Privacy Preserving Schemes

Authors: Yoav Ben Dov, Liron David, Moni Naor, and Elad Tzalik

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 256, 4th Symposium on Foundations of Responsible Computing (FORC 2023)

Abstract
Side channel attacks, and in particular timing attacks, are a fundamental obstacle for secure implementation of algorithms and cryptographic protocols. These attacks and countermeasures have been widely researched for decades. We offer a new perspective on resistance to timing attacks. We focus on sampling algorithms and their application to differential privacy. We define sampling algorithms that do not reveal information about the sampled output through their running time. More specifically: (1) We characterize the distributions that can be sampled from in a "time oblivious" way, meaning that the running time does not leak any information about the output. We provide an optimal algorithm in terms of randomness used to sample for these distributions. We give an example of an efficient randomized algorithm 𝒜 such that there is no subexponential algorithm with the same output as 𝒜 that does not reveal information on the output or the input, therefore we show leaking information on either the input or the output is unavoidable. (2) We consider the impact of timing attacks on (pure) differential privacy mechanisms. It turns out that if the range of the mechanism is unbounded, such as counting, then any time oblivious pure DP mechanism must give a useless output with constant probability (the constant is mechanism dependent) and must have infinite expected running time. We show that up to this limitations it is possible to transform any pure DP mechanism into a time oblivious one.
Cite as

Yoav Ben Dov, Liron David, Moni Naor, and Elad Tzalik. Resistance to Timing Attacks for Sampling and Privacy Preserving Schemes. In 4th Symposium on Foundations of Responsible Computing (FORC 2023). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 256, pp. 11:1-11:23, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2023)

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@InProceedings{bendov_et_al:LIPIcs.FORC.2023.11,
  author =	{Ben Dov, Yoav and David, Liron and Naor, Moni and Tzalik, Elad},
  title =	{{Resistance to Timing Attacks for Sampling and Privacy Preserving Schemes}},
  booktitle =	{4th Symposium on Foundations of Responsible Computing (FORC 2023)},
  pages =	{11:1--11:23},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-272-3},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2023},
  volume =	{256},
  editor =	{Talwar, Kunal},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.FORC.2023.11},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-179329},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.FORC.2023.11},
  annote =	{Keywords: Differential Privacy}
}
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